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Abstract  
 
Post-conflict army reconstruction is an important element of security sector reform 
(SSR), tracing its origins to at least 1980, before the SSR concept itself was 
formulated. Reconstruction of security forces is an important element in wider post-
conflict reconstruction, and for political reasons, an army has almost always deemed 
necessary. 
Since 1998, SSR itself has been increasingly conceptualized, with principles for SSR 
having been laid down by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) since 2004.  Yet SSR faces a host of philosophical and 
practical problems, perhaps the greatest being the gap between theory and practice 
(Chanaa's 'conceptual-contextual divide'). To make SSR efforts more successful, the 
underlying principles need to be revised and amended.  Post-conflict army 
reconstruction experience since 1980, and associated academic study, military 
doctrine, and work by international organizations (particularly the OECD) can 
provide a basis for such revision. This thesis aims to survey post-conflict army 
reconstruction activities since 1980, draw overall lessons from that review and field 
study in Liberia, and propose amendments to the SSR principles on that basis. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
When the colonial powers withdrew from their former possessions in the 1950s and 
1960s, the developing polities they left were almost invariably much weaker than the 
imperial homelands. Efforts to achieve development were hampered by lack of 
security provision, among many other factors. The monopoly of violence, the critical 
attribute of the modern state, was incomplete at best, and, beyond the capital cities, 
often left in the hands of chiefs and community leaders.1 Yet because of agreements 
to respect what was incomplete sovereignty, notably the Organization of African 
Unity’s 1964 Cairo decision to accept existing African colonial boundaries, and the 
freezing effect that Cold War alignments imposed upon interstate relations, world 
powers treated the new developing countries as states formally equal to their own.2  
 
In the early 1990s the increasing prominence of internal conflicts with international 
implications prompted a rise in efforts to halt such wars. Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Somalia, and Rwanda became perhaps the most widely known examples. To ensure 
that the peace created by such interventions can make long-lasting development 
possible, it was and is vital that security be maintained. Physical security is required 
to allow development work to take place. Africa and Asia continue to be torn by 
internal conflicts, many eventually attended by the presence of international 
intervention forces.3 While they are in place, they often effectively act as the 
country’s defence force as well as dampening internal conflicts.4 International 
interventions only usually last for a few years (eg. the UN Mission in Somalia, with 
the current UN Congo mission being a rare exception).5 
                                                 
1
  Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People? : 
Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), 9. 
2
  J.N.C. Hill, "Challenging the Failed State Thesis: IMF and World Bank Intervention and the 
Algerian Civil War," Civil Wars 11, no. 1 (2009): 40-41. 
3
  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2009, (SIPRI, Oxford 
University Press), 2009, 71-72.  
4
  The clearest examples of intervention forces acting as exterior defence forces are in Kosovo 
against Serbia and in East Timor, with INTERFET poised against Indonesia. 
5
  Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, The quest for viable peace : 
international intervention and strategies for conflict transformation (Washington, D.C. Arlington, Va.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press ; Association of the United States Army, 2005), 38. 
 
  
 
 
Domestic political factors on the part of troop contributors, as well as UN reluctance 
to stay, dictate that intervention forces can only stay for a certain time. In any case, 
matching developed-state ideas on the appropriate reach of a state’s security apparatus 
with the contested reality of the developing world often means that as the intervention 
force withdraws, its task is almost always deemed incomplete. 
 
Mainstream developed-state ideas however sometimes need their assumptions 
challenged. Efforts to improve security provision can form part of the larger liberal 
peace project.  The liberal peace has five main components: democraticisation, the 
rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development.6 
Richmond argues that there is a weak consensus between the UN, major states and 
donors, agencies, and NGOs that all international intervention should incorporate key 
elements of the liberal peace.7 The liberal peace idea contains numerous positive 
elements, but these elements should not be put into practice without being aware of 
the direction, scope, and implications of the entire concept.  Perhaps even more 
important than this is the acknowledgement that intervention is an external, rather 
than homegrown, process. Therefore interveners may be more interested in their own 
aims rather than always being primarily focused on the well-being of the host state.  
 
Mainstream thinking on intervention in internal conflict deems the reestablishment of 
public order necessary to establish effective control of the means of violence.8 
Therefore, a transition of security responsibility to indigenous forces is considered 
necessary. Almost invariably it is deemed necessary to have both armed forces and 
policing organisations. While police forces, potentially including a gendarmerie or 
border guard, fulfill the main internal security requirement, armed forces are 
necessary to defeat external threats or sustained internal armed insurrection. 
 
However, armies in the developing world appear to face a diminishing level of threat 
from other states’ armed forces. An examination of major armed conflicts shows that 
                                                 
6
  Oliver P. Richmond, 'The problems of peace: understanding the liberal peace,' Conflict, 
Security and Development, 6:3 (October 2006), 292. 
7
  Ibid. 
8
  Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars : Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1999), 10. 
  
 
few since 1990 are caused by one state confronting another. One of the exceptions, 
Ethiopia-Eritrea, has its origins in previous internal conflict within Ethiopia’s 
previous boundaries. While they retain their previous orientation towards defence of 
national borders, armed forces in the developing world today seem much more likely 
to be used within their nation’s boundaries. This is partially because the colonial 
system in Africa forged a state system with the utmost respect for boundaries. States 
are often weak, and only able to claim sovereignty over distant hinterlands because no 
other state can challenge their rule.9 State armed forces engage each other less 
because European colonial customary practice, reinforced by post-independence 
agreements, has meant that few states attempt to challenge another’s territorial 
integrity by force. In many cases, armed forces are used against internal unrest or 
insurrection. This has external involvement in many cases. Examples include the 
Taliban, which span Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Forces démocratiques de libération 
du Rwanda (FDLR), whose leadership opposes the current Rwandan government 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth ‘the Congo’), and invasions 
of exiles, such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
Whether threats are internal or external, armed state land forces – armies - are almost 
always required, as navies and air forces cannot effectively hold ground. Only a single 
post-conflict country, Haiti, elected to dissolve its armed forces completely, mirroring 
what might be identified as a Caribbean trend, following Costa Rica10 and Panama. 
Even in countries without formal armies, armed state land forces can evolve. The 
militarization of the Costa Rica Civil Guard is a good example.11  
 
The signing of the peace accord effectively initiates the post-conflict period. Ideally 
armed disturbances will taper off while political and practical space for development 
activities will grow. Reconstruction of an army is among these activities. However, it 
is again necessary here to emphasize the assumptions on which peace accords are 
                                                 
9
  Jeffrey Herbst (2000) quoted in Jonathan Di John, ‘Conceptualising the Causes and 
Consequences of Failed States,’ Crisis States Research Centre/LSE, January 2008, 30. 
10
  Donald E. Schulz, Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?, Parameters, Winter 1997-98, pp. 73-91, 
accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97winter/schulz.htm, November 26, 
2008. See also Eirin Mobekk, International Involvement in Restructuring and Creating Security Forces: 
The Case of Haiti, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 12, No.3, Autumn 2001. 
11
  Julio Montes, ‘The Costa Rican Defence Forces,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 
1994, 525. 
  
 
almost always founded. The liberal peace almost always underpins the motives of the 
external powers who often steer the substance of the peace accords.  The varying 
motivations of the powers involved thus need to be kept in mind. 
 
Partially because armed forces are seen as a symbol of statehood, an indigenous army 
is almost always recreated. There can be severe time pressure on the process because 
troop contributing states wish to bring their forces home.12 In most cases, the 
interveners and other partners wish to quickly supplant the multinational force with 
local assistance. Interim expedient organizations such as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps 
are sometimes created. To take over from these expedient arrangements, and in order 
to eventually take on defence responsibilities, efforts are usually begun almost 
immediately to rebuilding an armed state land force. A land force development 
programme often appears to be formulated without sufficient input from higher-level 
strategic guidance. The best elements of both international best practice and partner 
visions for national defence are sometimes not included. Indigenous national defence 
planning is not always informed by a sophisticated analysis of alternatives derived 
from consideration of threats and tasks.13 East Timor is a good example of this 
situation, where even the year’s delay in formulating an appropriate future for the East 
Timorese resistance army, Falintil, created severe resentment and the risk of unrest.14 
 
The armed forces’ reconstruction programme must be tailored to the security 
requirements of the strategic and regional environment faced by the new government. 
Len LeRoux, a former South African Air Force officer with experience of the South 
African transformation process, said that, ideally, these forces should be ‘adequate, 
affordable, appropriate, and accountable.’15 The author’s view is that the planning for 
armies in these contexts should be carefully considered over a long period, if at all 
possible. Beyond that, armies should concentrate on relatively simple procedures and 
                                                 
12
  Most evident in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also evident in INTERFET in East Timor. The 
United Kingdom only committed a single company group of Gurkhas for the initial phase; they were 
withdrawn shortly afterwards. http://www.gov-
news.org/gov/uk/news/british_troops_withdraw_from_east_timor/49512.html, accessed 20 May 2010.   
13
  International Crisis Group, Timor Leste: Security Sector Reform (International Crisis Group, 
Asia Report No. 143), January 17, 2008), 11. 
14
  Edward Rees, "Under Pressure: Falintil-Fdtl Three Decades of Defence Force Development 
in East Timor 1975-2004," (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
2004), 7. 
15
  Len le Roux, Challenges for Defence Planners in Africa: Ensuring Appropriate, Adequate, 
Accountable, and Affordable Armed Forces, African Security Review Vol. 15, No.4, December 2006. 
  
 
techniques, as well as light rather than heavy forces. Developed-country standard 
procedures are often overly complex to be inculcated in these contexts, due to 
inadequate educational systems. The less complex the equipment selected, the more 
likely it is to be sustainable over the long term.  
 
Immediately after the peace accords are signed, an interim period begins, where 
neither the new government nor, often, international stabilization forces, are fully in 
place.16 The various groups represented in the peace agreement often try to seize as 
much advantage as possible for themselves, setting off continual political interplay. 
This can spill over into armed confrontation. Informal security groupings, already 
present, continue to foster both security and insecurity in complex patterns. 
Meanwhile there are often pressing humanitarian concerns which take up the attention 
of key decision-makers. Amid this near-chaotic environment, alongside all the other 
governmental programmes which have to be formulated, is the new army and wider 
defence planning. Ideally this assessment and the resulting programme should take 
account of wider national security needs and be the result of a consultative process 
between the various stakeholders.17 It is best if the resulting programme is locally 
owned and will remain appropriate well into the future.  
However, often, this does not take place, because Western models, inculcated through 
programmes only a few months or years in duration, are worn away. Western patterns 
may simply not ‘take root’ sufficiently in a very different context. 
 
Security sector reform is one of the most important concepts that is often utilized to 
give coherence to such defence redevelopment programmes. The concept arose from 
the confluence of defence transformation priorities, particularly in Eastern Europe, 
with long-established development requirements which were being reassessed after 
                                                 
16
  For further discussion of this gap, see Mark Downes and Robert Muggah, ‘Buying Time: 
How Interim Stabilization can enhance Security Sector Reform in Post-war Settings,’ Future of 
Security Sector Reform Conference paper, May 2009, p.5. The OECD recognises an ‘inception phase’ 
involving many of the same issues; see OECD Handbook on SSR 2007, 24. 
17
  For a discussion of these issues, see Andrew Rathmell, Kevin O’Brien, Olga Oliker, and 
Susanna Bearne, ‘National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform,’ RAND 
Europe, June 2005, accessed at http://www.ssronline.org/edocs/tr-289-
ssdat%20national%20security%20decision-
making%20structures%20for%20security%20sector%20reform.pdf, 24 January 2009. 
  
 
the end of the Cold War.18 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU) all became gradually involved, in 
areas ranging from reorganization of defence establishments to demobilization and 
reintegration of former combatants. NATO and the EU were faced with the challenge 
of non-democratic control of the security sector in countries that were aspiring to 
membership. Meanwhile, the development community was seeking ways to reduce 
funds allocated to security expenditure. Continuing debates over civil-military 
relations and the proper place of a military in a democracy also increased interest in 
the proper place of armed forces in domestic politics. 
 
These three streams of thought were combined into what became known as security 
sector reform, a term first coined by Claire Short, UK Secretary of State for 
International Development. She introduced the term in a speech on May 13, 1998, to 
draw public attention to the need to comprehensively reform the security sector.19 
Efforts soon began to synthesize the concept and make it practically useful, work 
which has continued to the present day.  
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has played a 
significant part in systematizing the SSR concept and establishing guidelines for its 
use, often through its Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In 2004 the DAC 
promulgated SSR principles, which were reissued, with some changes, in the OECD 
DAC Handbook on SSR in 2007. These principles aimed to ensure that SSR was 
carried out in a consistent fashion that appropriately reflected international norms and 
was accepted by the OECD DAC members and other interested parties.  
 
They say that ‘…SSR should be:20 
• People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights 
principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear and 
measurable reductions in armed violence and crime. 
                                                 
18
  Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 344, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2002, 7-15. 
19
  Peacebuilding Initiative, Security Sector Reform and Governance: Definitions and 
Conceptual Issues, accessed at http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1793#_ftn15.   
20
  OECD Handbook on SSR, 2007, p.21-22 
  
 
• Seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security 
challenges facing states and their populations, through more integrated 
development and security policies and through greater civilian involvement and 
oversight  
• Founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based on a broad assessment 
of the range of security and justice needs of the people and the state. 
• Developed adhering to basic governance principles such as transparency and 
accountability 
• Implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the 
institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively 
and for justice to be delivered equitably.’ 
 
Each of these principles covers a number of distinct components. This complexity 
makes it difficult to assess the success of each clearly. Some are also peripheral to 
army reconstruction, as opposed to wider security sector reform. Therefore, to 
produce a clear list of assessable principles, they have been reordered as follows. 
 
SSR should be: 
• People-centred and locally owned 
• Based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law 
• A framework to address diverse security challenges, through a broad needs 
assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies  
• A practice promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement 
• Transparent and accountable 
• A practice that enhances institutional and human capacity. 
 
This more simplified formulation aims to preserve the meaning of the OECD 
principles while rendering them into assessable form. 
 
Since 1998, SSR, and the implementation of the OECD DAC SSR principles, has 
been hampered by what Chanaa called the 'conceptual-contextual divide.'21 This term 
represents the enormous gap between the ideals of security sectors in the North, well-
                                                 
21
  Chanaa, 2002, 61. 
  
 
funded by centuries of investment supported by rich economies, and the reality of 
security sectors in the South. In addition to a difference in resource levels of many 
orders of magnitude, there are enormous cultural differences, and the aims of senior 
national leaders may simply be different from those in the North. An effective and 
accountable security sector may not be such of a a high priority. 
 
Reflecting these challenges, attempts to reconstruct post-peace accord armies have 
been beset by a number of difficulties. These have included repeated missteps in the 
preparatory stage, a tendency to adopt Western procedures beyond their useful limits, 
inadequate consideration of overall national security issues, and difficult 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, which often face 
severe problems in the reintegration phase. Inadequate coordination with other 
security redevelopment programmes has also been a problem. These weaknesses both 
show and reflect the deficiencies of the current security sector reform principles. Post 
conflict army reconstruction can serve as a useful mirror to examine the level to 
which the OCED DAC principles cater for the current environment, and what changes 
might be usefully made to them. Improvements in the principles would then serve to 
improve the way SSR programmes both for armies and more generally are delivered. 
 
Research Question and Objectives 
Western and Soviet bloc armies gained extensive experience of army redevelopment 
during the Cold War. These activities were aimed at creating partner armies in 
strategic part of the world. The underlying function was to strengthen each political 
bloc’s strength, with lesser regard for the status of any particular country. This 
situation made it more acceptable to apply Western (and also Eastern) models, 
strategies, and doctrines in a literal and derivative fashion.22 In the West, the United 
States Army Special Forces followed their Foreign Internal Defense doctrine while 
assisting many states, while the British and French armies tended also to try to 
replicate themselves but not while following such a formalized doctrine. In the East 
the Soviet Army replicated itself in nearly identical fashion across Eastern Europe and 
sometimes beyond. 
 
                                                 
22
  Dr Rocky Williams, ‘African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform,’ 
JoSSM, March 2005, 6. 
  
 
As this pattern indicates, military advising and assistance has since its modern origins 
in the early 1800s been overwhelmingly a bilateral process.23 The advice given to the 
first of the recent army reconstruction efforts, in Zimbabwe from 1980, followed this 
pattern, as did the activities in Namibia from 1990, and South Africa from 1994. From 
1994 to 2010, however, methods began to diversify. In addition to new operations 
which retained the traditional bilateral framework, such as British assistance to Sierra 
Leone since 1999 and the United States’ Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorist Initiative 
(TSCTI) engagements across West and North Africa, multilateral, coalition 
framework, United Nations, and private contractor approaches have been applied, 
depending on the particular circumstances of the country concerned. However, despite 
the overtly different nature of each intervention, Anglo-American countries’ armies 
seem to have dominated the process repeatedly. 
 
The post-Cold War era, where the development and prosperity of individual states, as 
opposed to worldspanning power blocs, is the objective, means that much more 
attention has been paid to local views and concerns, spawning the ‘local ownership’ 
debate within Security Sector Reform. SSR principles were developed by the OECD 
DAC to guide the overall process of SSR as the concept gradually coalesced. Yet the 
experience of post-conflict army reconstruction appears to indicate that these 
principles might benefit from amendment. 
 
Each country’s situation and experience is different, requiring, to achieve the best 
results, a unique, tailored set of solutions. Ideally, local actors would design, develop, 
and then implement the entire programme. Yet roughly the same group of 
international interveners – the United States and British Armies, and former personnel 
of those armies, sometimes with their close allies the Canadian and Australian 
Armies, as well as a variety of U.S. private military contractors – travel to different 
countries repeatedly, carrying out the same type of army reconstruction mission.24 
                                                 
23
  Donald Stoker (ed.), ‘Military Advising and Assistance: From mercenaries to privatization, 
1815-2007,’ Routledge, London and New York, 2008, 1. 
24
  The U.S. and British Armies have been involved in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, South 
Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, and Southern Sudan. The Canadian Army has been 
involved in Sierra Leone. The Australian Army has been involved in East Timor. Contactors have been 
involved in Iraq and Liberia. 
  
 
This ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach risks mis-application of ideas appropriate to one 
theatre to another, dissimilar environment.25  
 
Army reconstruction activities have taken place at least eight times since 1993, in 
Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, 
the Congo, and Kosovo. Very similar cases took place during the Cold War, from 
1980 in Zimbabwe, and from 2005 in Southern Sudan. Closely related army 
reconstruction activities have occurred in Namibia from 1989-90, and in South Africa, 
from 1994. 
 
As discussed above, these programmes have faced multiple challenges adapting to the 
new post Cold War environment in which much more attention must be paid to local 
sensitivities. Yet army reconstruction programmes, however well attuned, have been 
ongoing for over ten years in the post-Cold War environment. Several donor-inspired 
and more fully locally-owned army reconstruction exercises are underway around the 
world currently, some named above, but others elsewhere such as in Uganda and 
Nigeria. Some, such as in the Congo and Afghanistan, are in the process of expansion. 
This lengthy series of engagements offers a rich experience base which can be drawn 
upon to provide course corrections for the OECD's current SSR principles.  
 
Thus the research question is: 
“Are the OECD DAC SSR principles relevant and practical for post-conflict army 
reconstruction?” 
 
 
The core argument of this thesis is that the current OECD DAC's SSR principles lack 
relevance, and need to be significantly modified in order to make them practical for 
future post-conflict army reconstruction programmes. 
 
The research objectives are: 
                                                 
25
  Ball and Hendrickson note that insufficiently considered assumptions increase the likelihood 
of such ‘one size fits all’ models being implemented. Ball and Hendrickson, 2005, 26. In UNMIL, the 
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1. To survey existing practice and guidelines which are relevant to understanding the 
reconstruction of land forces (examined in Chapters 2 and 3). This research identifies 
three key concepts which play a major role in post-conflict army reconstruction. 
2. To examine a wide range of army reconstruction interventions to analyze the effect 
of  three identified key concepts: political-economic factors, capability enhancement, 
and SSR principles (examined in Chapters 5) The SSR principles alone do not guide 
post-conflict army reconstruction, and to improve the SSR principles elements of 
these two other factors should be included. 
3. To empirically test these three key concepts in a single case study, Liberia 
(examined in Chapter 6) 
4. To assess the viability of currently available overall strategic guidance against both 
the wide range of army reconstruction issues covered and the single field case study 
(examined in Chapter 7) 
5. To identify other broad areas of knowledge that might be examined in future 
research (covered in Chapter 7) 
 
Scope 
As indicated in the first pages of this chapter, this thesis focuses on building effective 
and accountable armies after internal conflict. While all security forces have political 
importance, the principal challenges to accountable security forces in the developing 
world lie with armies. The history of civil-military relations and coups since 1960 
shows this. Simply put, air forces and navies usually pose much less of a danger to the 
political status quo of any given state. Much of the research this thesis will generate 
regarding armies will also be applicable to the reconstruction of naval and air forces. 
In addition, as indicated by the military focus of the introduction, this thesis examines 
only part of the  international intervention issue, that dealing with military issues. The 
civilian aspects of intervention are an important issue, but do not form part of the 
research problem this thesis seeks to address. This thesis also only examines a specific 
time period. The particular characteristics of post-conflict army reconstruction after 
an agreed peace accord only appear since 1980, with the reconstruction of the 
Zimbabwean National Army. Thus this thesis examines post-conflict army 
reconstruction from 1980 until 2010, with updates in some areas to 2011. 
 
 
  
 
Organization of the Dissertation  
Chapter 1, this introduction, outlines the background to the recent phase of army 
reconstruction since 1989. It reviews the trends that have affected armies in weak 
states since the end of the colonial period, their need to respond to predominantly 
internal threats, the fact that armed forces are usually retained in being, and the 
challenges of defining and implementing security sector reform. Thereafter the 
research question and objectives are discussed, to discern patterns and derive some 
generic guidance. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 review the relevant bodies of knowledge and analyses the SSR 
literature. This chapter surveys and analyses the existing SSR literature which is 
relevant to the topic, including the evolution of SSR and its critiques, and the 
guidance available for post-conflict army reconstruction. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the method used in the study. It elaborates on the methods used to 
carry out the research, the fieldwork’s execution and challenges, and analysis 
methods.  
A literature review was initiated in August 2008, to survey the existing writing on 
security sector reform. This review aimed to determine whether guidance on how to 
reconstruct post-conflict armies already existed. A series of research questions were 
then formulated, and examined, in a multiple case chapter, across a number of 
different cases to hone the concepts to be investigated. 
 
The field case study selected was Liberia. Liberia is the only country where, as of 
2010, private contractors have been given primary responsibility to execute the 
entirety of an army reconstruction programme. A range of methods are available to 
use in case studies, but given the complex nature and large number of variables 
present in the post-conflict environment that Liberia presents, it was deemed that a 
qualitative content analysis of data gathered was the most appropriate method.  
 
The primary methods used to gather the data during the fieldwork were interviews 
and the acquisition of relevant documents. The primary alternate methods considered 
and rejected were questionnaires and surveys, because the information required was 
held by key officials only. Analysis took the form of critically examining the content 
  
 
of the interviews and documents, and then building patterns from the evidence which 
then were matched against the initial theoretical proposition. 
 
Chapter 5, the case study chapter, explores what is known about the main points of 
inquiry in regard to other army reconstruction operations. Three main factors which 
affect all the cases are examined. First, the political and economic drivers that 
influenced the reconstruction of each army are analyzed. Second is the historical 
priority in army reconstruction, enhancement of institutional and human capacity. 
This includes the level to which programmes have been able to create a force suitable 
for the long-term, which might resonate with the requirements of a fully considered 
national security strategy, while also addressing immediate post-conflict needs. Third, 
the applicability of security sector reform principles is examined. The chapter 
examines fifteen cases. The cases are Zimbabwe from 1980, Namibia from 1990, 
Mozambique from 1993, South Africa from 1993, Timor from 1999, Kosovo from 
1999, Sierra Leone from 2001, Afghanistan from 2002, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Burundi, Iraq, and Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2003, Liberia from 2004, 
South Sudan from 2005, and Nepal from 2006. It should be clearly noted that the term 
'security sector reform' was not applied to the first four cases in Southern Africa; the 
concept had yet to be formulated. 
 
While of some interest, two other cases are excluded. Neither the integration of the 
National Volkesarmee in Germany from 1990 onwards is examined, as it is a 
developed world case, nor the creation of the South Korean Constabulary from 1945-
50, as it is not post-Cold War, and over fifty years ago. The Cold War context of army 
reconstruction in South Korea, directed at external defence rather than post-conflict 
stability, is too distant from today’s realities to draw useful lessons. The work 
therefore focuses on the creation of armies whose immediate priority is attaining 
operational capability to relieve an international intervention force. Tasks may include 
exterior defence, actions against internal rebellion, or humanitarian assistance and 
development work, but as explained above, tends to concentrate upon internal 
operations. The emphasis is upon developing lessons from experience since 1990 to 
apply to efforts underway, under consideration, or foreseeable in 2010. 
 
  
 
Chapter 6 is the field case study on the reconstruction of the land component of the 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The case study focuses on the early decision-making 
involving the recreation of the AFL, and the contractor-implemented phase from 2004 
to December 2009. Its purview stops after the transition in American support from the 
contractors to U.S. Department of Defense primacy in January 2010. This chapter 
analyses closely the relevant political-economic drivers, factors influencing capacity 
achieved, and the validity of the SSR principles, in the Liberia field case environment.    
 
Chapter 7 addresses the research question, summarizing the results of the research, 
that the SSR principles as currently utilized are not sufficiently relevant and practical 
for post-conflict army reconstruction. It also identifies and elaborates on areas where 
rewording of the SSR principles might improve their realistic application to post-
conflict situations. This chapter also notes potential areas for further research, 
including additional areas of knowledge that might shed light on the issue. 
 
Definitions 
In order to more precisely examine the topics in question, the key terms involved will 
be defined so that they are well understood when used throughout this dissertation. 
International intervention force refers to an international military force that has been 
given legal responsibility to establish or maintain security within a country, and has 
been successful in so doing. Almost invariably this is by a resolution of the United 
Nations Security Council. Excluded from this thesis are those international 
intervention forces only given responsibility for a portion of a state’s territory, with 
the rest of the territory excluded. Examples include the Interim Emergency 
Multinational Force or Operation ‘Artemis’ in the Congo and the Multi-National 
Force in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Also excluded are forces that did not achieve 
domination of the security space within a country. This prerequisite is required to 
allow security redevelopment efforts to effectively take place. Therefore, the United 
Nations Mission in Rwanda is excluded, and so thus is the reintegration of former 
enemy combatants into the Rwanda Patriotic Army. 
There are three cases that do not fulfill these requirements exactly, but have been 
included nonetheless. This is because they share the key characteristics of army 
reconstruction in a post conflict environment. In Zimbabwe, no international 
intervention force was deployed. However, an entirely new army had to be created 
  
 
from three previous forces. In addition, a Commonwealth Monitoring Force had been 
deployed to support the initial assembly of the guerillas. In South Africa, no 
international intervention force was deployed. However, again, formerly warring 
parties had to be combined into a new army. In South Sudan, the international force 
was only given responsibility for part of the state’s territory. However South Sudan 
was a well-defined area that had been the subject of UN Security Council resolutions 
aiming to resolve the threat to international peace and security being generated there. 
Army redevelopment refers to the process of conducting extensive restructuring, 
retraining, and/or reequipping an armed state land force, often to undertake a new set 
of tasks from its previous mission. An example would be the redevelopment of the 
South African Army in the mid 1990s. 
Army reconstruction is the process of establishing an armed state land force which has 
previously effectively been dissolved, or so decayed that it has effectively lost the 
characteristics which make it identifiable as a state institution. An example would be 
the reformation of the Falintil-FDTL as a state army from 2000-1 from its previous 
existence as a guerilla resistance movement. It takes place in permissive 
environments, where often a peacekeeping force has deployed, such as in 
Mozambique, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Timor, Kosovo, Southern Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe, 1980 onward, Namibia, 1989 onward, and in South Africa from 1994. It 
also takes place in non permissive environments, where the focus is on establishing 
security (periods in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Congo.) 
Post conflict refers to a period after an interstate war or internal armed conflict has 
been the subject of a peace accord between warring parties. A peace accord is almost 
always signed, and it is usually hoped that the most major outbreaks of violence will 
thereafter be restricted to civil unrest. It should be held in mind however that armed 
conflicts do often continue after accords have been signed, such as in the Congo after 
2003, the Sudan after 2005, and Afghanistan and Iraq,  
 
This thesis will explicitly use the term ‘army reconstruction’ as a term to indicate both 
army reconstruction and army redevelopment when referring to the general 
phenomenon. This is for brevity reasons. The single term will be used for both facets 
unless either specifically needs to be examined. The reason for the use of ‘army 
reconstruction’ is that of the fourteen cases identified, all involve the creation of a 
new institution, except in South Africa. Even in South Africa, while the army was not 
  
 
renamed, the overall defence force was, from the South African Defence Force to the 
South African National Defence Force. 
 
Significance of the Study 
Possession of the monopoly of violence is a key attribute of a modern state. In order 
to assure effective reconstruction as well as development of stricken states, an armed 
state land force must be reconstructed. As detailed above, though many such 
programmes have been carried out since 1980, they have encountered a variety of 
significant challenges. Since 1998 the concept of security sector reform, and later 
defined SSR principles, have been developed, which has subsumed some army 
reconstruction activity under its auspices. Yet the SSR principles suffer from the same 
weaknesses as SSR itself, the gap between policy and practice, or the 'conceptual-
contextual divide.' The SSR principles in their current form are not sufficiently 
practical and relevant. If SSR is to become more effective in the future, a more 
realistic and focused set of principles would be of value. Thus this study’s original 
contribution to the body of knowledge is the scrutiny of the experience of the past 
twenty years of army reconstruction in post-conflict environments so as to 
recommend amendments to the current OECD DAD SSR principles.  
 
Three other points should be noted. Firstly, since an investigation of the Egyptian 
Army of the 1830s, no doctoral work appears to have been undertaken which 
examines the initial creation of a land force. Secondly, no doctoral work appears to 
have been carried out on the Liberian armed forces since Harrison Akingbade’s 1977 
thesis, The Role of the Military in the History of Liberia 1822-1947. Thirdly, no 
academic investigation appears to have been conducted upon the creation of land 
forces in the post-conflict environments common to multinational interventions since 
1990.  
 
 
 
  
 
 Chapter 2: The SSR Literature 
Introduction  
 
Examining the experience of reconstructing post-conflict armies necessitates a critical 
examination of the relevant literature. This chapter will review the relevant security 
sector reform (SSR) literature, showing that directly applicable guidance is new and 
limited to military doctrinal manuals produced since 2007. Part of the reason for this 
lack of widely accepted frameworks is that the current wave of land force recreation 
dates only from 1990 with the integration of rival factions in Namibia. Much of the 
directly relevant discussion specifically on armies is confined to the practitioner 
literature.  
 
However the decision mechanics of creating, designing, and then implementing army 
reconstruction programmes have significant commonalities with development and 
more general SSR programmes. Post-conflict army reconstruction has a great deal to 
learn from the wider SSR literature. The SSR debate itself draws upon politics, 
development studies, history, management studies, and anthropology. From the 
1990s, academics have arguably developed a significant amount of theory and 
casework relevant to post-conflict armies. Recently prescriptive doctrine has been 
developed by both the United States and British Armies for the construction of 
security forces.26 However, it has been shown in Iraq that a purely military ‘force 
generation’ approach can leave a yawning gap between trained soldiers (or 
policemen) on the street and the relevant Ministers, without the bureaucratic 
infrastructure in between to make the whole institution effective.27 The situation in 
Iraq mirrors experiences elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan. Thus it is evident that 
non-military perspectives may have a significant contribution to make in terms of 
producing ‘appropriate, adequate, accountable, and affordable’28 security forces.  
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The literature review focuses solely on the multi-disciplinary contributions to the 
wider subject of security sector reform. An investigation of post-conflict army 
reconstruction could be academically situated in several different domains, but there 
are good reasons for focusing this thesis solely on SSR. Two domains dominate 
writing on post-conflict army reconstruction:  SSR and counter-insurgency. One could 
investigate the issue by reviewing the counter-insurgency literature, but counter-
insurgency at its heart is concerned with ways to win wars. SSR is focused on 
constructing or reconstructing the state, and incorporates the development literature in 
a much more intrinsic fashion. SSR has a longer-term time horizon; wars will end, 
and the military’s attention focus elsewhere, but states and their problems will remain. 
Their challenges will need continuing thought. Other domains, such as civil-military 
relations, and defence conversion, have been examined but do not dominate the 
literature. The state-building literature lacks enough emphasis on the role of security 
forces. Finally, military history will not be discussed as a separate issue because this 
thesis focuses on contemporary rather than primarily historical challenges.  
 
The literature review is broken into two major sections. This chapter examines 
security sector reform, starting with its definition. It then discusses the evolution of 
SSR and its linkages to the post-conflict redevelopment of armies. Here the non-
military perspectives that have relevance to army reconstruction are introduced. There 
are at least six significant issues that face SSR institution building currently. Some of 
these issues bear upon army reconstruction more closely than others. The six include: 
*the absence of, or severe weaknesses in, the state;  
*the difficulty of operationalizing the local ownership concept;  
*the difficulty of legal-bureaucratic institution building in neo-patrimonial societies; 
*the balance between building effectiveness and governance within security forces,  
*the value of wide consideration of, and formulation, of national security strategies;  
and the potential value of the new sub-discipline of security sector management. 
 
The second section of the literature review, presented in Chapter 3, discusses what 
existing conceptual guidance, both from wider SSR experience and purely military 
learning, have now been formulated which can guide army reconstruction in a post-
conflict context. These fall into three main categories: defence reform guidance, the 
experience of disarmament, demobilisation, and rein
  
 
combatants, and recent national military doctrine as developed from 2007. The gaps 
thus identified in the literature build to the conclusions, which chart the path this 
thesis will take. 
 
 The Evolution of SSR and its linkages to Post-
Conflict Army Reconstruction 
 
To explore issues of army redevelopment and reconstruction, it is important first to 
look at the overall framework of security sector reform as presently conceived. Army 
reconstruction will succeed or fail not just because of its own merits, but because of 
the influences of wider state and security building efforts. Such examination makes a 
more informed analysis of the army reconstruction process possible. The concept of 
SSR evolved in the 1990s from the convergence of developmental, defence reform 
and peacekeeping efforts. Theories of civil-military relations also played a role. 
Significant influences upon SSR’s development as a concept included the role of the 
United Nations and the ‘War on terror’ since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 
More recently, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has played a significant role in consolidating SSR thinking and practice 
through the compilation of the OECD Handbook on SSR. 
 Definition 
Defining security sector reform has been a subject of constant debate.29 Various 
analysts have explored the definition of the term and in the process deconstructed the 
term ‘security,’ ‘security sector,’ and the normative use of the term ‘reform,’ as well 
as the alternate term ‘security system reform,’ promoted by the OECD.30 Alternative 
terms used have included security and justice sector reform, rule of law, security 
sector transformation and security sector governance. Here however the term security 
sector reform will be used as it is most widely utilized. At least four separate 
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expanding definitions of what the security sector (or, pace the OECD, security 
system) meant were laid out by Hanggi in 2004.31 All included the security forces and 
their civilian management and oversight bodies. Widening the ambit, however, the 
broader definitions brought in judicial and law enforcement bodies, and successively 
non-statutory security forces – a debate with particular resonance in Africa32 – and 
non-statutory civil society groups. 
 
Some of the most widely accepted early definitions of security sector reform, such as 
those promulgated by the UK Department for International Development (DfID),33  
included both management and oversight bodies as well as the state military security 
providers themselves. While there has often been debate over what exactly the 
definition should include, the basic dual partnership of security forces and their 
oversight institutions has been relatively generally accepted,34 though some analysts 
argued otherwise up until about 2008.35 Thus for working purposes the 2007 OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Handbook definition will be used:  
 
‘Security system reform’ is another term used to describe the transformation of the 
‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and 
actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is 
more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, 
and this contributes to a well-functioning security framework.”36 
 
The OECD prefers the term ‘system’ rather than sector so as to refer to the whole 
system of actors working on security related issues. However, the 2007 Handbook 
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appears to be the de facto standard for the subject, whether the term system or sector 
is used.  
 
There are two important elements in the OECD definition. The first is democratic 
governance, which implies proper management and oversight. The second is a ‘well 
functioning security framework,’ which implies effectiveness. The OECD definition  
means that land forces need to have both proper management and oversight, and be 
effective in carrying out combat and stabilization functions. Superimposed over the 
land force, carrying out a supervisory role, must be a body or series of bodies which 
are able to provide ‘effective governance, oversight, and accountability’37 for all 
security organisations.  
 
A security sector might be capable of iterative, gradual, evolution to improve 
effectiveness, but still not reflect SSR norms. Democratic oversight is one of the 
critical differences between such a sector, relatively immune to checks and balances, 
and the democratically accountable and responsive sector that is the aim of reform. 
The OECD Handbook states that: ‘democratic accountability of the security and 
justice sectors is based on the principle of transparency, responsibility, participation, 
and responsiveness to citizens.’38 The handbook recognises six independent ‘pillars’ 
of oversight and control, being internal, executive, legislative, judicial, independent 
bodies such as Ombudsmen, and civil society. Each portion plays a unique function 
and adds a check upon the others. With internal controls often weak in post-conflict 
situations, international assistance has often achieved some strengthening of 
parliament and civil society oversight. However they often remain very weak in 
comparison to the executive, with, as Nathan points out,39 inadequate technical 
knowledge to hold ministries of defence, for example, to account.  
 Origins 
The SSR field itself originated from the confluence of developmental and 
intergovernmental (UN, EU, NATO) efforts to better consolidate peace in conflict-
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stricken areas since the end of the Cold War.40 The great powers’ military approach to 
security in the developing world also changed. There was no longer a requirement to 
reinforce sometimes weak regional surrogate states against states aligned with the 
other bloc. Instead there was the opportunity for a much more collaborative approach. 
The end of the Cold War allowed much more attention to be refocused on security not 
just in a strictly military sense, but as a part of the development conundrum.41  
The United Nations became slowly enmeshed in security reform issues as a result of 
the wider state-building mandates given to missions in the early 1990s.42 UNTAC in 
Cambodia, as well as experiences in Eastern Slavonia with UNTAES and in a slightly 
more limited fashion in Mozambique with ONUMOZ, aimed at implementing a 
comprehensive peace settlement that would address all the elements necessary to 
achieve a sustainable peace. Among the challenges these missions faced were 
disarming and demobilising former soldiers in preparation for their return to civilian 
life. Demobilisation efforts as part of these comprehensive peace settlements began to 
raise the need for more comprehensive, holistic, security sector thinking as it was 
found that there was no necessary correlation between reductions in force and budget 
levels and the success of economic developing in a post-conflict country.43 
 
Reform of EU and NATO candidate states’ defence and security sectors became a key 
condition of eventual membership and helped to cement the SSR agenda in Europe.44 
One of the elements of the ‘European model’ that candidate countries were required 
to adopt was the democratic control of the security sector. This was made easier to an 
extent by the fundamental restructuring of most countries’ defence establishments set 
off by the end of the Cold War. NATO emphasised that membership in and 
cooperation with the organisation would be contingent on the adoption of ‘shared 
values.’45 NATO candidates were required to meet certain requirements. NATO had 
considerable leverage to force at least some level of defence sector reform before 
candidate accession. Yet the entry of many former Communist countries in two 
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enlargement rounds resulted in questions over NATO’s ability to induce further SSR 
after accession.46  
 
From the development aid community, it became apparent during the Cold War 
period that social tensions caused when economic growth was fostered could hinder 
donors’ development efforts. Questions began to be asked about how best to reduce 
military expenditures.47 Thus development institutions such as the World Bank and 
OECD became increasingly interested during the 1990s in ways in which 
development could be refocused to address root causes of conflict. Development 
ministries such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
Department for International Development began to support reform of the security 
sector as a key underpinning of socio-economic development. The concept was 
championed by DfID following the election of the Labour Party in the United 
Kingdom in 1997.48 Claire Short, UK Secretary of State for International 
Development, first coined the term in a speech on May 13, 1998, to draw public 
attention to the need to comprehensively reform the security sector.49  
 
SSR’s origins also drew inspiration from the civil-military relations debates most 
notably initiated by Samuel Huntington.50 Since the early 1960s much of the 
discussion on civil-military relations focused on how military intervention and the 
assertion of control over civilian governments could be prevented. This work, which 
has become known as the ‘first generation’ problem, led after the end of the Cold War 
to the ‘second generation’ discussion, attempts to establish and effectively operate 
efficient structures for democratic governance of the security sector at a sustainable 
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cost to the country concerned.51 Recent 2009 research shows that it is not easy to find 
empirical evidence that the central problem of civil-military relations as conceived by 
Huntington and his contemporaries, a military often institutionally hungry for power, 
has ever existed.52 As Ball and Hendrickson describe however, the role of the military 
in politics was an important part of the debate that eventually gave rise to SSR.53  
 
Chanaa summarized SSR as consisting of political – setting the context, institutional – 
describing the ideal security sector, and economic and social dimensions – outlining 
the necessary support mechanisms for long-lasting reform.54 Since Chanaa’s 
overarching thesis which sought to define the discipline’s extent at relatively early 
stage, some years have passed, and some notable lessons identified. Rathmell and 
Sedra drew different conclusions on the state of the field in 2009. Rathmell recently 
re-made the crucial point that ‘any elite will only envision reform of its core state 
functions, notably security and justice, in exceptional circumstances,’ so ‘holistic, 
sustainable and thorough-going reform will be the very rare exception,’ linked to 
circumstances such as reforms in Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War 
or situations of state collapse or reformation.55 Sedra has argued recently that the 
problem with SSR as has been conceived in the past ten years or so is its 
‘inadaptability and one-size-fits-all approach,’ necessitating differentiated models for 
improved implementation in the future.56 Sedra argues that different models might be 
applied, say for post-authoritarian states as opposed to states which are being 
reconstructed after conflict. As described below, SSR has also arguably faced a 
number of severe difficulties in its application to developing state contexts which give 
ample basis for the kind of reassessment of the discipline now under way. 
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Chanaa was framing her analysis of SSR during her stay at the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in 2000-2001.57 Yet before the Adelphi Paper incorporating her 
work was published, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States had 
great effects upon international relations and defence issues worldwide. The resulting 
US ‘war on terror’ threatened distortion of the SSR agenda. Ball said in 2006 that 
there was currently ‘huge pressure to make security the key foreign policy objective 
of donor countries.. subordinating trade and development policy.’58 Especially in 
Africa, ‘war on terror’ concerns have been fostered upon developing countries where 
in actual fact they are more concerned with their huge poverty reduction challenges. 
Despite ostensible attention being paid to the governance aspects of SSR, what 
appears to have eventuated is a continued focus on elevating operational 
effectiveness. Ball quotes a UK official who strongly supports a governance 
orientation, but said in mid 2005 of SSR in general that ‘it is virtually all train-and-
equip.’59 This situation has not appreciably changed since that time.60 
 
The concept then began to move through a series of evolutions, including significant 
input by the OECD DAC. In 2004, the members of the DAC promulgated their policy 
on security sector reform and its governance. The policy defined SSR as “the 
transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, 
responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a 
manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good 
governance.”61 The DAC saw the agenda in 2004 as SSR in four-fold terms of 
developing a clear institutional framework, establishing viable oversight mechanisms, 
professionalizing security forces and making them capable, and ensuring the 
sustainability of justice and security sector reform. These four principles played a 
major role in the way in which SSR was delivered on the ground, though, as described 
below, sustainability of reform has always been a concern. In many circumstances, 
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without ongoing supplementary external manpower, it is difficult to sustain either 
training standards or accountability improvements. 
 
The DAC later played a significant role again in the evolution of SSR thinking by 
producing the OECD Handbook on SSR in 2007. The OECD Handbook lays out core 
SSR principles, first promulgated in an earlier publication in 2004. It then sets out  
guidance for fostering an appropriate political environment, assessment practices, 
guidance for strengthening public institutions, and specific guidance on reforms for 
each part of the security sector. Managing, monitoring, review, and evaluation of SSR 
programmes is also covered. The Handbook has been widely accepted as providing 
authoritative guidance for the discipline, drawing on much field experience and 
academic thinking. 
 
As the DAC’s SSR principles have become influential, it is worth elaborating on 
them. The principles include the need for SSR to be people-centred, locally owned, 
and based on democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law.62 SSR 
should be seen as a framework to structure thinking on how to address diverse 
security challenges. These diverse challenges should be addressed through more 
integrated development and security policy and through greater civilian involvement 
and oversight. The DAC also states that SSR should be founded on activities with 
multi-sectoral strategies, based on a broad assessment of the range of applicable 
security and justice needs. SSR should be developed adhering to transparency and 
accountability principles. Finally SSR should be implemented through clear processes 
which aim to enhance the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy 
to function effectively. The SSR principles have endured since 2004 and have had 
significant impact. Since 1998 the core challenge for SSR has been implementing 
Northern derived ideas in non-Northern environments, a difficulty encountered for 
decades by the development community. 
 
The United Nations has historically had a strong SSR role, whether explicitly 
recognized or not. The UN has been involved in DDR, justice reform, and attempts to 
create a more coherent approach to SSR. DDR is one area of SSR where the UN 
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played an early and central role. DDR gained much prominence, especially in the 
international development field, through its use in early post Cold War UN 
peacekeeping missions in such countries as Namibia,63 Cambodia, and 
Mozambique.64  Since this earlier period, DDR programmes in countries such as 
Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Iraq (less successfully)65 have come to form a 
major element of the present SSR effort.  However historically it has been much 
easier to disarm and demobilize combatants than to effectively reintegrate them into 
society, and this has led to continuing problems.66 The DDR process retains 
significant importance in paving the way for the formation of new armies, as it has 
done in Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and elsewhere. At the same time, the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) became extensively involved in justice reform. 
 
Arguably the first identifiable SSR recommendations from the United Nations were 
for Mali in 1994 and 1995. UN officials suggested a ‘security first’ programme of 
institution building for the police and other agencies, to stop flows of small arms.67  
UN SSR efforts initially benefited from a measure to increase UN field coordination, 
the ‘integrated mission’ concept. Thereafter two major policy initiatives were 
introduced to instill greater coherence into UN SSR efforts. The first was the 
formation of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, and the second was 
the later UN policy on SSR. 
 
SSR as a whole has become part of the explicit development of UN ‘integrated 
missions.’ Since the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions have become 
increasingly multi-dimensional, with tasks including ‘police and defence reform, 
restructuring, training and operational support; assistance in the restoration and 
reform of judicial and prison systems; support for the restoration of state authority and 
administrative capacities at central and local levels; good governance; support for 
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civil society; and assistance to constitutional processes.’68 All these functions were 
carried out under the mission head, the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG). The UN development agencies dealing with refugees, child rights, 
food aid, womens’ concerns, and the like, had in many countries conducted activities 
in parallel with UN peacekeeping forces, often not well coordinated. Some stretched 
into the SSR realm. As an initial step, UN Headquarters brought the varied UN 
development agencies in each country under the authority of a Resident Coordinator, 
almost invariably the UNDP head. The next step in countries with both a 
peacekeeping mission and a development presence was to unify the command 
structure, which was done by designating the Resident Coordinator as a Deputy to the 
SRSG with responsibility for the humanitarian and development aspects of the UN’s 
mission.69  
 
This greater coordination of functions within the UN laid the basis for more effective 
field activity, but security sector reform as a concept remained under defined and 
contested within the UN system. In addition, the UN lacked SSR capacity and any 
common approach. Rees phrased this concern in 2006 as ‘the distinct and independent 
tools of peacekeepers and development actors have proved generally insufficient to 
the task of SSR.’70 UN Headquarters attempted to provide more guidance by creating 
the new Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in 2007. OROLSI 
started to provide more integrated direction for the large number of policing and 
justice initiatives the United Nations had underway. 
 
A second initiative was the production of a Secretary-General’s Report on SSR, 
embodying UN SSR policy. In February 2007 a Security Council statement requested 
a report on UN approaches to SSR, and the report was released in January 2008. 
Noting the extensive work already under way by Member States on SSR, and the 
wide variety of SSR activity underway within the UN, the report advocated a series of 
measures. These included developing UN SSR policy and guidelines, improving SSR 
capability both in New York and in field missions, building partnerships to provide 
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effective support, expertise and adequate resources to national security sector reform 
processes, and the establishment of an UN SSR unit to deliver on these priorities.71 
As a result, an SSR unit was created within OROLSI, and has begun a number of 
coordination initiatives.  
 
However Hanggi and Scherrer make a strong argument for further UN SSR capability 
improvement so as to approach the subject in a holistic fashion, reflecting SSR tenets, 
to enable a more cohesive delivery of SSR efforts in the field, and to implement SSR 
from beginning to end of the conflict cycle.72 Hanggi and Scherrer do not end on an 
optimistic note.  Short-term concerns of exit strategy and longer-term reconstruction 
and development needs, require SSR for different tasks, and these have created a 
continuing tension between them that may severely hamper the development of a 
common UN SSR programme. Hanggi and Scherrer say that ‘it may prove difficult to 
overcome this bias and establish a common vision for post-conflict SSR that fully 
encompasses the governance dimension.’73 Rees adds that a blend of both 
peacekeeping and development tools will be necessary to better implement UN SSR, 
as well as skills such as institution building, participatory decision making, public 
administration and management and legislative and policy development, not 
traditionally found in the peace operations community.74 
 
Increased acceptance of the SSR approach within developed-world militaries has been 
signaled by the adoption of the concept by the U.S. Army and in a joint British 
doctrine note. In autumn 2008, the U.S. Army issued an updated field manual on 
stability operations, incorporating a full chapter on SSR that reflects the DAC 
approach to the matter.75 The UK had already incorporated DfID formulations of SSR 
into a Joint Doctrine Note on the Military Contribution to SSR published in 2007. As 
regards army redevelopment specifically, the UK released a doctrine note in 2007 on 
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Developing Indigenous Armies and the US a manual on Security Force Assistance, 
covering essentially the same subject, in mid 2009. 
 
From its inception SSR thinkers have worried about the gap between SSR policy and 
practice, referred to by Chanaa as the ‘conceptual-contextual divide.’76 Analysts, 
including Alice Hills, have asked whether SSR is flawed because it is based on a 
limited understanding of the security sector in many parts of the world.77 Good 
empirical analysis of how security sectors actually function in the developing world 
has often been superseded by emphasis on democraticizing norms,78 though some 
older exceptions for Africa exist by writers such as Luckham, Cox, and Baynham,79 
and other studies have been done on Asia and Latin America. Concerns have also 
repeatedly been expressed over whether SSR programme implementation is simply 
impractical due to the alien nature of northern SSR norms in many parts of the 
developing world (for example, the idea of dividing the public and private arenas in 
the context of African neopatrimonal states.)80 Whether implemented in government 
ministries or remote security force bases, SSR’s northern norms appear often unlikely 
to survive contact with long-held parochial loyalties. 
 
One thread of the SSR debate with particular importance for army redevelopment is 
the balance, as mentioned above, between improvements in effectiveness as opposed 
to enhancing the accountability of security forces. While the ‘war on terror’ has 
heightened the apparent need for effective security forces, emphasis on effectiveness 
rather than accountability has deep roots in the ethos of Cold War security assistance 
programmes. Many U.S. security assistance efforts eventually trained, equipped, and 
then supported on operations, forces that were operating under authoritarian 
governments. This ‘reform versus SSR’ debate mirrors difficulties during UN peace 
operations as discussed above, and difficulties in Afghanistan and elsewhere that have 
attracted the label of the ‘slide toward expediency.’ As discussed further below, it 
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raises the question of whether army redevelopment efforts, which are often almost 
devoid of significant governance improvement components, can still be regarded as 
SSR. 
 
The end of the Cold War military confrontation between the Western and Eastern 
blocs made possible a global reassessment of security provision. In Europe, the EU 
and NATO began to consider accession of new candidate countries. Worldwide, the 
United Nations became involved in a myriad of security related activities. The 
development community, including the international financial institutions, became 
increasingly interested in refocusing their efforts to address the root causes of conflict. 
At the same time, a ‘wave of democratization’ appeared to offer new hope to the civil-
military relations theorists. Shared interests and opportunities converged to produce 
security sector reform, a new policy agenda. The new agenda had a broad span, with 
political, institutional, economic, and social dimensions. The broad span of SSR 
allowed many different priorities to coexist, and assisted in popularizing the concept. 
Yet Chanaa’s ‘conceptual-contextual divide,’ formulated within five years of the 
concept coalescing, identified a significant obstacle to the policy agenda. 
Since Chanaa identified this issue, introspection over SSR’s possible flaws has gone 
hand-in-hand, almost paradoxically, with a great increase in the concept’s use. SSR 
remains an extremely valuable, widely used concept. 
 
 Critiques of Security Sector Reform  
Though the concept of security sector reform is clearly an advance on its antecedents, 
various strands of development theory and civil military relations, it has come under 
sustained criticism almost since its inception due to a number of potential weaknesses, 
five of which are developed below. 
 
One critique which accepts the current SSR paradigm, is that of the awesome 
coordination difficulties that large SSR projects, which usually occur simultaneously 
with transitional governance and reconstruction efforts, can involve.81 A well-
designed strategic plan that includes all the parts of the security sector that need 
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addressing is also very important. Such a plan is sometimes relatively absent, or as in 
Haiti, does not cover vital appendages: while army disbandment, the main feature of 
the plan, did take place, DDR was not effective.82 These difficulties are often 
exploited by vested interests inside the recipient’s state apparatus to benefit 
financially while playing the assisting states off against each other.83 The task is easier 
when one party is much more engaged than the remainder, such as with the United 
States in Iraq, Afghanistan and Liberia.  
 
The sheer enormity of the programmes that might support each security sector 
component is demonstrated by the SSR tasks apportioned by the 2002 Bonn 
Agreement for Afghanistan. Germany was allocated police reform; Italy, judicial 
reform, Japan, with the United Nations, disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration; the UK counternarcotics, and the United States the Ministry of Defence 
and armed forces.84 Each one of these tasks, across a country as large as Afghanistan, 
could absorb the efforts of thousands of specifically designated personnel. Since 
2001, foreign troop levels alone in Afghanistan have routinely exceeded 10,000; other 
agencies add further personnel. Where donor involvement is most acute, such as in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Congo, and in Kosovo, there can be considerable competition 
between donors.85 For example, the Congo has had multiple military aid providers 
since the first UN mission left in the 1960s,86 which led to competition by the 1970s.87  
Today in the Congo donors continue to compete, both over police assistance and 
armed forces’ assistance programmes. To address this situation, Boucher argues that 
when coordination is not possible, or when different actors refuse to recognize a 
coordinator’s role, individual donors should define the areas where cooperation is 
required, and communicate plans in a timely fashion.88 This type of prescription will 
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not necessary resolve the coordination issue, but it appears to be the best option 
available in many countries where different donors are implementing SSR 
programmes. 
 
Another potential critique of SSR can be developed from thinking about the liberal 
peace agenda. SSR and especially post-conflict army reconstruction is often a 
primarily external activity, and internal actors simply may not share the vision of SSR 
propounded by outside donors. This type of criticism shades into the local ownership 
debate, and thus is further developed below. 
 
Deeper criticism of the entire SSR edifice has developed with at least five major 
facets: (i) insufficient resources for the very large task that deep and comprehensive 
SSR implies, (ii) the inherent difficulty of applying a democratising approach to what 
are almost invariably neo-patrimonial states, (iii) insufficient local ownership, (iv) 
that security force assistance may be over-focusing  upon equipment and skills 
transfer (‘Train & Equip’ programmes) rather than governance improvements, and 
that (v) that overall national security strategies, a key tool to develop a comprehensive 
approach, are being neglected in favour of institutional transformation. Finally there is 
also a concern of lesser magnitude that lessons from the discipline of management are 
not being applied in SSR contexts where they may have significant value. 
 Absence/Severe Weakness of the State 
Scheye and Andersen note that in fragile states, the state is a minority provider of 
services, including public safety, security, and justice.89 Attempting SSR in these 
areas is much more difficult than in the former Warsaw Pact and more benign 
developing countries for which the concept was initially developed. The environment 
is significantly more adverse. In postcolonial Africa, the monopoly of violence, a key 
attribute of the Weberian state, was ‘incomplete at best and often, for practical 
purposes, left in the hands of chiefs, community leaders, and others.’90  
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In actual fact, armies co-exist alongside other weak state institutions amid a network 
of security providers dominated by the informal sector. The wide range of non-police 
security providers can include community anti-crime groups, religious police, 
ethnic/clan militias, political party militias, civil defence forces such as the Civil 
Defence Force that played a significant role in Sierra Leone, informal and formal 
commercial security groups, state-approved civil guards, local government structures, 
customary police and courts, and restorative justice committees.91 In Afghanistan, for 
example, 2006 official estimates indicate that 90% of Afghans rely on customary law 
due to a lack of trust and confidence in formal justice institutions.92 Alongside these 
other security providers, armies in the developing world play a much lesser role than 
Northerners might initially imagine.93  
 
Armies are one institutional component of the state’s range of tools to provide 
security for development. But the entire state sector is only a minority provider. 
Thus it appears that there was and is a disjuncture between the imagined potential 
power of the state army possessed by most Northern SSR conceptualizers, and the real 
potential of armies in these states. SSR, to a great extent, is a ‘Northern’ project 
formulated in accordance with Northern values, as touched upon by Nathan.94 As Ball 
pointed out in 2005, ‘ownership of the SSR concept and policy agenda by developing 
countries is very low.’95 Northern concepts appear to have induced a perception that a 
relative level of equality of power might be possible between developed-state and 
developing-state armies. Thus it appears that the security that post-conflict armies 
might be able to provide for citizens has been frequently overestimated.   
 
Extensive informalisation of state institutions, and blurring of boundaries, makes 
improvement of state institutions more difficult. Stepputat, Andersen, and Moller say 
that the ‘distinction between state and non-state…. [do] not necessarily correspond to 
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the concrete empirical relations that are revealed through closer scrutiny.’96 Examples 
are not hard to find; Boas says that in the case of the Eastern Congo, the state and 
privileged access to resources via the state remain important, but ‘this integration is 
built on flexible and constantly negotiated relationships of patronage, leading to the 
establishment of what maybe [sic] best described as competing military-commercial 
nexuses.’97 In Darfur, a large majority of Arab militias’ members are formally 
members of government security organizations such as the People’s Defence Force 
and Border Intelligence Guard.98 The complications induced by these linkages in post-
conflict states place a premium on working from good empirical knowledge of 
specific personal linkages in specific regions, rather than neat Northern boundaries 
between organizational constructs. 
 
Even where the state has a significant presence, the SSR project as currently 
envisioned usually requires far more institutional development resources than can be 
made available. In 2007, Baker and Scheye said that available resources were 
incapable of delivering proposed reforms.99 They note that both the quality and 
quantity of human resources are likely to be insufficient in fragile states, that their 
finances are over-committed and dependent on less than certain revenue streams, and 
that ‘physical, constitutional, legal, and administrative’ resources are likely to be 
lacking.100 They cited the example of the Sierra Leone Police, which despite heavy 
donor support remains weak.  
 
Affordability of security forces has been a weak point both for African armed forces 
throughout the post-colonial era, as Le Roux highlights below, but also, as discussants 
at the Future of SSR e-conference in May 2009 noted, for more recent defence reform 
efforts. The problem has historical roots. Colonial transitions left many developing 
states with underskilled replicas of Northern defence ministries. These ministries were 
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often seduced by the promise of high-technology equipment that was expensive to 
buy and difficult to maintain. Acquisition processes were also often vulnerable to 
corruption. Financial mismanagement saw further sums disappear either through 
incompetence or malfeasance. Thus into the 1990s the basis of developing-world 
defence fiscal competence was weak.  
 
Since 1990 security sector revitalization processes have almost invariably been very 
expensive – mirroring, to some extent, military establishments in colonial countries at 
the point of independence.101 Afghanistan is one of the worst examples of this 
process, where additional expansions in the size of the army continue to be 
implemented when the process is already unsustainable. Spending on the Afghan 
security sector reached 494% of domestic revenues in the 2004-2005 fiscal year.102 
Unsustainable spending has continued since. Analysts of the Afghan security sector 
have grave doubts about the future of the army reconstruction effort, due to 
unsustainable spending and absence of quality Afghan personnel.103 Unsustainable 
military spending has also occurred in Sierra Leone, as noted above, and Liberia.104  
 
Countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan may be able to preserve unsustainably 
expensive armies due to the continued support of wealthy Western donors who are 
strategically engaged, but for other countries such as Sierra Leone or the DR Congo, 
financial stringencies risk the failure of the entire army reconstruction project. Often 
foreign donors find the necessary resources initially with the implied expectation of a 
transition to full local funding, yet this can be very difficult. This creates an inherent 
sustainability problem. As a DfID programme manager said of the Sierra Leone 
Police’s vehicle fleet, ‘the only thing worse than not having any capacity is having 
temporary capacity and then it being taken away.’105 Scheye and McLean, in their 
recommendations on justice and security service delivery in fragile and war-torn 
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states, urge a focus on fiscal sustainability.106 In army reconstruction terms, the 
smaller the projected army planned, the better the long-term result may be. 
 
Technical approaches exist that can alleviate the problem, such as costing the entire 
life cycle of a weapons system, and utilizing a ‘needs driven but cost constrained 
approach.’ Efficiency drives may also improve matters.107 Yet these remain 
inadequate solutions. Put simply, army reconstruction done to a standard developed-
world model is beyond the financial reach of most poor developing world countries. 
Alternatives may be found in a deliberate restriction in the use of modern technology, 
a reversion to systems such as horses, card files and human runners and secretaries. 
These practices, it must be admitted, were perfectly adequate to launch and sustain the 
Napoleonic Wars and the First and Second World Wars. It should be possible to at 
least trial, on a limited basis, a low-technology army that could be modernized if 
additional resources became available. 
 
Ambitious projects may be unsustainable, but there may be other options. Reno’s 
analysis of informal networks in Liberia may help in charting an answer, at least for 
planned countrywide programmes such as police forces. Reno examined the nature of 
Liberia’s informal criminal-political networks which incorporate violent people which 
have committed war crimes.108 He argues that such networks should be ‘captured,’ at 
least initially, in order to allow the rebuilding government to govern more effectively.  
Reno’s mix of formal and informal solutions paves the way to a potential ‘triage’ 
solution for governments faced with limited resources.109 Applied to army 
reconstruction, ‘triage’ might take either a regional or a capacity bounding approach. 
In countries such as the DR Congo or Afghanistan, remnant unreconstructed armed 
groupings in some areas might deliberately be left, to focus scarce resources where 
there are better chances of success. In other countries, where the government can 
exert control over the whole of its claimed space, a capability bounding rather than a 
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regional bounding might be appropriate. A more cautious force buildup, with 
significant emphasis on logistics, might well increase the chances of a more 
sustainable force in the long term. 
 
State security organizations, including armies, are important security actors in post-
conflict contexts. Yet Northerners’ intrinsic biases may cause them to overestimate 
the extent of state power that may be achievable. State security organizations coexist 
within a larger network of non-state security provision, can be extensively 
informalized, and face severe resource limitations. It is clear that the absolute size of 
the resources required for thorough SSR is enormous, and the capacity to absorb 
donors’ aid in a post-conflict environment can be limited. The high profile and urgent 
needs of these states also fragments available donor resources and distracts from the 
further stabilization of better off, more benign, developing countries. It is also not 
certain whether, under the twin pressures of fossil fuel depletion and climate 
change,110  major donor states will continue to find the resources for SSR in anything 
but the most strategically vital states in the medium to long term.  
 
 Difficulty of transforming neopatrimonial government 
institutions  
SSR is a concept founded in democratic norms which attempt to replicate the features 
of rational–legal modern states. There is no clear template for how this might be 
replicated in developing neo-patrimonial, states. Hills says that “democratic ideals of 
accountability and impartiality have little relevance when the impact of the modern 
state has been felt but social norms make no distinction between the private and 
public realm.” 111 These type of neo-patrimonial political networks are a part of ‘all 
late developing states, particularly ones at low levels of development.’112 This 
includes virtually all the states where SSR is being attempted, and all the case studies 
examined in this thesis. SSR shares a weakness here with development theory in that 
it inherently attempts to inculcate these concepts upon culturally dissimilar states 
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which do not share rational-legal features. SSR focuses upon changing the security 
structures of states, but is reliant on a more fundamental transformation having taken 
place already. Modern neo-patrimonialism must have already been succeeded by the 
full separation of public and private arenas of the modern rational-legal state for SSR 
to be fully possible. 
 
Egnell and Haldén added another layer to this critique in 2009.113 They found that 
SSR projects faced great difficulty achieving success where states did not have a 
‘Westphalian’ structure of state, society, and polity. Pointing out that in Europe these 
features evolved in sequence, they note the great difficulty of trying to force an 
ahistorical evolution by trying to create them simultaneously. They cite Amitai 
Etzioni approvingly, who argues that there is a widespread overestimation of the  
‘transformative powers of even the most powerful nations and organisations when it 
comes to changing and re-engineering the regimes of other nations.’114 Thus they 
argue that one ‘should carefully determine what level of ambition is realistic for each 
specific project dependent on local circumstances.’115 Law also cautions against over-
expectation: ‘to assume that [interventions] can, in half a generation or so, build 
structures securing the accountability of the security sector, where little or none 
existed pre-conflict, is unrealistic.’116  
 
SSR appears to be ill-equipped to change the less central, security, structures of a state 
where its central structures do not reflect rational-legal values. Those attempting to 
implement SSR where the rational-legal transition has not fully taken place will 
therefore always be trying to change the fundamental nature of the state in a contorted 
and illegitimate fashion. If a state should change, its evolution should focus upon its 
central nature first, and major attributes, such as its security arrangements, later. The 
‘monopoly of violence’ means that security arrangements are intrinsic to the nature of 
the state. But changing them in order to change the state is less effective than trying to 
change the state first, after which the security changes might start unfolding with little 
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extra effort in any case. Security change should ideally follow nationally led 
discussions and be based on national norms and values – whether written or 
unwritten.  
 
If the situation was viewed in purist terms, the ideal approach would be to halt 
attempts at SSR interventions until a full rational-legal transition had taken place. 
This of course is not possible for two reasons. Firstly, the transition between neo-
patrimonialism and the full apparatus of the rational-legal bureaucratic state is not 
clear-cut. Portions of the state structure may be operating along rational-legal lines 
while others remain working to a neo-patrimonial logic. SSR efforts would have to 
wait forever. There is some logic in pausing, but little in giving up the task entirely, as 
this would run against the underlying ethos of most developed-world governments’ 
aid efforts. Second, the bureaucratic inertia of the SSR industry, linking government 
departments, developed-world security forces, universities, policy research institutes, 
consultants, and private contractors, is already set well in motion, and SSR efforts, 
however ill-fated, will continue. Yet those considering such efforts should first 
closely consider how likely it is that they will be able to implement the full force of 
democratizing SSR, or whether they will be limited to carrying out simple reform 
within a state structure that does not match SSR’s core democratic values.  
 
This limitation to reform instead of full SSR has resulted in a ‘slide toward 
expediency.’ 117 This formulation describes programmes aimed at increasing the 
democratic accountability of the security sector which have instead been superseded 
by a singular emphasis on training and equipping security forces. As this issue is 
intimately interconnected with raising armies both effective and accountable, it is 
expanded upon separately below.   
 
The difficulty of the neo-patrimonial to rational-legal transition has arguably not 
received enough attention in the SSR discourse. Much more attention has simply 
skipped that issue altogether, and has assumed that practitioners are already working 
within a rational-legal framework, albeit one which may be operating in an 
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authoritarian or otherwise non-democratic mode. Thus what is frequently referred to 
as the challenges of corruption, from this perspective, is simply reflective of the 
normal functioning of a neo-patrimonial society. 
 
Egnell and Halden argue that there may be neither states nor civil societies - in the 
‘Westphalian’ sense of the words – to engage with. Instead governance consists of 
‘complex webs of informal networks,’ that may constantly shift (in the case of Sierra 
Leone) or be established, formal, and strong (in the case of the clan or tribal-based 
structures of Central Asia).  
 
Also relevant to the issue of operating in neo-patrimonial societies are conflicts 
between international human rights standards and local values. Scheye and Andersen 
have written cogently upon the problem.118 For example, developing-state security 
forces may inflict violence on detainees in their custody in order to secure 
information. Adherence to international human rights standards and democratic norms  
are part of the SSR principles introduced above. But where human rights standards 
conflict with local practices, donors and other Northerners involved are faced with 
complicated choices. Part of the answer may involve remembering that human rights 
may not be as cross-culturally applicable as they might seem.119 The 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was an essentially Northern construct, and Northern 
thinking dominated many of the following legal instruments as well. Scheye and 
Andersen suggest that a contextualization of human rights standards may provide part 
of the way forward: ‘..choosing between different values, or at least in the short to 
medium term refraining from attempting to promote them all at once.’120 To adjust to 
each specific situation, it might be best if designers of army reconstruction 
programmes clearly identified which SSR standards were most important for each 
programme. Trade-offs might then need to follow, probably, to ensure sustainability, 
for the medium term at least. 
 
All these commentators argue for a more locally variant and locally determined 
process, a far cry from the originally Northern vision of SSR. At its extreme, the force 
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of these arguments suggests that army reconstruction processes might not be possible 
at all. Since SSR assessments and programmes will, whatever their actual assistance 
value, continue, considerable thought needs to be given to the future nature of such 
programmes. 
 
Reassessment would almost certainly produce more sustainable SSR programmes. 
But while such reassessment is underway, programmes animated by the current SSR 
ethos will continue. All evidence suggests that such programmes take consistent effort 
over a long period to be effective. It seems that either very large resources must be set 
aside by donors for a multi-decade effort – an effort constantly vulnerable to being 
diminished at the expense of other foreign or domestic issues – or expectations must 
be reduced. Since the end of the Cold War, the only such large efforts have been in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sierra Leone, all states which are perceived as having strategic 
importance by a major power. Involvement in each of these three cases has either 
declined or is projected to decline. Given the enormous effort invested and the mixed 
results achieved, it appears that the launching of such very large efforts in the future 
will be uncommon. Therefore, in general, expectations need to be reduced. A more 
realistic direction for SSR efforts would probably include attention to non-state 
security actors as an equal priority at the very least. 
 
 Local Ownership 
Local ownership, the idea that SSR will not be sustainable unless it is shaped and 
driven by local actors, is one of the key tenets in today’s view of SSR. Laurie Nathan, 
wrote the first book-length study of the concept in 2007.121 He emphasised earlier 
researchers’ conclusions that at that time, ‘local ownership is more of a rhetoric 
device than a guide to donor officials engaged in SSR.’122 He recommended that local 
ownership be given greater force by more emphasis on the process rather than content 
of SSR. He also recommended that SSR should be designed in a way that promoted 
national ownership, through a careful process plan that included all the actors 
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involved, from decision-makers to the disparate outside parties interested in the 
process. He recommended a number of initiatives by which donors could initiate SSR 
in a small scale but thus sustainable fashion.123 
 
Since Nathan’s work was published, the local ownership concept has come under 
searching criticism. Critics say that ‘serious questions remain over what ownership 
actually entails, and to whom precisely we are referring when we talk about locals.’124 
A clear tension now exists between SSR’s universalist democratizing norms, and the 
generally accepted SSR requirement for local ownership. If a project is inculcated 
thoroughly with democratic norms, it may face difficulties gaining local buy-in from 
governments threatened by these norms.125 On the other hand, if it is too ‘locally 
owned,’ it may not be recognizable as security sector reform, merely a different stage 
in the evolution of an authoritarian security sector. 
 
A question put squarely by Martin and Wilson, and not adequately answered in the 
current SSR discourse, is that of ‘which locals?’126 Donais suggests this question is 
often not addressed adequately. But, to the extent it is, he says, there are at least three 
levels of local ownership discussed along a minimalist-maximalist continuum, from 
the national political / security sector elites, to a broad involvement of civil society,127 
to Martin and Wilson who suggest that the ‘locals who matter are in fact the entire 
citizenry of the country in question.’128 Close examination of most army 
reconstruction programmes indicates that only the elites are engaged, with the broad 
mass of the population only involved, if at all, as potential soldier recruits. As 
currently conceived, army reconstruction programmes are among the least locally 
owned SSR projects underway. This applies especially to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Liberia, where, contrary to previous traditions, a high-quality, voluntary 
force model has been proposed and then imposed as the solution. The United States 
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Army seems either unable or unwilling to mentor and reconstruct armies that do not 
match its image.129 
 
This imposition of current Northern forms, on top of existing rivalries, has led to 
multiple points of potential or actual disagreement within many armies undergoing 
extensive redevelopment or reconstruction. As Decalo noted, many African armies 
‘seeth … with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and personal grievances’130 that makes 
armies such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, or Liberia poor starting points for 
redevelopment. Giustozzi casts this contest in the Afghan case as ‘shadow ownership’ 
as the Ministry of Defence struggled with the United States to claim a limited measure 
of control over the process of constructing the new Afghan National Army.131 The 
Shia/Sunni/Kurd faultlines in Iraq reflect the same weaknesses. 
 
Martin and Wilson introduce the notion of a more locally owned ‘Security Sector 
Evolution’ (SSE) process to replace the flaws they perceive in SSR.132 SSE, they say, 
would mean that the aim was to influence the evolution of the security sector, rather 
than design and build a ‘better’ version. Practitioners and donors would focus upon 
strengthening the ability of civil society to signal its needs and views, and, on the 
other hand, strengthen the ability of, and incentives for, the security sector to sense 
and respond to those needs. This approach would mean giving up any pre-defined 
strategy in favour of a uniquely evolved unpredictably structured security 
architecture. Formal army reconstruction programmes might become much rarer 
under this model. 
 
Reflecting upon the meaning and relevance of the local ownership issue in the current 
SSR debate, Donnais says that ‘it is not clear that [these issues] can be resolved, at 
least not on a macro level.’133 The sheer sweep and variance of SSR engagements is 
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simply too wide for an all-embracing answer to the conundrum. If there is not to be 
one answer, there will have to be many, and, as Donnais begins to suggest, potentially 
on differing medium and micro levels. As answers to this critique are developed, they 
may not leave SSR in a recognizable form, with its current norms intact. Scheye’s 
writing on security sector development, in which he suggests a realistic and 
disaggregated approach to SSR, embodies some ideas on how to move forward.134 
Post-conflict army reconstruction in its current form appears very vulnerable to these 
critiques, and should probably be extensively reassessed. Future army reconstruction 
programmes needs to be formulated with a through appreciation in mind of who 
actually provides defence and security services to communities, and what role is 
appropriate for armies in view of the state’s limited resources.  
 
 Sectoral versus strategic transformation priorities 
The achievability of through, meaningful SSR is threatened by critiques over the vast 
resources and commitment required, an insufficient understanding of how to 
transform government institutions, and the contradictions involved in local ownership 
as opposed to democratizing, universalist norms. Yet there are also other weaknesses 
in the discipline. A close evaluation of three such issues points to improvements that 
will add to the effectiveness of both SSR and army reconstruction within it.  
 
First is the great value of a strategic national security assessment.  If a comprehensive 
security assessment is made prior to separate departmental programmes being 
initiated, such programmes will be much more responsive to other initiatives and the 
wider governmental environment. Second, SSR suffers significantly from the long 
heritage of programmes launched which only aim to improve training standards and, 
sometimes, only train recipient personnel on newly delivered equipment. If SSR is to 
be successful, management practices must be firmly set in place, and security forces 
need to be accountable. Third, the application of management principals to SSR, a 
practice now known as ‘security sector management’ (SSM), promises potentially 
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significant improvements in effectiveness, in line with its previous evident promise as 
regards the management of national armed forces.135  
 
Before developing the place of national security reviews versus potentially premature 
initiatives to transform the defence sector, it is useful to review their place in the 
accepted SSR framework. In effect, the apex of a country’s national security 
machinery has two principal roles: the more publicized task of developing and 
maintaining democratic civilian control, and what the OECD calls ‘strengthening the 
process for reviewing security threats and developing the capacity to respond to 
them’136 – implementing a holistic national security policy. Creating and maintaining 
an effective national security policy which coordinates the efforts of not just military 
forces but all security agencies is critical.137 In covering SSR’s multitude of sub-
fields, a holistic, comprehensive approach, well planned at the operational level or 
higher,138 is needed in order to integrate efforts coherently together.139 In examining 
land forces, it is critical to acknowledge that armies will not work effectively in 
isolation, and thus appropriate linkages to police forces, ministries of defence, and 
other involved civilian agencies need to be considered.  
 
Rocky Williams outlines the main elements of the national policy required to 
institutionalize an agreed framework within which defence forces and armies within 
them, should operate. 140 Firstly, key constitutional principles upon which the 
management of the armed forces need to be laid out; secondly the responsibilities 
which the government has to the armed forces need to be established, including the 
provision of adequate resources and clear political leadership; thirdly a clear policy 
framework for the armed forces needs to be provided, usually in the form of a White 
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Paper or similar document (which ideally cascades from a national security strategy). 
Beyond the framework set out by Williams, it becomes clear that armies do not have 
to be restricted to purely military functions. In Africa, the Botswana Army is focused, 
to a great degree, upon protection of natural resources,141 and the Congolese FARDC 
maintains development brigades in Katanga.142 However, such activities need to be 
defined and agreed, through an institutionalized policy process, to avoid exploitation 
of the public purse. 
 
However a full understanding of the value of an integrated national security policy 
planning process in an SSR context has developed relatively late. Perhaps the first 
major signal that engaging in a thorough national security planning process would aid  
SSR and probably avoid further duplicative work was the results of the Uganda 
Defence Review, which was initiated in February 2002. Here planning for military 
reform was initiated which focused exclusively on defence, but then had to be 
widened, after it was found that only three of the threat indicators out of the total of 
134 could be addressed by the armed forces.143 The concept took time to make its way 
into the wider SSR literature; neither the OECD’s 2004 paper on Security Sector 
Reform and Governance nor Hanggi’s 2004 survey of security sector reform and 
reconstruction as part of a wider DCAF work make any mention of the issue.144  
 
The idea of prioritizing a national security review process, as opposed to addressing 
specific security sub-sectors, has not gained widespread adherence. For example, the 
Liberian national security strategy development process commenced in late 2006 and 
concluded in January 2008, well after the U.S.-inspired reconstruction of the armed 
forces had been set in motion.145 However, recently, the value of addressing overall 
polity security concerns before implementing thoroughgoing institutional change has 
been more widely realized. The first time the concept was implemented came when 
the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review was initiated in 2006. The Review begun 
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well before the next evolutionary step for the province’s security force, the Kosovo 
Protection Corps, needed to be implemented. The International Security Sector 
Advisory Team has started incorporating the concept within their work, including in 
Guinea-Bissau,146 and efforts are underway to begin a national security policy 
formulation process in Nepal, before the institutional process of integrating the Maoist 
PLAN and government forces begins.147  
 
While not yet firmly incorporated in commonly understood SSR programming, 
prioritizing the development of a formalized national security strategy before 
institutional reconstruction takes place may alleviate the difficulties caused by the 
three major issues raised above. Firstly, it requires far less resources than major force 
reconstruction programmes – probably only the services of, at most, three to four 
outside facilitators. Secondly, if compiled with little outside involvement it will be 
more reflective of the actual situation inside the country, whether neo-patrimonial or 
more fully rational-bureaucratic. The extent to which data and analysis will be 
included, not included, or manipulated to maximise external donor support or to 
support certain outcomes will be an unavoidable consequence of the general level of 
transparency prevailing in the country.  
 
While there are a number of potential advantages in formulating national frameworks, 
there are also a number of implementation difficulties. Scheye notes that they can take 
three to five years to draft; have exhibited little effect on improving justice and 
security delivery for, at best, a decade or more; are rarely capable of being 
implemented; and are sometimes among the first casualties of a democratic transition 
of power to the opposition, as was the case in Timor-Leste. In reviewing SSR efforts 
in 2010, Scheye suggested that one of the principal values of national strategies was 
actually the local actors’ skills acquired in the drafting process. Acquisition of these 
skills helps the development of human capital.  
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 Short-Term Stabilization versus Longer-Term Governance  
Programmes which focus on transferring equipment and skills to foreign security 
forces, without concerns over governance have a long history. Foreign advisors were 
dispatched to Chile, for example from 1810 and to Egypt from 1815, and many 
advisors served less formally earlier.148 During the Cold War, U.S. train and equip 
programmes involved aid to Cuban exiles which led to the Bay of Pigs operation as 
well as many armed forces in Latin America and elsewhere. Yet during the Cold War 
the emphasis was on gaining foreign friends, not building security forces that 
mirrored the advisor nation’s own values.149 Where this was tried, Cold War 
experience in the Congo/Zaire and Vietnam (and possibly Nigeria,150 Liberia and 
Afghanistan) proved that it was often difficult to build up reliable management 
mechanisms for indigenous armed forces. After the Cold War ended, U.S. emphasis 
shifted to the promotion of democratic values, and this well matched the developing 
theories of what became SSR. Yet the same types of issues continued to be a problem. 
Hills reports the same failure with regard to British police following the end of the 
Cold War: “many years' [British] support to forces such as those of Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe have failed to promote either accountability or the good management 
practices consistent with Western interpretations of liberalization or 
professionalism.”151 
 
A number of converging factors have however meant that the promotion of good 
governance and management practices has often been subordinated to concerns of 
training and equipping security forces. The U.S. ‘war on terror’ has increased pressure 
to build numbers of security forces quickly, due to the stabilization imperative to 
deploy as many personnel as possible. While not directly involving creation of 
security forces, the desire for actionable intelligence from captured terrorists has led 
to the circumvention of Western countries’ legal safeguards and allegedly to 
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torture.152 A more intelligent approach might have taken longer but produce more 
results (as well as avoiding bad publicity). Gaining allies’ aid worldwide to help avoid 
legal constraints has not bolstered the profile of SSR norms.  
 
As well as these ‘war on terror’ induced factors, the intrinsic difficulty encountered on 
UN missions of changing the state has also contributed. Mark Sedra coined the above-
mentioned term, the ‘slide toward expediency,’ to describe programmes which aimed 
at increasing the democratic accountability of the security sector, but instead 'have 
been superseded by a singular focus on training and equipping the country's fledgling 
security forces.' Numerous analysts have reported the problem, including Ball153, Rees 
(most successes have occurred in organising security forces, while the greatest 
failures have occurred in establishing civilian oversight and management),154 Sedra,155 
Law,156 Hutchful and Fayemi157 and Hills among them. 
 
One of the more important factors in creating this ‘slide to expediency’ has been the 
short-term stabilization imperative, especially since the ‘war on terror’ began, to 
rapidly train and deploy as many security force personnel as possible. This appears to 
have been a significant factor in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. These countries are also the ones where there has been the least attention 
to an army reconstruction agenda that reflects core SSR norms.158 Somewhat 
surprisingly, the need to deploy army forces quickly does not appear to have hastened 
training elsewhere. Transition of responsibility to a revitalised local force has not 
been explicitly planned for nor undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor in Kosovo. In 
East Timor, the United Nations took an inordinate amount of time to decide how to 
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deal with Falintil, encamped at Aileu, and from September 1999 to February 2001 the 
bulk of the revered guerillas remained there in deteriorating conditions.159  
 
This ‘operational capability vs comprehensive SSR’ issue leads one to question 
whether much of the army reform programmes underway can actually be considered 
true democratising SSR. Programmes simply aimed at arming and training army and 
police forces appear to undermine SSR’s core principles.160 The issue is interwoven 
with the difficulties of creating full local ownership of army reconstruction 
programmes. Local ownership is usually interpreted as including the active consent of 
national political elites. Yet while these elites may operate in a system which has 
some democratic features, in many cases, allowing full democratic oversight and 
outside influence from parliament and civil society over such programmes is 
anathema. Thus programmes which improve or create effective armies are welcomed, 
but not the governance aspects which would make the programmes more 
comprehensive and thus sustainable. Including such governance aspects can often 
trigger local dissatisfaction and opposition, and therefore struggle between donors and 
local elites.  
 
The successful incorporation of governance components into army redevelopment or 
reconstruction programmes is the crucial mark of whether a programme can truly be 
considered SSR. Based on analysis of army reconstruction programmes, it appears 
that significant governance components were attempted in a total of four – Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, South Africa, and Sierra Leone. Due to absence of any 
perceived need (in the early operations in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique) UN 
delay and reluctance to take decisions (East Timor), and the aforementioned short-
term stabilization imperatives, governance has not been, it seems, a significant 
component of many army reconstruction programmes. It may be very difficult for 
both reasons of short-term stabilization trumping governance, and the three major 
obstacles posited above, to effectively achieve meaningful and sustainable SSR in 
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these programmes. This situation both reflects and raises questions about deeper flaws 
in the SSR concept as a whole. 
 Security Sector Management 
The five areas surveyed above all include areas of concern that potentially threaten 
the basis of SSR and army reconstruction within it. The concern with security sector 
management (SSM) is different. The application of management principles to SSR 
promises a number of potentially useful techniques and improvements in the way the 
discipline is implemented, both conceptually and in the field. The question as regards 
SSM and army reconstruction is what benefit the application of SSM techniques can 
have and whether they can be applied to alleviate some of the issues canvassed above.  
 
At first glance, recent SSM literature seems to offer attractive, more sophisticated 
tools which could assist in carrying out army reconstruction programmes. These 
include work by Fitz-Gerald and Tracy in 2008, and Van Veen also in 2008. 
 
Fitz-Gerald and Tracy analysed alternate decision making models to decide which 
model best suited security sector reform’s requirements.161 They determined that a 
variant of the Multi-Criteria Decision-making Model (MCDM) was the best choice of 
the varied models available for further analysis. Fitz-Gerald and Tracy developed a 
two-dimensional model with a y-axis representing ‘Strategy Value’ and an x-axis 
representing ‘Ability to Implement.’ Potential programmes, which might include, for 
army reconstruction, ‘basic recruit training,’ or ‘civics training for soldiers’ are then 
scored on a weighted scale to produce a value for that particular policy proposal. An 
‘ability to implement’ is then calculated by group brainstorming. Thereafter both the 
policy proposal value and ‘ability to implement’ are determined and plotted on a 3x3 
matrix, as depicted in Figure 1. This allows the relative value of each proposal to be 
considered. 
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Figure 1: Possible Actions Resulting from the MCDM SSR Decision Matrix (Fitz-
Gerald and Tracy 2008) 
 
If an army is not in being, the model can be applied to the complex process of DDR. 
If an army is in being - army redevelopment versus army reconstruction - the model 
provides a sophisticated, rigourous process for choosing the most valuable and easiest 
to implement programmatic sub-component. The Western model of army 
reconstruction depends upon all steps of the recruit/train/exercise/operate sequence162 
being implemented. The modified MCDM model would thus be run multiple times in 
order to guide planners through each step of the rebuilding process. 
 
It could be considered that there might be two weaknesses with this model. A first 
potential weakness of the model is the necessity for indigenous actors to accept its 
premise. In at least one context, that of Africa, Prunier suggests that Westerners have 
repeatedly been manipulated for indigenous actors’ ends.163 The model has been 
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subject to initial field testing.164 However the data on the field testing is insufficient to 
determine the absolute level of complexity of the test case. Some neo-patrimonial 
environments, such as the eastern Congo, have layers upon layers of different issues 
which all interrelate. In complex neo-patrimonial contexts, interveners attempting to 
utilize this model may not be able to fully appreciate attempts by group participants to 
manipulate its workings. Scheye noted in 2010 that ‘donors do not take the 
multivariate politics of partner countries sufficently into account.’165 The model is 
only two years old; further testing will refine and develop it.  
 
Another potential weakness, the difficulty of attributing the correct discrete values to 
intangible qualities, should eventually be nullified through repeated use. The same 
value, such a ‘4’ for police development, may actually describe differents levels of 
perceptions of capabilities in different countries. A ‘4’ in Burundi may describe a 
different level of capability than a ‘4’ in Thailand. This makes it difficult to achieve 
comparative assessments. In other words, it may be difficult to avoid ‘comparing 
apples with oranges.’ Particular intangible-numerical associations may also be 
challenged, however, if there is political value in doing so, which might be more 
likely to come from beyond the working group’s immediate participants. 
 
Van Veen’s work on reverse stakeholder mapping is also a potentially very valuable 
tool for SSR assessment.166 It is also a two-dimensional, four-box model. However it 
is focused on ‘the identification of realistic and meaningful strategic SSR 
objectives.’167 Examination of army reconstruction programmes reveals that in most 
cases there is an implicit understanding that army creation will be required, thus 
setting the strategic objective. Often the intent to create or redevelop an army is 
specifically written into the peace accord (eg in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique, or 
Nepal). The Haiti case shows this trend as well. Before the Haiti intervention of 1994, 
U.S. military planning called for the retention of an army reduced in strength. It was 
the specific decision of Haitian President Aristide to disband the army, against 
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international wishes, that reduced Haiti’s security forces to a police force only.168 In 
2011, newly-elected Haitian President Michel Martelly promised during his campaign 
to recreate the force.169 This plan only reinforces the trend which shows that retention 
of an army is almost always prima facie expected.  
 
However, if an army is already in existence, and redevelopment is required, Van 
Veen’s model is an excellent tool. It provides a means to navigating the complex 
array of personal and factional interests that usually exist in such forces in a post 
conflict situation. However, an essential requirement is a comprehensive 
understanding of the actors, their interests, and their inter-linkages. Sometimes this 
prerequisite is not put in place, as Van Veen himself acknowledges.170  Short tours of 
duty for international staff are a particular problem. An example directly relevant to 
army reconstruction is that of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which have up until 2010 
focused undue effort on the insurgency and not enough on understanding the 
environment and the people.171 If this knowledge is available, the Van Veen model 
becomes useful. Without an adequate depth of data, little success will be achieved. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard is an additional management tool potentially useful for 
improving the effectiveness of army reconstruction and redevelopment programmes. 
Fitz-Gerald and Jackson argued for the application of the Balanced Scorecard to SSR 
strategizing because ‘it is a balanced system for indices for effectiveness and has been 
widely accepted in the management of small, medium and large organizations’ 
worldwide.172 The scorecard is a performance measurement tool that has been 
additionally adopted for strategy and communications. It ‘translates an organisation’s 
mission and strategy into a comprehensive set of performance measures that provide 
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the framework for a strategic measurement and management system.’173 According to 
the Balanced Scorecard Institute, introducing the tool into use will:174 
*Increase focus on strategy and results  
*Improve organizational performance by measuring what matters 
*Align organization strategy with the work people do on a day-to-day basis  
*Focus on the drivers of future performance  
*Improve communication of the organization’s Vision and Strategy, and 
*Prioritize Projects / Initiatives (that will achieve that strategy) 
 
The scorecard breaks down organisational performance into four main areas, which 
for the private sector were financial, customers, internal business process and learning 
& growth. The financial perspective is traditionally placed at the top as this is the 
aspect the organisation wishes to perform best in. The inter-relationship of the other 
three perspectives are ideally combined in such a way as to produce the best possible 
financial performance. To adopt the tool to SSR use, Fitz-Gerald and Jackson changed 
the primary focus from that of customer to the whole of a society affected by SSR. 
The amended model is depicted in Figure 2 below. Prioritizing the Societal 
perspective at the top, Fitz-Gerald and Jackson changed the other three corners to 
enabling mechanisms, resources, and future. Enabling mechanisms (the former 
internal business processes) include, for this version, specific sub-programmes such as 
a peacekeeping mission, justice reform, micro-credit programmes, disarmament 
programmes, etc. The futures section, Fitz-Gerald and Jackson said, would cover 
education and training activities. 
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Figure 2: A Balanced Scorecard for Security Sector Reform (Source Fitz-
Gerald/Jackson 2008) 
 
The Balanced Scorecard is a helpful assessment tool when faced with integration of a 
number of programmes, at a general level. Yet army reconstruction, in the form of the 
organise-train-operate-reconstitute cycle,175 must go through a series of specific steps. 
Due to this more rigid nature, the process can be modeled in greater detail than the 
BSC allows.  
 
Thus the recent Security Sector Management literature is of potential use for 
ascertaining guidelines for army redevelopment and reconstruction. Fitzgerald & 
Tracy’s MCDM model is potentially very valuable for SSR decision-making. 
However, it may require further validation and testing. The Van Veen model is also 
potentially very valuable if a rich understanding of the specific context is available, 
but will have to be trialed in the field. The BSC, reflecting its origins and application 
to a wide range of issues, is a generalized tool for a situation, army reconstruction, 
that can be more specifically analysed. Overall SSM is in its infancy. With longer 
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practice and field trials, it may potentially be of great value, though it appears at the 
moment to systematically underestimate the effect of power relations.176 Other models 
will no doubt be created in the future to address different issues. But the first step will 
be popularizing the models so that they can be thoroughly evaluated. This may be 
slow due to the unfamiliarity of the calculation processes involved to those without a 
management background. In countries where the education system has been destroyed 
by war, assimilating the complex concepts involved may also be difficult.  
 
 Summarizing the SSR Critiques 
Having examined the origins of SSR and its major critiques, the question is to 
ascertain which of them bear directly upon army reconstruction as a subcomponent of 
defence sector reform, itself part of wider SSR.  
 
According to the OECD, SSR should be approached in a holistic fashion, with work 
in ministries on regulations parliamentary scrutiny, and the training and equipping of 
security forces all complementing each other. Yet since 1998 SSR has arguably 
privileged this state-centric approach when applying it to regions where the state is 
not the primary security provider. Given the fragility of the state in these 
circumstances, it appears extremely unlikely that state security organisations will 
become such primary providers except possibly in the very long term. Nonstate 
organisms are established and customarily accepted, while increasing state capacity is 
vastly expensive. To fully implement its vision, the SSR project needs to more clearly 
recognise the extent of weakness of the state, and the non-state dominance of security 
provision, and adjust its approach accordingly. Armies should probably be tasked 
with more limited missions that they might be able to accomplish more fully, while 
the vast majority of the non-military missions that adhere to the armed forces in the 
developing world are placed firmly on other shoulders.  
 
SSR is an inherent rational-bureaucratic process conceived as part of a properly 
functioning Northern-style state. However the majority of Southern countries operate 
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through versions of a neo-patrimonial system. Yet while SSR programmes are 
implemented they explicitly and implicitly seek to transform the core attributes of the 
state. The existing, weak, bureaucratic systems, which are usually subject to stronger 
kin and patronage imperatives, are strained extensively by reform pressures from 
abroad. The result for army reconstruction and security force development more 
generally has often been the ‘slide toward expediency’ – prioritization of capability 
improvements with emphasis on governance reforms falling away. A reduction in 
expectations will almost certainly be necessary, as well as a contextualized approach 
to choosing which values to prioritize, in order to make progress.  
 
Local ownership is a core tenet, if a perennially difficult one, of SSR. A recipient 
country’s leaders and citizens must adopt transformation as their own if changes are 
to be sustained. Yet army reconstruction is one of the least locally owned sets of 
programmes incorporated as part of the SSR paradigm. From Zimbabwe to Bosnia-
Herzegovina to East Timor to Kosovo, the model to be aimed for almost every case is 
a high-quality all-volunteer force. This agenda has had varying levels of adoption and 
sustainment. Scholars looking at options to address the local ownership conundrum 
more effectively appear to raise the possibility of a range of ownership options, from 
micro, to medium and macro levels,177 adapted to the specific environment. Such 
changes would mean fundamental change to the present pattern of army 
reconstruction.   
 
Just as threatening to the ideals of SSR is the lack of effectively functioning 
governance components in army reconstruction programmes. Upon a close 
examination of the set of programmes categorized as army reconstruction by this 
thesis, it appears that very few fully qualify as SSR. The ‘war on terror’ and other 
pressures that have prioritised the short-term stabilization imperative of getting the 
maximum number of soldiers operational have meant that ‘train and equip’ type 
programmes has become much more prevalent. This is also directly applicable to 
SSR-compatible army reconstruction, threatening its integrity.  
 
                                                 
177
  Donnais 2008, 5, and Scheye 2010 11-16. 
  
 
The effect of these sustained criticisms is to leave mainstream, large-scale SSR 
accused of being essentially impractical and untrue to some of its core tenets. The 
development of national security strategies or Martin and Wilson’s Security Sector 
Evolution do however provide a path forward, provided a diminution of objectives is 
accepted. If incorporated into programmatic reality, SSR would in most non-urgent 
cases be transformed from a large scale invasive effort to a long consultation process 
before more limited action. At the beginning of an intervention, however, it will often 
be necessary to accept less locally owned immediate security solutions in order to 
stabilize the situation. Yet even if introspection produces a change in policy, army 
reconstruction programmes dominated by ‘train and equip’ imperatives will continue, 
and continue to be launched, as well. Evolution of these types of military aid 
programmes will in most cases lag well behind the evolution of the academic-led 
discipline. 
 
One of the few remedies to set against this set of dilemmas is the increasingly adopted 
option of formulating an overall, integrated, national security strategy before 
embarking upon comprehensive institutional transformation. This approach was first 
utilised in Kosovo from 2006 (though Kosovo at the time was not technically a 
sovereign state). Requiring only salaries and support for a few facilitators at the most, 
it is not resource intensive. It will reflect the nature of the society it operates within, 
whether neo-patrimonial or nearly fully rational-bureaucratic. However, its analysis 
and accuracy is likely to be distorted to a greater or lesser extent in order to produce 
formulations that will appeal to outside donors. The less international involvement 
there is, the more local ownership there will be. Support can be provided by South-
South facilitation, and such facilitation is likely to be more appropriate to the 
conditions than advisors from the global North. Governance concerns, rather than 
emphasis on training and equipment, can be incorporated early in the process. Such an 
approach can set favourable conditions for army reconstruction much earlier in the 
overall SSR process. 
 
Army reconstruction appears to be heading in two diverging directions. One direction 
represents the main thrust of present activity, concentrating on the ‘train and equip’ 
side of army assistance with few concerns over governance. This trend leads one out 
of the true SSR paradigm, but seems unlikely to have its level of activity reduced 
  
 
because of that. The other direction, headed by activities such as national security 
strategy reviews and civil society-security force consultations, leads away from 
recognizable defence sector reform in the current mode and into an unforeseeable 
series of security force evolution activities. Unifying the two streams of activity 
seems unlikely, given the long history of relative failure in incorporating governance 
considerations into army redevelopment. Therefore the challenge is to choose the 
right option of the two for each individual situation. Debating the issues thoroughly, 
through whatever variant of a national security strategy review or a security sector 
evolution process, is almost certainly the best alternative to achieve sustainability 
through maximization of local ownership. Where immediate security solutions are 
required, however, creating capability quickly through a ‘train-and-equip’ approach 
may be the only viable alternative. 
 
To summarize, major issues facing security sector reform include the role of non-state 
security actors, the challenge of a neo-patrimonial, rather than rational-bureaucratic, 
state system, inadequate local ownership, and lack of governance components within 
programmes. As noted above, these factors and other seem to lead army 
reconstruction in two separate directions, ‘train-and-equip’ programmes and gradual 
security force evolution activities. Yet to match the multiples challenges there is also 
guidance available, from a variety of sources. The next chapter moves the discussion 
from challenges and opportunities facing SSR, to a detailed analysis of guidance 
available for army reconstruction. 
  
 
 
 Chapter 3: Army Reconstruction Literature Review 
  
 Existing Army Reconstruction Guidance   
 
This chapter moves from challenges and its opportunities facing SSR, to issues 
specific to army reconstruction as a part of defence reform. The ‘conceptual-
contextual divide’ which hampers SSR is very obvious when army reconstruction is 
examined in detail. This section examines guidelines, strengths, and critiques 
applicable to a range of defence sector related programmes. The results of such 
examination can then be fed back to evaluate the SSR principles. Existing guidance at 
the strategic and operational level is now well-informed by contextual study. But 
changing government and international agency operating methods is a long, slow 
process with frequent reversions. At the tactical level, little progress has been made to 
change innate Northern conceptualizations of what is and is not achievable for the 
security agencies of a ‘post-conflict’ state. The liberal peace agenda, and the 
motivations of external actors as opposed to those indigenous to a country, is also 
only infrequently questioned. 
 
This section reviews in succession the broad policy guidance and doctrine which is 
available for post-conflict army reconstruction. The broad policy guidance covers two 
main issues. First is overall SSR guidance for policy and process from the OECD 
Handbook. It has served as a milestone in developing the field. The other is defence 
sector reform, including Boucher’s and Burgess’s work, and Le Roux and 
Bonnemaison’s ideas on ‘appropriate’ forces. The communities of practitioners and 
academics working on development and SSR have iteratively created a range of 
techniques and processes which can add a great deal of value to land forces 
reconstruction programmes. Thereafter disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR), an often important precursor to land forces reform, will be 
examined. The recent written doctrine for developing armies, produced by the UK and 
US since 2007, is then analysed.  
  
 
 Broad Policy Guidance 
Effective SSR programming, Fitz-Gerald and Jackson said in 2008, ‘appeared to be 
driven largely by active SSR donors who work with experienced sets of personal and 
professional networks on the ground; and the movement of those networks from one 
theatre of operations to another.’178 SSR training opportunities were initially limited 
to a few courses provided by specialist institutions such as the Global Facilitation 
Network for SSR. Applying only individuals’ previous experience, whether military 
or developmental, means that approaches and techniques for SSR will be inherently 
limited to that previous skill-set. This situation had led to much wasted effort in 
several theatres. For example, retired U.S. soldiers employed to train the Iraqi army in 
contractor positions face an organizational environment significantly different from 
peaceful training camps in the continental United States. These failures were slowly 
recognized, and much has been learned, especially since the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks brought an unprecedented increase in army reconstruction activity. 
Partially in response, SSR practitioners, aided by the international development 
community, made a concerted effort from 2006 to amass overall guidance to fill this 
‘absence of guidance and tools supporting SSR interventions.’179  
 
Much of this effort became focused on the development of the Implementation 
Framework – Security Sector Reform (IF-SSR). The creation of the IF-SSR in turn 
resulted in the OECD DAC Handbook on SSR in 2007. The OECD DAC Handbook 
made available valuable overall guidance to the whole SSR community.180 Many SSR 
donors and enabling partners adopted the Handbook as a baseline framework for their 
work. Meanwhile, the number of SSR training providers has increased, with the 
International Security Sector Advisory Team, the United Nations, the Folke 
Bernadotte Academy, and the Austrian Defence Ministry all administering training 
courses.   
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 Broad Overall Guidance for Defence Sector Reconstruction 
The compilation of the OECD DAC Handbook drew together in systematic form 
much knowledge that had only theretofore existed at the level of individual 
practitioners and groups of practitioners.181 Section Three of the Handbook outlines 
an assessment tool covering ‘conflict and political analysis; assessing the governance 
and capacity of the security sector; identifying the needs of the poor, and highlighting 
other frameworks and programmes with which SSR could be linked.’182 Chapter 5 of 
the Handbook lays out overall guidance for strengthening national government 
institutions, while a section of Chapter 7 addresses defence reform specifically. Then 
the defence sector itself will be more closely examined, firstly sketching the relatively 
rigid and inflexible nature of army reconstruction programmes as they currently are 
being implemented. The defence sector process guidelines in Chapter 7 of the OECD 
Handbook will be then discussed, and then the work of Burgess, LeRoux and 
Bonnemaison. 
 
The OECD Handbook describes ideal steps for a through assessment process. These 
include extensive consultation, and the conduct of a series of analyses covering the 
whole conflict situation, including parallel programmes. Joint assessments with other 
international partners and the local government are desirable if possible. In the case of 
army reconstruction, one of the most important issues is army-police interaction. Yet 
here the OECD Handbook does not emphasize sufficiently the insecurity that both 
armies and police forces tend to create. While the OECD’s work is well-considered, 
multiple scholars suggest assessment and research should go beyond this level of 
engagement. They believe a ‘thick description’ - a la Geertz - of the environment 
should be attempted.183 Such additional work involves significant effort, but promises 
significant rewards in terms of understanding the local environment. 
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Effective capability development has been a challenge since the colonial era began, as 
Northerners have attempted to socialize peoples of other cultures into their behavioral 
and professional norms. While developing capability, SSR projects should be 
incorporated within overall national development programs documents.184  
 
Military capability development effectively has two parts. At the initial stage, military 
capability development - initial recruit training - is reasonably simple, about up to 
platoon or company level. Given a level of experience by the trainers and some 
facilities and resources, there are no special difficulties. The difficulties arise when 
heavy equipment and specialized support training is introduced.185 Effective 
maintenance, supply, and personnel administration all require well-trained personnel 
operating within a strong institutional framework. Many are not fulfilling directly 
military tasks, but instead administrative ones for which opportunities, or pay, may be 
much greater in civilian life or in the NGO community. This assumes that the skills 
can be imparted in the first place – something that may be difficult once the foreign 
trainers leave, in countries where the literacy rate can be very low. Thus backing 
trained junior soldiers with all the institutions that go to making up an army can be a 
very difficult task. 
 
There are a number of potential difficulties with this approach. The first is the 
question of whether army reconstruction, a very foreign-dominated process, can be 
smoothly incorporated into wider SSR efforts without distorting them. Enormous 
projected costs for SSR for example are frequently provided by foreign donors 
without being channeled through the country’s Ministry of Finance. The second is the 
risk of creating an over-powerful civilian entity which can dominate much 
government business in a country where security is lacking. A good example is the 
Office of National Security in Sierra Leone, where even non-security functions were 
being drawn within its ambit.186 The Sierra Leone example cited relied heavily on a 
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few key figures well capable of running such a potentially politically powerful office 
in a non-partisan way. The OECD may overestimate the likelihood of having such 
personnel available who can be trusted to run the process in a non partisan fashion.  
 
Overall the Handbook lays out a well thought out series of considerations vital in the 
undertaking of SSR efforts. Yet it is arguably an over-projection of Northern 
conceptualizations onto areas that are by nature very different. Overall, the critical 
weaknesses are not just the oft-mentioned lack of capability and intent. Capability and 
intent are important drawbacks. In the countries under study, with education and an 
ethos of service both often lacking, such limitations do hold progress back. But 
probably more important is that well-meaning interveners ‘tend to give too little 
attention to the functions that are served by dysfunctional phenomena such as civil 
wars.’187 Thus a complex set of factors may push policy in the direction of failure. 
Policy may address a certain problem, but not with sufficient resources, or not 
including key local actors, or only address symptoms, rather than root causes. These 
problems can result in failure through ‘obstacles to implementation’. Yet the failure of 
a particular policy does not mean that all those contributing to the intervention have 
failed in their most important goals.188 For example, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is giving substantial aid to the Congolese Army (the FARDC). But whether the 
FARDC becomes efficient and accountable may not matter particularly to the PRC, if 
their aid to the army assures them continued access to the Congo’s minerals.  
The OECD Handbook is also biased to an extent by the prevailing approach to SSR 
which privileges state-based solutions. If state institutions are not strong enough in 
post-conflict environments to make these policy prescriptions effective, the 
Handbook’s approach is severely hampered.  
 
Before moving from discussion of OECD guidance on strengthening institutions to 
the more specific defence reform process, it is useful to review the generally common 
characteristics of army reconstruction. Army reconstruction programmes are usually 
supply driven, do not usually reflect the consensus of the wider local population, are 
restricted in their ability to flexibly adjust to changes in the local situation. They are 
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even more restricted in contractor settings due to the necessity for adherence to a 
fixed contract. They persist because they are the prevailing vehicle of choice for 
implementation of formed programmes, long the usual method of engagement of 
overseas aid for development and defence ministries.189  
 
As opposed to policy, the OECD Handbook provides helpful guidance on the process 
of army reconstruction. Linkages to wider SSR efforts as part of defence reform are 
important. Police functions and responsibilities vis-à-vis the armed forces, especially, 
need to be carefully delineated and well understood.190 Oversight is critical, through a 
variety of institutions. There are a number of important issues to consider in army 
reconstruction programme design.191 Building reconstruction constituencies both 
within and beyond the military is especially important. Within the military, the 
interests of the different functional, hierarchical, and social groupings need to be 
considered and factored into the process. Once the need for a reconstruction or 
redevelopment programme has been accepted, creating a consensus on objectives and 
benchmarks is important.192 Here, it can be difficult to avoid subvention by particular 
vested interests. Advisors’ reports also make it clear that there can be significant 
resistance to setting clear objectives. Indigenous senior officers sometimes do not 
wish to commit targets to paper,193 often, probably, to avoid being held accountable. 
 
Encouraging public debate on defence and security issues allows the security 
concerns of more groups to be heard. It can potentially increase long-term 
sustainability by fostering greater local ownership, though it will be influenced by 
vested interests. South Africa is a good example of improved public involvement 
heightening the effectiveness and credibility of the reform process.194 To inculcate 
lasting improvements in armies’ effectiveness, it is likely that improvements in 
management and accountability will be more fruitful – a contention supported by 
Scheye and McLean’s work.195 Without well-entrenched management procedures, 
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short-term training improvements are likely to be dissipated. If such procedures are 
firmly set in place, conscientious internal review may eventually lead to priorities 
being identified for donor consideration, at the very least. 
 
The OECD outlines a number of lessons which have been learned during previous 
reform processes in the former Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and elsewhere. These include 
the need to build reform constituencies, and the need to challenge unbridled military 
secrecy.196 Most recent civil wars have involved extensive violence against the 
civilian population. These and other undesirables need to be prevented from entering 
the permanent force.197 The recent process in Liberia provides the best example of 
filtering potential applicants for a new army. Extensive background checks, including 
home visits and interviews were conducted.198 Once the undesirables have been 
filtered out, the new soldiers must gain public trust if the force is to be effective.199 
 
The level of attention paid to the OECD DAC guidelines in the army reconstruction 
arena has been limited. As mentioned above, numerous commentators note that a 
‘train and equip’ approach has prevailed over concerns over higher-level governance 
of the security sector. More widely, with the exception of South Africa and Sierra 
Leone, an assessment of SSR in Africa in 2005 found that while various types of 
security reform programmes were planned or under way, few of them conformed to 
the OECD-DAC definition.200 The process in Iraq echoes this trend.201  
 
Stephen Burgess, Alix Boucher, Len LeRoux and Eric Bonnemaison offer a number 
of army reconstruction recommendations. In 2008 Burgess wrote possibly the most 
important directly relevant work to date on integrating security forces.202 He 
examined post-conflict African armies which were formed by merging rival warring 
factions into a new army. He identified four factors that he determined affected the 
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success or failure of integrating security forces. The four variables were state strength, 
external involvement and assistance, the professionalism of contending militias, and 
the management of the integration process. However Burgess’s work does not 
examine some of the factors involved in great detail. The discussion above critiquing 
SSR examines most of the factors he describes in a more precise fashion. 
 
Boucher authored a note on current practice on defence sector reform in 2009.203 She 
echoed the primacy of a needs assessment when designing programmes, and asked 
whether armed forces were really actually necessary (as opposed to perhaps only 
border guards or a gendarmerie). Roles and responsibilities needed to be defined, and 
existing armed forces need to be carefully evaluated to determine whether they are 
either too large or too small to meet the country’s requirements. The armed forces’ 
role, purpose, and structure needs to be driven by the country’s national security 
strategy and policy documents. She echoes the need for coordination between 
different donors’ programmes referred to above. 
 
In 2006, LeRoux developed a vision of armed forces which were ‘appropriate, 
adequate, accountable, and affordable.’  Creating forces appropriate to their missions 
means a focus on realistic missions; ‘fast reaction to humanitarian disasters,’ and 
‘effective support to civil authorities,’ are better priorities than the unreal prospect of 
defence against external state military aggression.204 Herbst points out that borders 
can often be guaranteed by international customary practice, with little likelihood of 
border changes. ‘Weak states have been able to claim sovereignty over distant 
borderlands because no other state could challenge their rule.’205206 Development or 
maintenance of a gendarmerie capability is perfectly legitimate, though not historical 
practice in Anglophone states.207 Bonnemaison warns that the basic mission of the 
military must not become either a quasi-police role or that of replacing private 
companies undertaking developmental work. Yet other scholars argue however that 
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such a role can free up scarce resources.208 During the first decade of the twenty-first 
century such a development role for armies in Africa remained a temptation to 
national governments.209  The present author believes, that a properly relief and 
development role, might allieviate to an extent that lack of activity that LeRoux's 
'unreal prospect' of exterior defence implies.  
 
This is a thesis focused upon weak states which have had to accept international 
intervention forces. The evidence suggests that it is extremely difficult to reconstruct 
or otherwise create effective, accountable armies in these type of weak states.   
Therefore the intellectual question of how to create such armies remains unresolved. 
State and army are intrinsically linked. The literature suggests that evolution through 
war is the only known way of building effective states.210 European rulers threatened 
with losing their states’ existence were forced to make state structures more effective 
in order to repel attacks. Many weak states in Europe were destroyed in continual 
warfare over hundreds of years.211 State boundaries continually moved, as strong 
states reshaped and destroyed weaker states. The surviving states eventually created 
effective state institutions, including armies.  
 
Jeffrey Herbst explored this issue in regard to Africa in his book States and Power in 
Africa, published in 2000. He noted that the OAU’s 1964 Cairo resolution on border 
problems froze state boundaries in Africa through a ‘pledge to respect the frontiers 
existing on their achievement of national independence.’ This was intended to avoid 
threats to the political leadership of the newly independent colonial states. With state 
boundaries frozen, the type of warfare that created effective states in Europe could not 
take place in post-colonial Africa.212 Diplomatic compromises in other regions of the 
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world have also created the same type of unmoving boundaries. Examples relevant to 
this thesis include the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It appears that 
there is a conceptual answer to how to create effective and potentially accountable 
armies, but it may not be of immediate assistance for the states at the core of this 
thesis. 
 The DDR Experience  
Army reconstruction is one of a number of SSR programmatic components whose 
outcome depends heavily on the result of the critical interim period, immediately after 
a peace accord has been signed. To allow implementation to begin, the intervening 
force must quickly seize dominance of the security space.213 Once this dominance has 
been ensured, threats to the peace process can be addressed.  
 
This is the point from which disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) 
programmes have a crucial role. DDR programmes aim to transition former soldiers 
of national armed forces and insurgent or warlord fighters from a precarious existence 
as combatants to productive members of society. DDR programmes under the United 
Nations banner and beyond have over eighteen years of history, since programmes 
began in Mozambique in 1992. It is relatively easy to collect weaponry and disburse 
transition payments. However the most significant DDR obstacle is the repeated 
difficulty of reintegrating ex-combatants into social and economic life. Often the 
reintegration component programme is neither sufficiently well planned nor well 
funded. DDR is important for army reconstruction because it serves as the critical 
transition link between warring combatant and retrained soldier status. If it is 
executed badly, there will be much more difficulty recreating an army.  
 
The conventional view of DDR can be summarized through its treatment in the 
OECD Handbook and the ISS’s monograph on Sierra Leone. The process consists of 
planning, scheduling implementation, collecting weapons, storage and disposal or 
destruction, monitoring and verification, and reintegration efforts.214 The OECD adds 
the necessity to make decisions on post-conflict security forces prior to 
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demobilization, so as to smooth the process out and to avoid a security vacuum, as 
well as the need for an effective census and identification programme, in order to 
reestablish democratic control and build public trust.215 Members of the military who 
will be retired or demobilized by reconstruction processes need to have expectations 
of generous separation support dampened if at all possible. This is not a hard and fast 
rule, as potential political disruptions by former combatants during DDR may force 
reassessment in the interests of keeping the peace.216 Stockpile security is also an 
issue.  
 
Beyond demobilization, the process can involves counseling, civic education, and 
retraining of ex-combatants in useful skills. Yet much of the retraining, for example, 
in Sierra Leone, in car repair and carpentry,217 is not particularly productive due to 
lack of economic opportunity and start-up capital.218 Furthermore, in countries which 
are fundamentally primary producers, there is often little interest in agriculture, where 
the bulk of opportunities lie.219 If demobilized combatants are not placed into 
employment or provided with skills training opportunities, they can slip into crime or 
banditry.220 Tailored reintegration programmes, such as that of Land Mine Action in 
Liberia, can provide a solution, where training is supplemented with individual 
placement of ex-combatants back into preferred places of settlement.221 However such 
programmes are relatively expensive and very resource intensive, and thus difficult to 
mount on a large scale. Spear emphasizes that while reintegration is difficult, it 
remains the most important part of the process, even if delayed by years.  
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Johanna Spear highlighted challenges and opportunities encountered by numerous 
DDR programmes in a 2005 e-book summary.222 Challenges included the insufficient 
attention to reintegration as noted above, and neglect of psychological issues. Neglect 
of psychological reintegration hampers the ability of ex-combatants to feel fully part 
of society once again. Issues that hamper DDR and are common with other SSR 
efforts include the short attention spans of donors. DDR cannot save a flawed or 
unpopular peace settlement – ‘politics is the independent variable,’ not the technical 
perfection of the DDR process. This is true of other SSR efforts as well. Porous 
borders and widespread regional conflict can also hamper DDR efforts limited to one 
country. Combatants can go through the DDR process in one country, and then 
become involved in another conflict in close geographical proximity. Attempting to 
identify potential solutions, Spear calls for deeper local knowledge to be available to 
interveners, perhaps involving contributions from anthropologists. 
 
Knight describes the tendency of the insurgent groups’ command structures to remain 
as mutual support networks for the former combatants, contrary to the stated aim of 
DDR which is often stated to be dissolving such structures.223 Such networks 
sometimes become criminalized, becoming corrupt political networks as referred to 
by Reno above. Knight emphases the necessity in some cases to provide specialized, 
targeted assistance to the former insurgent organisation so that it could become a pure 
civilian organisation willing to pursue its (often political) objectives peacefully.  
 
In some cases, DDR is only really half completed, and the new forces must deal with 
soldiers that really should be in retirement, such as the personnel of the 1st Battalion 
F-FTDL in East Timor224 and the thousands of older soldiers in the DR Congo’s 
integrated brigades.225 Legal codes applicable to the armed forces in some situations 
do not have provision for routine retirements.226 Provision for retirement of soldiers is 
often overlooked, but can be vital to appropriately cater for potential spoilers. 
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Makinda advances a critique of the mainstream DDR approach by challenging its 
foundations, which, he argues, rests to a great degree on realist and liberal theories.227 
He says that a viewpoint founded upon constructivist theory would show that peace 
processes, including DDR, are not just reliant on financial resources and technical 
arrangements, though they are important. Instead, he argues that the interplay between 
disarmament, on the one hand, and reconstruction, political, social, and economic, on 
the other, ‘is at the core of any successful peacebuilding ..project.’228 Makinda’s point 
is correct, and confidence-building mechanisms need to be considered for inclusion in 
any post-conflict redevelopment process planning. 
 
Mistakes or omissions in the DDR process will damage the following army 
reconstruction programme. A graphic example can be seen in the Congo, where ‘non-
integrated’ FARDC formations fomented trouble and forced the deployment of 
unready integrated brigades into combat. The OECD urges that ‘planning for DDR 
..be a thorough process that takes into account the future size and shape of the armed 
forces.’229 This is the ideal. Yet the more comprehensive and complete the DDR 
process, the easier the following army reconstruction programme will be. 
 
 Doctrine for Reconstructing Armies 
Until around 2007, it appears that no explicit military doctrine had been produced 
which mandated how developed-world armies might assist the reconstruction of 
partner armies in the developing world. In keeping with army reconstruction’s 
Western character, two major Western armies, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, appear to be the sole source of doctrine on the subject.230 Specific formal 
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doctrine on army reconstruction has only appeared since 2007. Earlier U.S. doctrine 
on Foreign Internal Defence (FID) might be thought to have some relevance, 
however, in practice, it does not appear to have been utilized.  
 
The first example of army reconstruction in line with this thesis’s definition was that 
of Zimbabwe in 1980. There is no conclusive data on whether the British Military 
Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) had a manual or procedures for integrating 
and constructing the Zimbabwe National Army, but it appears unlikely. The BMATT 
commander in 1989-91, then Brigadier Tim Toyne-Sewell, had no such doctrine 
available to him.231 This is because the British Army has historically been a 
pragmatically based organization which has not relied heavily on formal doctrine. It 
emphasised flexibility and an empirical approach.232 For much of the post 1945 
period, General Kizely says, ‘to most officers, there was no such thing as ‘doctrine,’ 
only ‘pamphlets,’ – and they were at best a basis for discussion, and for quoting in 
promotions exams.’233 Thinking began to change in the 1990s after General Sir Nigel 
Bagnall commissioned Design for Military Operations, but this trend does not appear 
to have produced any doctrinal thinking for reconstructing armies until a British 
pamphlet of 2007. In addition, Thomas Marks reminds us that just because doctrine 
directs that an army should operate in a particular way does not mean that these 
instructions will be heeded.234 It is likely that the British doctrine described below, 
though more realistic in its appraisal of political factors, is less heeded than the 
counterpart doctrine from the U.S. Army.235 
 
Formal doctrine on army reconstruction had to wait until the British and U.S. Armies 
found it needed in Iraq and Afghanistan. These recently developed manuals provide 
the most explicit guidance identified on the actual mechanics of reconstructing or 
redeveloping a land force. Describing effectively the same process, they exhibit 
strong similarities. Their most severe weakness is their primarily tactical focus, which 
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does not pay enough attention to integrating the army reconstruction process into  
operational and strategic level campaign planning.  
 
First compiled was the British Army’s Doctrine Note 07/16, Developing Indigenous 
Armies, completed in 2007. The Note says that ‘development of an indigenous army 
is easier to describe than to define.’236 It divides the task into preparation, recruitment, 
training, and operations, while noting that these kinds of distinctions are not so clear 
in real life. Key suggested fundamentals included the importance of motivating the 
indigenous soldier, applying local solutions, selecting and maintaining long term 
goals, flexibility, and the distribution of indigenous success stories to bolster morale 
and confidence.237 A good example of the latter is the British arrangement of the entry 
into Musa Qala in 2007. The Afghans took the lead, and the situation was arranged so 
that the media saw no ISAF personnel on the streets when the cameras arrived.238 
 
Preparation steps include identifying individuals who are intuitively suited to working 
with indigenous soldiers, building acceptance of the innate nature of the indigenous 
force, and both cultural and specific military-cultural awareness. Developing language 
skills as well as subject matter experts who can teach the operations and equipment 
support for each weapon or vehicle is also necessary. Recruitment also includes 
sustaining the buildup of the indigenous force from the outset. Training an indigenous 
army should be ‘characterised by understanding and assessment of the indigenous 
soldiers’ capabilities.’239 Ideally, the content of the training would be decided by the 
indigenous soldiers themselves, though this is usually not possible from the outset.  
 
On operations, options for support of the indigenous army include incorporating 
individual soldiers as an integral part of the indigenous unit, partnering allied and 
indigenous units, or embedding assistance teams. The final stage is transition to self 
reliance, in which one needs to express success or failure of the reconstruction effort 
in terms of regional normality. Developed-world standards are not necessarily 
applicable. Timing the transition from directing efforts to mentoring indigenous 
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trainers or commanders is ultimately an intuitive judgment based upon the level of 
indigenous capability and the capability levels normal in the region. 
 
The comparable U.S. Army manual, Field Manual 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance, 
was published on 1 May 2009. It defines Security Force Assistance as ‘the unified 
action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces 
in support of a legitimate authority.’240 Security Force assistance itself is a new 
concept, only coined in 2006. When the U.S. Army arrived in Afghanistan and Iraq, it 
found itself ‘doing something where they had no existing terms describing what they 
were doing or doctrine on how to do it.’241 The nearest available doctrine was 
‘Foreign Internal Defense,’ (FID) when the U.S. helps a host nation government 
prevent or defeat insurgency, lawlessness or subversion. During the Cold War, FID 
was doctrinally a U.S. Army Special Forces task, to train, advise, and assist host 
nation forces. Yet until Iraq and Afghanistan had a government, what the U.S. Army 
and its allies were carrying out was not FID. To make matters worse, if the indigenous 
army is being trained for both exterior and interior defence, depending on the exact 
nature of the assistance, it could fall under a whole range of separate, confusing U.S. 
definitions:242   
 
Confusion exists even when the U.S. trains a force, such as the Georgians, to 
defend themselves from both external and internal threats. Such training 
would doctrinally be Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA) 
but not FID. However, if those same Georgian forces received Joint Combined 
Exchange Training (JCET) with Special Forces or a combined exercise with 
U.S. GPF  [general purpose forces], that training would still be SC but it 
would no longer be SA. If the training was part of the State Department 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) conducted by a contractor, DOD 
might not be involved at all and in that case it would not be SC but it would be 
SA. None of these familiar doctrinal terms cover all developmental situations 
which can easily lead to gaps in planning and confusion during execution.  
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The previous terms, FID, SC, and SA were each tied to a particular aspect of the 
issue, rather than the activity itself.243 Foreign Internal Defense described, as its name 
implied, internal defence, usually counter-insurgency. Security Cooperation was 
associated with a single agency – the Department of Defense – and aimed to build 
defence relationships that promoted specific U.S. security interests, developed 
friendly military capabilities, and provided U.S. forces with access to host nations. 
Security Assistance, on the other hand, was tied to funds provided by the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 whereby the U.S. 
government provided defence articles, training, or services in furtherance of national 
objectives. To avoid rewriting the existing doctrine completely, it was decided to 
create a new term which would focus on the activity, rather than the location, funding 
source, or agency. ‘Security Force Assistance’ was the new term selected. 
 
The best available doctrinal basis for U.S. and U.S. contractor activities in the early 
1990s, while acknowledging these complications, remained Foreign Internal Defense. 
Yet this doctrine was focused on relatively small-scale support to irregular operations, 
not training either conventional heavy manoeuvre fighting forces or forces for 
external defence. Its essentials are described in the 1994 manual FM 31-20-3, 
‘Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces.’ The manual states that the 
‘primary SF mission in FID is to organize, train, advise, and improve the tactical and 
technical proficiency of these forces, so they can defeat the insurgency without direct 
U.S. involvement.’244 It has been described as being about ’professionalising gangs,’ 
and key personnel involved in the Liberia AFL programme from 2004 have said that 
it was not appropriate for use when trying to reconstruct an army.245  In addition, as 
described above, it was a Special Forces doctrine. While some of the soldiers and 
contractors involved in the first wave of U.S. army reconstruction programmes in the 
mid 1990s might have had some involvement in Special Forces, key personnel did 
not.246 It appears that significant numbers of the officers involved in crafting and 
implementing the U.S. programmes from the mid 1990s would have had limited 
involvement at best with Foreign Internal Defense doctrine. 
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The Special Forces manual describes in detail the procedures to be followed in 
conducting these activities, but focuses upon the mechanics of imparting knowledge, 
without incorporating ways in which such activities might form part of a 
democratically controlled army. Not only did such assistance focus on the mechanics 
of training, but it appears that, in most cases at least, the U.S. ‘did not care’ whether 
the training successfully enhanced the capability of host nation forces.247 The object 
of the training, during the Cold War, was met if the U.S. gained political advantage 
from providing the training. Whether host-nation military capabilities were enhanced 
might be incidental.  
 
Despite some fifteen years of additional experience, and the changed imperatives of 
the post-Cold War environment, the 2009 Security Force Assistance manual 
maintains a largely unchanged focus on the mechanics of training foreign forces. As 
part of its ‘Framework’ chapter, the U.S. Security Force Assistance manual describes 
the army reconstruction process in terms of ‘Tasks.’ Tasks in the U.S. model include 
organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist. Initial organisation of 
foreign security forces involves decisions on structure and overall procedures of the 
security force. Recruiting is the next stage, and requires attention to leader selection, 
personnel accountability, and demobilisation at the other end of the process. The first 
training task is making sure the foreign trainers are ready for their task and attuned to 
the host environment. Training standards must be set, and systematic training 
programmes and leaders properly developed. Appropriate equipment must be bought 
and facilities made available. Advising and assisting the foreign force is the final 
stage and continues until conditions no longer require it.  
 
The U.S. manual presents building up foreign security forces as almost a purely 
technical activity – as the text lacks consideration of political factors, in contrast to its 
British counterpart. As such it is very much in line with the apolitical approach seen 
in earlier work such as the 1994 Foreign Internal Defense manual. As a technical set 
of instructions, it fits in well with other U.S. Army doctrine, and is more likely to be 
followed by U.S. officers and soldiers. The U.S. and British manuals take a differing 
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approach to the quality and nature of the new force: while the British manual says that 
‘every …plan for engagement with indigenous forces should be steeped in 
cooperation with local and regional military-cultural normality,’248 the U.S. manual 
has a stronger emphasis on replicating U.S. practices: ‘..many armies lack a 
professional NCO corps; establishing one for a foreign security force may prove 
difficult. In the meantime, adjustments will have to be made..’249 
 
A significant deficiency within the U.S. manual is inherent in its technically heavy 
approach. Egnell and Halden argue that such concepts share the belief that with 
enough knowledge of the context, the actors, and their preferences, one can apply the 
correct actions and therefore produce specific, pre-determined outcomes. The effect of 
power relations is not sufficiently incorporated and the world is viewed as highly 
malleable and controllable. ‘By applying variables X and Y with the appropriate mix 
we can socially engineer our world as we see fit – even within historically minute 
time frames.’250 They go on to say that this type of orthodox positivism in the social 
sciences is rare, and reflects the inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, of explaining 
or predicting the outcomes of complex social processes and individual behaviour.251 
Egnell and Halden argue in response to this issue that contextual understanding needs 
to be increased and expectations of success reduced. Even if much greater knowledge 
of the context than foreign training forces usually have is assumed, the U.S. manual, 
with its detailed methodology, tends to imply greater expectations of success than can 
be realistically expected.  
 
The two doctrinal manuals together present a reasonably consistent framework for the 
actual activities involved in reconstructing armies. Both have preparative, recruitment, 
and operational phases, before noting important aspects for transition to self reliance.  
The UK construct is depicted in Figure 3 below. Often at this stage the majority of 
service support activities is still being carried out either by supervising developed-
world armies (such as in Afghanistan or Iraq) or contractors (such as in Liberia).  
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Figure 3: UK representation of the army reconstruction process, showing time 
progression from left to right. Source: Doctrine Note 07/16, page 6. 
 
Interestingly, neither manual mentions the necessity of the army under training 
identifying lessons after operations and implementing associated changes. Neither 
also mentions the recuperation or re-constitution which usually follows operations in 
developed-world armies.252 This sees personnel promoted, depart on courses, and 
losses replaced by newly arrived personnel, followed by the unit with its mix of old 
and new soldiers shaking down and beginning to repeat the training cycle.253 For 
example, ‘harmony guidelines’ for the British Army lay down that soldiers should not 
spend any more than 415 days of separated service in any period of 30 months.254 A 
recuperation period is required if units are not to be gradually worn down in manning, 
morale, and effectiveness.255 It is possible that this stage has only been omitted 
because it was not thought necessary to spell out stages post self reliance. 
 
Overall the two manuals together have something to offer. They do reflect differences 
in national doctrinal style, with the U.S. emphasis being far more prescriptive while 
the British not intending be ‘a set of rules’ but instead seeking to ‘guide, explain and 
educate.’ The broad applicability of the U.S. approach is however hampered by its 
insistence on U.S. techniques and practices. It might be wise to modify the U.S. 
prescriptions offered by incorporating greater local ownership. As noted above, their 
principal weakness is their tactical focus, but this is inherent in military doctrinal 
manuals intended to be used by soldiers in the field. The political maneuvering and 
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compromise required to successfully arrange army reconstruction programmes, or 
other stabilization lines of operation, is not usually covered by military manuals.   
There is insufficient information to judge whether the use of these manuals has made 
a significant difference since they were introduced. Given the ‘Restricted’ 
classification of Doctrine Note 07/16, any commentary on its value would have to be 
in classified publications, making it harder to access.  
 Conclusions 
The environment in which army redevelopment and reconstruction programmes have 
taken place has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Many such 
programmes are now viewed through the conceptual lens of SSR. SSR evolved from 
converging academic domains and intergovernmental policy initiatives in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. Development theory and practice, as well as civil-military 
relations, began to include security more and more as part of the development 
challenge. The expansion of the EU and NATO, and peace consolidation efforts, both 
UN and non-UN, began to include security reform efforts. The resulting concept came 
to include DDR, redevelopment or reconstruction of security forces, intelligence, 
border security, and gendarmerie reform, and a whole spectrum of oversight 
improvements in order to make democratic control fully possible. As more and more 
interventions were mounted, it became clear that well-executed DDR was often a 
prerequisite to building effective and accountable new armies.  
 
Aid organisations (especially the new British government department DfID and 
USAID), the United Nations, and international financial institutions, became more 
interested in incorporating security aspects into their wider programmes. The United 
Nations, slowly became aware that an integrated approach to dealing with these type 
of issues, from DDR to formulating national security policies, could be of much 
assistance. Yet of all the intergovernmental agencies which became involved in SSR, 
perhaps the most engaged was the OECD DAC. It took a definitional lead on the 
concept, first marked with the issue of their 2004 policy paper, and later with the issue 
of the OECD Handbook on SSR in 2007.256  
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Since the codification of the SSR concept as a distinct concept in the late 1990s, much 
experience has been gained in reconstructing security institutions. Much useful 
literature on a variety of SSR sub-topics has been produced as a result of this practical 
experience. Significant lessons have also been identified from activities during the 
Cold War and the early 1990s. One of the results of those lessons has been the 
codification of SSR principles by the OECD. The principles reflect normative 
aspirations for how the process should unfold. Examination of the army 
reconstruction experience can be utilized to amend the principles in line with what has 
been learnt since 1980.  
 
A number of themes emerge clearly from the above discussion of army 
reconstruction. Whether in Namibia, Kosovo, Bosnia, or Afghanistan, there are clear 
similarities in both success stories and the welter of challenges. Three main points 
emerge. First, army reconstruction is a significant area of SSR, frequently 
implemented in adverse environments. Second, three main areas of guidance on army 
reconstruction can be derived from the existing literature. Yet the focus is 
predominantly on training and equipping programmes to enhance capability, with 
much less emphasis on governance. Third, several key SSR norms, such as 
democratization, can conflict with social and historical norms in many countries 
where army reconstruction takes place. 
 
First, army reconstruction has become a significant programmatic area of SSR. But in 
the environments under study the state often does not have the capacity to effectively 
provide security. This affects the implementation of the wider liberal peace project. 
The environment is much more adverse than the development and post-authoritarian 
(often Eastern European) contexts in which much of the conceptual basis of SSR was 
shaped.  The adverse environment affects the conceptual congruence between SSR 
and army reconstruction. Close examination indicates that relevant political-economic 
factors are significantly different, and that state agencies, including armies, are 
actually a minority provider of security. A wide range of non-state security providers 
– including militias, community groupings, and commercial security companies - 
make up the other, majority, portion of the equation. The space available to 
implement the SSR principles is often much reduced.  
 
  
 
Second, the guidance that has now been formulated for army reconstruction has not 
been effective in advancing the debate beyond that historical emphasis on capability 
enhancement. Much of this has only been released recently, from 2007-2009. 
The guidance covers three broad areas. The OECD provides the best guidance for the 
first two areas. While the OECD Handbook is unduly constrained by its predilection 
for state-centered solutions, it does provide the most recent and widely-accepted 
guidance on higher level state policy concerns, as well as factors which drive the 
assessment and programme design process. The third area, army reconstruction 
capability enhancement itself, is well addressed by the British and U.S. military 
doctrinal documents. However these three sources have not been integrated into a 
coherent framework. The OECD and British documents, which do acknowledge the 
significant influence political considerations have on the entire process, contrast to a 
marked degree with the enhancement of capacity emphasis of the U.S. manual. This 
emphasis on capacity has marked the U.S. military approach since the Cold War, and 
has been exacerbated by the imperatives of the ‘War on terror’. A lack of emphasis on 
local ownership means that the U.S. approach can result in an unsustainable army 
whose capability is lost after foreign support is withdrawn.  
 
Third, the OECD’s SSR principles, widely accepted by donors, are often at odds with 
the nature of the recipient state. The democratising aims of SSR stem from the global 
North. They reflect the nature of their originator societies, which have gone through 
much political evolution to arrive at today’s relatively open democracies. Frequently 
the states in which army reconstruction and wider SSR is undertaken have inherently 
different political traditions. Many, especially in Africa, have strong neo-patrimonial 
structures which resist democratic initiatives. Replacing personalized control by the 
institutional safeguards inherent in the OECD approach can be unwelcome. 
Improving accountability and management arrangements for security forces can 
threaten elite ownership over them. Local ownership, if seen as efforts to build broad 
popular legitimacy for security forces, can also be unwelcome to existing elites. 
Alleviating these value conflicts presents a thicket of difficulties. But choosing which 
SSR standards are most important for each individual programme, and accepting 
resultant trade-offs, may help to pave the path ahead. 
 
  
 
These three points suggest that the SSR principles themselves would be likely to gain 
from reappraisal based upon post-conflict army reconstruction experience. The three 
key factors identified above - relevant political-economic drivers, efforts to enhance 
capability, and the applicability of the SSR principles - provide an analytical construct 
by which post-conflict army reconstruction can be rigourously examined in order to 
elicit elements for potential improvement. However, before this can be done, a 
methodological approach must be selected that will elicit the required data so that 
analysis can take place. The method selected must be appropriate to both the 
researcher’s worldview and the research subject. Therefore, the following chapter on 
methodology analyses alternatives and outlines the chosen approach.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
 
This thesis aims to suggest revisions to the current OECD DAC SSR principles from 
the experience of post-conflict army reconstruction since 1980.  The only comparable 
UK doctoral theses uncovered were both historical, a 1993 Oxford examination of the 
performance of the Egyptian Army in the reign of Mehmed Ali Pasa in the 1830s by 
K.M.M. Fahmy, and a 1998 SOAS dissertation by R.V.J. Young on the history of the 
Iraq Levies from 1915 to 1932. Repeated searches for other theses, using four 
different databases, has yielded no other works. 
 
This chapter establishes the methodological framework used for the study. It begins 
with the arguments already marshalled in the literature review conclusions, including 
the conclusion that the SSR principles would benefit from amendment on the basis of 
experience. The most fundamental tenets of social science and the researcher’s 
viewpoints upon them are then reviewed. The development of the positivist paradigm 
is briefly described, and then three main currents of the interpretivist paradigm that 
developed in reaction to it. Quantitative and qualitative research as alternate possible 
research clusters are then examined. The chapter then briefly describes the various 
qualitative research paradigms through which social science can be viewed, and how 
their strengths and limitations affect this research. Qualitative research methods are 
then discussed, before the research design is outlined.  
 
The research design is focused around a number of research objectives, together 
forming a narrowing case study approach. The utility and limitations of specifically 
applicable qualitative indicators are discussed. The extent of the claims this research 
can make is then explained.  Political-economic factors, capability enhancement, and 
the SSR principles together form a three-part analytical construct that allows 
rigourous examination of the SSR principles in order to identify areas for potential 
improvement. Using this construct, the multiple case analysis structure serves to 
confirm or eliminate broad trends elicited from the single field case study. Thereafter 
  
alternate possible research approaches to ascertain the data required are introduced. A 
section on the field case study justifies the case choice and explains the methods 
utilized. Ethical issues and confidentiality concerns are covered. A data analysis then 
precedes the summary. 
 
 The State of the Literature  
 
Post-conflict army reconstruction is a significant part of international interventions in 
internal conflicts. There have been a number of such interventions since 1980, and 
significant difficulties have been encountered. Thus the phenomenon is worthy of 
further study in order to identify lessons and improve processes for the future. 
 
A wide project scope was initially chosen.  Therefore, the literature review initially 
trialled a multi-disciplinary approach. The topic areas initially considered included 
defence conversion, military history (effectively a survey of relevant post-1945 
military historical events), management and organisational theory, and SSR. Yet it 
became clear a year into the research that the number of potential relevant topical 
areas was too numerous to be surveyed within the time available. This left a single-
domain review, and following consideration, it was decided that SSR be the chosen 
domain. SSR is the academic domain in which army reconstruction is most easily 
included. It appears to be the best available academic niche for the subject. This is 
because it incorporates elements of the development literature and civil-military 
relations in an integrated fashion.  
 
The other principal alternative, counter-insurgency, is focused upon the best way to 
win wars. The use of SSR as a framework allows examination of statebuilding 
practices in both peace and war. Counter-insurgency would also rule out examination 
of army reconstruction where internal conflicts were not insurgencies. Two examples 
make this clear. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a war of attrition and 
manoeuvre, and the conflict in South Africa displayed more of the characteristics of a 
terrorist campaign inside the country and manoeuvre operations beyond its borders. 
For these reasons, selecting counter-insurgency as the single academic domain to be 
studied would have elicited less data. 
  
 
Surveying the literature detailed in Chapter 2 presents the following picture. Firstly, 
army reconstruction has since 1990 become a significant programmatic component of 
what is now termed security sector reform. Army reconstruction is often carried out in 
less than benign environments. Yet the nature of army reconstruction programmes 
reflects more Western doctrines and practices than the environments in which it takes 
place. States in the developing world are often very much weaker than their Northern 
counterparts. They share the security environment within their accepted territorial 
boundaries with a wide variety of other non-state actors. This means that Northern 
conceptualizations of what security sector reform is achievable can vary widely from 
developing-country realities.257 
 
Secondly, a relatively strong corpus of high-level guidance for army reconstruction 
can be derived from the distillation of the experience of the last fifteen years and 
before. The OECD’s 2007 SSR Handbook gives guidance on both preparatory 
considerations and assessment and programme design.  Guidance on the mechanics of 
army reconstruction includes a 2007 British Army doctrine note and a series of U.S. 
Army doctrine works which culminated in the 2009 FM 3.07-1 Security Force 
Assistance. The British and U.S. manuals together provide a fair picture of current 
best practice for army reconstruction. But current methods, inspired to a great degree 
by American practice, usually emphasize a ‘train-and-equip’ approach. This emphasis 
has its roots in the Cold War army assistance approach, which prioritized military 
capability development over any improvements in governance, management, or 
accountability. Therefore there is little tradition of management and accountability 
improvements for present army assistance programmes to follow. Furthermore, ‘war 
on terror’ concerns have induced a strong emphasis on increasing the effectiveness of 
Western allies’ security forces in areas of strategic importance. 
 
Thirdly, the OECD’s SSR norms are often at odds with the nature of the recipient 
state. A further long-running concern has been the difficulty of putting local 
ownership, a core aspiration, into real practice. SSR incorporates mostly Northern 
norms, and the majority of SSR programmes are put in place as part of wider 
                                                 
257
  See Eric Scheye and Andrew McLean, "Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security," 
(Paris: OECD, 2007). 
  
Northern aid efforts. The democratising aims of SSR stem from the global North. 
They reflect the nature of their originator societies, which have gone through much 
political evolution to arrive at today’s relatively open democracies. Frequently the 
states in which army reconstruction and wider SSR is undertaken have fundamentally 
different political traditions. Many, especially in Africa, have strong neo-patrimonial 
structures which resist democratic initiatives.  
 
These findings, and especially the third, suggest the possibility of revision of the SSR 
principles to increase their effectiveness, based upon study of army reconstruction in 
adverse environments. This will be carried out through a qualitative, inductive process 
to build recommendations from existing data.  
 
 Social Science Research Fundamentals  
The researcher’s worldview shapes the way that research is conducted. Gray says that 
a researcher’s epistemological stance influences four separate concepts. The 
theoretical perspectives adopted influences the research methodology. The 
methodology in turn influences the choice of methods.258 This is the reason why 
innate assumptions about the nature of reality that a researcher can make should be 
clearly established in the course of academic investigation. A researcher’s perspective 
on ontology, or the theory of existence, also influences the lens through which one 
views the world. This section will first examine alternative perspectives on 
epistemology and ontology. It will then look at alternative perspectives and the 
methods selected for the first three of Gray’s four elements: quantitative and 
qualitative research strategies, qualitative theoretical perspectives, and methodology. 
The detailed method selected will be described in the Research Design section. 
 
Epistemology and ontology are perhaps the most important two branches of 
philosophy upon which a researcher’s position must be absolutely clear. According to 
Gray, epistemology tries to understand ‘what it means to know.’ This is a 
philosophical view of the matter. Bryman and Bell, writing from a practical business 
perspective, characterise an epistemological issue as the ‘question of what is (or 
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should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline.’259 Perhaps the central 
issue in epistemology is whether social science questions can be studied according to 
the same principles as natural science questions.260 A researcher’s ontological 
perspective needs to be made clear. According to Gray, ontology is the study of being, 
or the nature of existence. The central question in ontology is whether the universe is 
unchanging and permanent, or formless and chaotic.261  
 
The natural scientific bent of this author’s upbringing dictates his perspective upon 
epistemology. In regard to epistemology, social science questions should be studied 
with methods as close as possible to those of natural science. However, it is clear that 
misperception and imperfect observation can distort an observer’s worldview.  
 
The present author’s views on ontology have evolved as the thesis developed and 
more was learned about the various ways issues could be interpreted. Initially, he 
believed that reality was effectively unchanging and permanent (what is known as an 
objectivist ontological perspective). Constructed or subjective views of reality form 
the basis of the other two ontological perspectives identified by Bryman and Bell. 
These two perspectives seemed to represent a distortion of the universe as it actually 
was. Yet his view changed as more was learned about how various different 
perspectives could be taken. Army reconstruction in developing states appears 
vulnerable to different narratives depending upon the viewpoint of the observer. Thus 
a constructed version of reality appeared more and more appropriate as the 
complexities of the subject became clearer. This constructivist ontological worldview 
had an effect on the number of alternatives available when deciding upon the 
appropriate theoretical perspective.  
 
Exactly what constitutes knowledge is contested between the social and natural 
sciences. As noted above, this is a central question for epistemology. Bryman and Bell 
say that there is ‘a long-standing debate about the appropriateness of the natural 
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science model for the study of society.’262 This debate is interwoven with support for, 
and criticism of, positivism. Bryman and Bell define positivism as ‘an 
epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural 
sciences to the study of social reality and beyond.’263 They note however that the 
constituent elements of positivism vary depending upon the author who discusses it. 
However, almost invariably, a sharply-drawn distinction between theory and research 
is one of its key elements. The role of research is to test theory. Theories generate 
hypotheses, which can be tested, and will therefore allow evaluations of laws. Bryman 
and Bell note that the debate on the natural sciences’ model and its use in social 
sciences involves a number of accounts of scientific practice, such as empirical 
realism and critical realism. However, they say that positivism is the focus of 
attention, because ‘the account that is offered [of the natural sciences model] tends to 
have largely positivist overtones.’264 
 
Interpretivism is the term Bryman and Bell use to collectively describe a number of 
ideas that form a competing epistemology to positivism. Supporters of an 
interpretivist epistemology, Bryman and Bell say, share a view that ‘the subject matter 
of the social sciences – people and their institutions – are fundamentally different 
from those of the natural sciences.’265 Bryman and Bell say that interpretivism forms 
an alternative to the positivist approach that has dominated scientific discourse for 
decades. They say also that this approach requires that the social scientist grasps the 
subjective meaning of social action.  
 
Bryman and Bell note that interpretivism’s intellectual heritage includes Weber’s 
notion of Verstehen, and the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition. They also 
mention symbolic interactionism, which occupies a similar intellectual space to the 
hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition.266  
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Gordon argues that the views of Comte and Saint-Simon were too speculative and 
metaphysical to be regarded as predecessors of either positivism or sociology.267 
Gordon argues that of the large number of writers that have shaped modern sociology 
(and thus interpretivism), three stand out from all the others: Herbert Spencer, Emile 
Durkheim, and Max Weber.268 He argues that in their work, these three writers 
effectively defined the subject matter of modern sociology and developed many 
useful concepts for the future. 
 
Weber’s concept of Verstehen, which can be rendered in English as ‘understanding,’ 
is one of the more important of these three writers’ concepts. Verstehen does not 
appear to be a clear concept. Gordon begins his explanation of Weber’s work by 
noting that Weber wrote his scientific papers in a complex and obscure style that 
‘makes his ideas difficult to grasp.’269 Translation difficulties compound the matter.  
This issue noted, Gordon describes the concept as follows. The social scientist can 
explain events in terms familiar to anyone, if one adheres rigourously to the idea that 
individual persons cause social events.270 An individual takes purposive actions, and 
can construe the actions of others in similar terms. ‘By tracing the causes of social 
events to individual actions that reflect the operations of such mental processes’ such 
events can be made understandable.271  Gordon says that the social scientist can 
usefully use a Verstehen-inspired heuristic approach to project oneself into the minds 
of others, and that this can be utilized as a normal mode of work.272  
 
Weber was developing Verstehen and other concepts at roughly the same time as 
phenomenology was first developed by Edmund Husserl. Husserl’s book Logical 
Investigations appeared in two parts in the years 1900 and 1901. Sokolowski argues 
that this book ‘is generally considered to be the first true phenomenological work.’273  
 
In describing phenomenology, Gordon says that it ‘is naïve to treat empirical data as 
unproblematic equivalents of real things.’ Here he draws upon ‘the distinction 
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between the information about external things that emerges from the interaction 
between sensations and our cognitive apparatus, and the things ‘in themselves.’ ‘274 
Empirical facts therefore play a more sophisticated role than just sitting in judgement 
upon theoretical hypotheses. This distinction is at the heart of phenomenology. While 
Husserl developed phenomenology as a philosophy, Bryman and Bell argue that the 
introduction of phenomenological ideas to the social sciences was the work of Alfred 
Schütz. They argue that Schütz was influenced profoundly by Weber’s concept of 
Verstehen and by Husserl. Schutz’s position, Bryman and Bell say, is well captured in 
the following much-quoted passage:275 
 
“The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not ‘mean’ 
anything to molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field of the 
social scientist – social reality – has a specific meaning and relevance structure 
for the beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of common-
sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which 
they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these thought objects of 
theirs which determine their behaviour by motivating it. The thought objects 
constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this social reality, have to 
be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense 
thinking of men, living their daily life within the social world.” 
 
These ‘thought objects’ correspond to Gordon’s conceptualization of the information 
derived from interaction between sensations and the cognitive apparatus.  
 
The phenomenological approach has similarities to hermeneutics, described by 
Bryman and Bell as a term concerned with the theory and method of the interpretation 
of human action.276 Gray describes a hermeneutic perspective as one where social 
reality is seen as socially constructed, rather than being rooted in objective fact.277  
 
Another influential concept for the social sciences, the paradigm concept, was first 
introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his book ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ in 
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1962.278 Following significant intellectual debate, Kuhn modified his position, and, as 
Gordon says, the changes he made effectively negated his overall theory of science.279  
The term ‘paradigm’ was reduced to merely a theoretical hypothesis, perhaps one 
more central than others, but not differing from other hypotheses in any fundamental 
fashion. It is in this sense that the term paradigm is used in this chapter. 
 Quantitative and Qualitative Research Strategies 
 
The interpretivist ideas discussed above have had significant impact upon social 
scientific enquiry. They demonstrate some of the reactions to positivism as an 
epistemology and how contested the idea of using natural scientific methods to 
describe the social world has been. Gray says that ‘in general … we now inhabit a 
post-positivist world in which a number of alternative perspectives (for example, anti-
positivist, post-positivist, and naturalistic) have emerged.’280 Bryman and Bell note 
that the rejection of a positivist epistemology is one of the basic distinguishing 
features of a qualitative research strategy. The distinctions between qualitative and 
quantitative research strategies include their view on the role of theory, their 
epistemological orientation, and their ontological orientation.  
 
Quantitative research, according to Bryman and Bell, can be construed as a cluster of 
strategies that emphasises quantification. Quantitative methods usually utilize a 
deductive approach to test a theory already constructed. They incorporate the 
‘practices and norms of the natural science model and of positivism in particular.’281 It 
embodies a view of social reality as external and objective. Quantitative methods 
utilize an objectivist ontological orientation, seeing the world as unchanging and 
permanent. On the other hand, qualitative research emphasises words and description 
rather than quantification, with its emphasis on counting discrete variables. It 
emphasises ‘the ways in which individuals interpret their social world.’ Social reality 
is seen as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ creation. 
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Bryman and Bell argue that qualitative methods exhibit the interpretivist 
epistemological orientation discussed above as well as a constructivist ontological 
orientation.282  
 
The distinctions between the two paradigms are not as clear as the features just 
identified might imply. Bryman and Bell say that ‘while it is useful to contrast the two 
research strategies, it is necessary to be careful about hammering a wedge between 
them too deeply.’283 Reality becomes more complex the more investigation is 
undertaken.  Bryman and Bell note that the distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative methods, while widespread and growing, is not uncontested. Some writers, 
they say, see the distinction as no longer useful. 
 
Among the issues that often confront quantitative researchers are measurement, 
causality, generalization, and replication.284 Given quantitative research’s emphasis 
upon measurement, issues of reliability and validity are significant concerns. 
Reliability is concerned with whether the results of a study are repeatable, in other 
words, the consistency of a measure. Validity is described by Bryman and Bell as 
whether a measure of a concept really measures that concept.285 Researchers utilizing 
a quantitative paradigm are usually concerned both with describing the world, and 
attempting to ascertain why events occur as they do. An emphasis upon 
generalization, shared by both paradigms, aims to guarantee that the research results 
can be taken as true for situations beyond those of the immediate investigation 
subject. The ability to replicate a quantitative experiment is also important because it 
demonstrates that the original findings were not the result of the original researcher’s 
characteristics or expectations. 
 
There are significant benefits to a quantitative research strategy. But because the vast 
majority of the data available was not very easily quantifiable, a qualitative strategy 
was chosen. Varying qualitative theoretical perspectives will first be examined, and 
then the factors that determined the particular perspective chosen will be explained.  
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 Choosing the appropriate qualitative theoretical perspective 
 
Within the broad field of qualitative inquiry, a number of theoretical perspectives are 
available. Alternate theoretical perspectives are open to active debate, with standard 
texts in the field presenting differing pictures of the field as a whole.286 Indeed 
qualitative research scholars Denzin and Lincoln said that: 
 ‘..the field.. is defined primarily by a series of essential tensions, contradictions, and 
hesitations. These tensions .. work back and forth between competing definitions and 
conceptions of the field.’287  
 
It is not this thesis’s task to resolve or define the various competing ideas on the 
subdivision of social sciences research. Thus from surveying key texts, a broadly 
representative listing of the key research methods’ paradigms will be presented, and 
the thesis’s chosen approach within these paradigms explained and justified. 
Qualitative methods can be seen in at least seven separate ways. Flick says that the 
‘various research approaches orient towards three basic positions:’ 
*the tradition of symbolic interactionism, concerned with studying subjective 
meanings and individual ascriptions of sense 
*ethnomethdology, interested in routines of everyday life and their production 
And 
*structuralist or psychoanalytic positions, starting from processes of psychological or 
social unconsciousness.288  
 
Guba and Lincoln present a different ordering of the field. They write that there are 
four major interpretive paradigms for qualitative research, including positivist (a 
quantitative methodology seemingly included to act as a comparison and starting 
point for the analysis) and post-positivist, critical, constructivist-interpretive, and 
feminist-post 
structural.289 They interpret these paradigms as follows: 
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* Within positivism, ‘real’ reality is apprehensible; hypotheses can be established as 
facts or laws. This is the basis of quantitative research. Post-positivism is critical; 
‘real’ reality can be only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible; not 
falsifiable hypotheses can be created which are probable laws or facts; 
* constructivist-interpretive (aiming at understanding and reconstruction; individual 
or collective reconstruction coalescing around consensus); 
* critical theory (one can aim only to apprehend a virtual reality shaped by social, 
political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values crystallised over time).   
*feminist-post structural; This approach emphasises problems with the social text, its 
logic, and its inability ever to represent the world of lived experience fully.290 It 
replaces positivist and post-positivist interpretation criteria by terms including 
reflexive, multi-voiced text grounded in the experience of oppressed people. 
 
From these varying paradigms, the most appropriate research approach needs to be 
selected for the research question. Some research approaches, therefore, would be 
better placed to examine post-peace army reconstruction than others. The present 
author believes that positivism is not an appropriate choice for investigating this topic. 
A natural science methodology cannot effectively be utilized to gather the data 
required. With positivism eliminated, there are a wide variety of other theoretical 
perspectives available for use. The differing typologies of theoretical perspectives 
propounded by different authors muddle the task of defining one’s methodological 
approach. Yet the type of research to be conducted in this thesis appears to fit within 
the interpretivist paradigm, (or, pace Lincoln and Guba, ‘constructivist-interpretive’). 
It also seems to be well described by Gray’s summary of phenomenological research. 
 
Gray describes a phenomenological research perspective as follows:291 
*capable of producing ‘thick descriptions’ of people’s experiences or perspectives 
within their natural settings 
*it emphasises inductive logic 
*seeks the opinions and subjective accounts and interpretations of participants 
*relies on quantitative analysis of data  
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*is not so much concerned with generalizations to larger populations, but with 
contextual description and analysis 
 
Many of these features resonate with the type of research that appeared feasible to 
investigate the central subjects of concern for this thesis. The desk cases and the study 
of the reconstruction of the AFL in Liberia will both use inductive logic, seek the 
opinions and subjective accounts/interpretations of participants, and rely on 
quantitative analysis of data. The weaving of interrelated accounts into the ‘tapestry’ 
in Chapter 6 on Liberia will, to some extent, produce perspectives within their natural 
settings.  
 
Contextual description and analysis will be introduced in Chapters 5 and 6 to help 
explain the research findings. However, as noted in the Analysis of Data section 
below, this thesis does aim at a certain amount of generalization to larger populations. 
It will be argued that the three key concepts provide a useful framework to analyze 
army reconstruction in developing states. 
 
The order in which these three key concepts are introduced reflects, to an extent, a 
historical approach. Gordon notes that in the debate over the ‘covering law model’ of 
history first propounded by Carl G. Hempel, ‘numerous commentators pointed out 
that a causal explanation of a particular empirical event consists of two elements: a 
statement of the ‘cause’ of the event; and a specification of the ‘conditions’ under 
which that cause operated.’292 Parallels can be drawn between this description and the 
three key conditions. Political-economic factors form the ‘conditions’ under which the 
‘cause’ (the aim of capability enhancement293) is introduced. Either none, some or all 
of the SSR principles may be introduced by actors in order to shape the process 
further. Therefore, a historical approach examining causes and consequences will also 
inform the analytical process. 
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The analysis of the Liberia field case will also aim to introduce a significant degree of 
contextual description and analysis. Issues as widely separated as corruption or West 
African regional rivalries can be better understood by placing them within the 
Liberian context informed by anthropology within the state’s current boundaries, and 
Liberian history. For these reasons, designation of this research as following a 
phenomenological paradigm seems justified. 
 
 Phenomenological Research Methods  
Within a phenomenological paradigm, a number of alternate methods are available. 
Bryman and Bell, writing in 2003, listed five main research methods associated with 
qualitative research: ethnography/participant observation; qualitative interviewing; 
focus groups; discourse and conversation analysis (language based approaches) and 
text and document analysis.294 Gray, writing in 2004, lists four main methods: 
questionnaires, interviewing, observation, and unobtrusive methods. Berg, writing in 
2009, listed the following seven qualitative research methods: ‘a dramaturgical look at 
interviewing,’ focus grouping interviewing, ethnography (including emic and etic 
stances), action research, unobtrusive methods, historiography and oral traditions, and 
case studies.295  
 
In examining these various method typologies, all the methods which correspond to 
one another will be grouped under Bryman and Bell’s typology. Then Berg’s two 
outlying methods will be described. Thereafter, the case study approach, built from a 
combination of methods, will be described. Then the particular version of the case 
study method adopted, utilizing interviews and document analysis, will be explained. 
  
Alternate Methods  
Ethnography 
Qualitative Interviewing 
Focus groups 
Conversation and Discourse Analysis 
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Text and Document Analysis 
Action Research 
Unobtrusive Methods 
 
Ethnography 
Ethnography is a long-established qualitative research method. The practice ‘places 
researchers in the midst of whatever it is they study’ and is used extensively by 
anthropologists.296 Various scholars have encapsulated this ‘examination of 
phenomena as perceived by participants’ as ‘cultural description’ or ‘thick 
description.’297 Ethnography should go beyond describing a population and try to 
understand it, or further, to explain its actions.298 Ethnography has distinct similarities 
to participant observation, where the researcher accepts that his or her presence in an 
environment changes, however slightly, the situation that one wishes to observe. 
 
An ethnographic technique was not appropriate for in this research. This was for two 
reasons. First, during the fieldwork, it would have revealed only a limited amount of 
the information required on adherence to SSR principles unless a great deal of time 
was available. Second, difficulties of obtaining access were anticipated.  
 
Qualitative Interviewing 
Qualitative interviewing is the use of interview techniques in qualitative research.  
It is much less focused that quantitative interviewing, and qualitative interviewing, 
Bryman and Bell say, has an emphasis on ‘greater generality in the formulation of 
initial research ideas and on interviewees’ own perspectives.’299  
 
Berg advances a symbolic interactionist view of interviewing when he uses the term 
‘a dramaturgical look at interviewing.’ This technique uses symbolic interactionism  
to add to the understanding about the process of interviewing and how one might go 
about mastering it.300 Essentially Berg says that ‘interviewing is best accomplished if 
guided by a dramaturgical model,’ with interviewing perceived as a ‘social 
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performance.’301 Interviewers should be prepared to play one or more roles, as part of 
a very flexible and fluid format, in order to gain the most from the interview.  
 
In conducting research for this thesis, variants of the individual interview were some 
of the most fruitful techniques. In deciding to use an interview technique, three 
options were available: structured, semi-structured, or unstructured interviews (also 
described as standardised, semi-standardised, and unstandardised interviews).302  
Structured interviews would have stayed rigidly with a pre-determined set of 
questions, without deviating from them even if useful additional information seemed 
available. Unstructured interviews would have merely been a conversation roughly on 
the subject of army reconstruction, without any attempt to pursue specific themes. It 
was decided to use semi-structured interviews, with a specific set of questions, but 
allowing the use of extra follow-up questions which could elicit further data on 
specific points if necessary.  
 
Focus Groups 
Focus groups are the third major method noted by Bryman and Bell. Focus group 
interviewing, Berg says, is an interview style ‘designed for small groups of unrelated 
individuals, formed by an investigator and led in a group discussion on some 
particular topic or topics.’303 Focus group interviews explicitly use group interactions 
as part of the data-gathering method. They are often used for ‘generating impressions 
of products, programs, services, or other objects of interest.’304 Focus group 
interviews were not used during this research, because the author was seeking to limit 
the time demands on key informants, and thus the interaction requested was limited to 
individual interviews. 
 
Conversation and Discourse Analysis 
Conversation and discourse analysis (CA and DA) is the fourth major method 
described by Bryman and Bell.305 Academics utilizing these two approaches see 
language is an object of interest in its own right. “It is not simply a resource through 
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which research participants communicate with researchers.”306 Language plays a 
critical role in structuring organizations (and wider social life). Bryman and Bell also 
say that language is not just reflective of what goes on in an organization, but instead, 
language and organization literately become one and the same.307 Conversation 
analysis ‘is the fine-grained analysis of talk as it occurs .. in naturally occurring 
situations.’ Bryman and Bell describe discourse analysis as the study of ‘how we say 
things – our phrases, our emphases, the things we leave out.’308 In speaking in a 
certain way, humans shape others’ perceptions and understandings, and so affect 
ones’ own reality and the reality of the people one is talking to.309   
 
It can be seen from this summary that a significant amount of access is necessary to a 
field site in order to properly carry out CA and DA. It would also be of great value to 
have an understanding of the field’s specific jargon.310 Access in the Liberian field 
case was not extensive enough to use either conversation or discourse analysis to a 
great degree. However a limited amount of discourse analysis was incorporated within 
the document content analysis carried out.   
 
Text and Document Analysis 
Text and document analysis is the fifth of Bryman and Bell’s described qualitative 
methods.311 This type of analysis includes historiography and archive use. Berg uses 
the term ‘historiography’ in place of historical research.312 Historiography is a method 
for discovering, from records and accounts, what happened in some past period, and 
seeks to offer theoretical explanations for various historical events.313 Historical data 
can be classified as primary, secondary, or tertiary sources. Primary sources are 
original artifacts, documents, or items; secondary source involve the written testimony 
of people not immediately present at the time of a given event; and tertiary sources 
involve the distillation and presentation of primary and secondary sources in the form 
of a collection or anthology. This research relied heavily on historical data organised 
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within the various case studies. The desk case studies relied almost exclusively upon 
secondary and tertiary sources. In researching the field case, significant efforts were 
made to acquire primary source documents, with some success; a range of UNMIL, 
DynCorp, and other documentation was obtained.  
 
The use of archives was not a very practical method for this research, as the Liberian 
national archives had been destroyed during the first civil war of the 1990s. Using a 
somewhat different source – U.S. Department of Defense records – led to a Freedom 
of Information Act request submitted in late 2008 which did not, eventually, lead to 
any information being made available. Thus efforts have been made to use archival 
sources, but with little success. It was judged that erosion and accretion would not 
yield any useful data. 
 
Two of Berg’s methods are not included in Bryman and Bell’s typology: action 
research and unobtrusive methods. If dissected, these two methods could be subsumed 
within Bryman and Bell’s typology. However, as they represent a slightly different 
research approach, it seems wiser to describe them separately. Action research is a 
‘kind of collective self-participatory enquiry undertaken by participants in social 
relationship with one another in order to improve some condition or situation with 
which they are involved.’314 It includes techniques such as a cogenerative inquiry 
jointly between an organisation and researchers.315 Given that the organisations 
involved in the research, principally the AFL, the Liberian Ministry of Defense, and 
other government ministries, were not collective participants but subjects, this 
technique was unusable. Unobtrusive methods rely not on intruding into peoples’ 
lives, but on examining and assessing human traces. Berg includes archival strategies 
and ‘physical erosion and accretion’ within this category of methods. While the use of 
archives to investigate previous events is relatively well understood, erosion and 
accretion is less so.  
 
Case Studies 
Multiple methods can be drawn together to create case studies. Bryman and Bell cite 
Knights and McCabe, who say that case studies provide a vehicle through which 
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several qualitative methods can be combined.316  Use of multiple methods avoids too 
great a reliance on a single approach.  
 
Berg suggests that case study is ‘an approach capable of examining simple or 
complex phenomenon [sic], with units of analysis varying from single individuals to 
large corporations and businesses; it entails using a variety of lines of action in its 
data-gathering segments and can meaningfully make use of and contribute to the 
application of theory.’317 Case studies develop theory through an inductive approach.  
In essence, a case study is an amalgam of one or a variety of research methods. It can 
provide a deep understanding – akin to Geertz’s ‘thick description’ – of phenomena, 
events, people, or organisations.318 Given the subject of this thesis, a case study 
method appeared to present a way of creating such a deep understanding to achieve 
the research objectives, in a way unachievable by no other single method. 
 
Case studies, Yin reminds us, rely on analytical generalization – generalizing the 
results obtained to broader theory.319 The basis of a theoretical underpinning on army 
reconstruction processes will be generated by the study, and will result in the building 
of a theory. The narrowing case study approach will give some ability to test potential 
guidelines across a range of cases. However, only if the final theoretical conclusions 
are tested, with positive results, in a second or third environment - where the 
theoretical conclusions predict matching results will occur - can the second or third 
testing be accepted as providing strong support for the theory. Thereafter, the results 
could be accepted for a much larger number of other, similar cases, even though 
further replications have not yet been performed.320 
 
Once the various materials on Liberia were collected, a case study method utilising 
content analysis was applied. The many variables in action in post-conflict cases, 
including bureaucratic politics, foreign donor interests, technical considerations of 
weaponry, fiscal issues, and the variety of particular personal motivations common to 
states evolving from a generally neo-patrimonial mode of government, seemed to be 
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best evaluated via this approach. The data gathered, in accordance with Yin’s case 
study recommendations, will need to be analysed  in such a way that it ‘converge[s] in 
a triangulating fashion’321 in order to avoid biases arising from a single source and to 
attain an acceptable level of rigour. Therefore, where the record appeared incomplete 
or contradictory, repeated efforts will be made to follow up with knowledgeable 
individuals in order to check the data.   
 
A combination of interviews and document content analysis was chosen to investigate 
issues in Liberia. Surveys, questionnaires,322 experimentation, and the review of 
previously published data would not have been capable of gathering the detailed data 
required. Questionnaires to a wide audience would only elicit limited data, as 
information is often held by specific officials only. Purposive sampling was 
utilized:323 only those with knowledge of the subject matter would be helpful to 
interview, and thus their bias, conscious or unconscious, became a major potential 
weakness. This potential problem increased the importance of obtaining numerous 
interviews to cross check key datapoints. To alleviate this problem, as many officials 
as possible with knowledge of the core issues under investigation were consulted. 
Those officials were also asked which other people might be able to provide further 
insights; a technique known as ‘snowball sampling.’324 
 
Care had to be taken during the research to retain the contextual framework of the 
information gathered. Much of the information required relied heavily, for its 
meaning, on its place within the overall context. Thus, while the data retrieval process 
was underway, the method chosen to obtain it had to retain the contextual framework 
in which the data had been originally been situated. Maintaining a fieldwork diary 
helped to achieve this, as the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the data 
was preserved for later reconsideration if necessary.   
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Research Design 
To build recommendations for revision of the SSR principles based upon the 
experience of army reconstruction since 1980, five objectives have been formulated. 
This section will describe the research design - how the research objectives build 
towards constructing the final theoretical framework. In doing so, it will discuss and 
justify the use of the selected political explanatory framework from the potential 
alternate models available to examine army reconstruction. 
 
1. To survey existing practice and guidelines which are relevant to understanding the 
reconstruction of land forces (examined in Chapters 2 and 3). This research identifies 
three key concepts which play a major role in post-conflict army reconstruction. 
2. To examine a wide range of army reconstruction interventions to analyze the effect 
of  three identified key concepts: political-economic factors, capability enhancement, 
and SSR principles (examined in Chapter 5) The SSR principles alone do not guide 
post-conflict army reconstruction, and to improve the SSR principles elements of 
these two other factors should be included. 
3. To empirically test these three key concepts in a single case study, Liberia 
(examined in Chapter 6) 
4. To assess the viability of the currently utilized SSR principles against both the wide 
range of army reconstruction issues covered and the single field case study (examined 
in Chapter 7) 
5. To identify other broad areas of knowledge that might be examined in future 
research (covered in Chapter 7) 
 
The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 surveyed the existing research on the subject 
area, addressing research objective 1. A summary of the literature review’s evolution 
and results was described above. This summary established a clear basis from which 
to evaluate the methodology for the rest of the thesis. The remaining research 
programme will focus on objectives 2-6. There are a number of potential ways in 
which each research objective might be achieved. Both quantitative and qualitative 
methods are possible, and will be assessed in turn. 
 
  
The following section describes how the investigation will progress from the 
identification of the three key concepts (capability enhancement, political-economic 
factors, and SSR principles) to examination of various cases. 
 
Adopting a unified theoretical lens guarantees the rigour of the analysis. Potential 
alternate models available to examine developing world army reconstruction include 
change management, project management, and versions of a weak state political 
governance model. The first two models are suggested because they would be among 
the first considered if such processes were taking place in a developed country. The 
third represents consideration of the primarily political nature of SSR and the factors 
at work in a developing country. 
 
The term ‘change management’ is drawn from the management literature. From that 
perspective, it has been defined as “the process, tools and techniques to manage the 
people-side of business change to achieve the required business outcome, and to 
realize that business change effectively within the social infrastructure of the 
workplace.’325 However, there are a number of misconceptions about the practice, 
first among them that the organizational change process actually creates value. Instead 
the Jarrett says that ‘in most cases of cultural and organizational change the expected 
benefits are not realized.’326 Change is infrequent but rapid, and cannot be ‘managed.’ 
However it may be possible to stimulate, steer, or tack with the wind of change. 
 
Project management is also a term developed through management studies. Nokes 
describes projects as the ‘management mechanism by which all change happens.’327 
Every activity in an organization, he goes on to say, either continues what has gone on 
before or is a project, which is to say something new. Change that does not occur 
through projects is unplanned. From this description, it appears that management 
projects are a tool originally conceptualized as part of a relatively stable environment 
both within the organization and beyond its boundaries. This corresponds to the 
generally stable environment in developed countries in which the concept was 
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initially developed. A large number of projects in both the public and private sector 
do now take place in developing countries. However, the assumptions that underlie 
project management appear better fitted for the developed-country environment in 
which the concept was first developed. 
 
Change management and project management models are both useful concepts for 
organizational change. Yet both appear to inadequately reflect the absolute degree of 
uncertainty, instability, and political turbulence prevalent in a post-peace accord 
developing state. Organizations in these circumstances are not strong, and do not have 
well established routines. Placement of individuals into leading and secondary roles is 
frequently not based on merit. This means that the skilled individuals required to 
implement the principles of change management and project management are often 
absent. Far more important are the motivations and ties of politics, linking groups of 
individuals to goals which change over time. For this reason, a power politics model 
seems more appropriate to reflect the actual characteristics which drive post-peace 
accord army reconstruction. In addition, among the three key concepts identified in 
the literature review, political-economic factors and SSR principles have significant 
political aspects. 
 
Because of the wide variety in the political environments across the 15 case countries, 
it was felt that selecting or constructing a very specific model would have lead to 
inaccurate over-generalization. South Africa is an exceptional case with well 
developed democratic institutions. But for the other 14 cases, the variety in the 
political landscape between Zimbabwe in the early 1980s and, for example, East 
Timor in the period from 1999 is great. This means that trying to craft a very detailed 
analytical model would impose a level of theoretical consistency which would not 
accurately reflect reality. SSR theorising has repeatedly rejected a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach, arguing that each environment merits examination on its own terms. Scheye 
notes that ‘there is unanimous agreement that donors do not take the multivariate 
politics of partner countries sufficiently into account.’328 Therefore the chosen model 
only lists key fundamentals.  
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Chabal & Daloz discuss three potential alternate models of weak state political 
governance in their 1999 book ‘Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument.’329 
These are a neo-patrimonial model derived directly from Weberian sociology, the 
hybrid state perspective, and the ‘paradigm of the transplanted state.’  
 
The neo-patrimonial model of governance has already been introduced in the 
literature review. Briefly, Chabal and Daloz argue that from this perspective the 
(African) state is both illusory and substantial. ‘It is illusory because its modus 
operandi is essentially informal, the rule of law is feebly enforced and the ability to 
implement public policy remains most limited. It is substantial because its control is 
the ultimate prize for political elites: indeed, it is the chief instrument of 
patrimonialism.’330 Chabal and Daloz say the neo-patrimonial model’s two main 
advantages are that it accounts for the overlapping of the public and private spheres, 
and that it helps to explains in which ways the operation of the political system is no 
longer entirely traditional. The outward façade conforms to Western standards while 
the actual workings ‘derive from patrimonial dynamics.’331 
 
The hybrid state perspective ‘focuses on the effects for politics of the mixing of the 
Western norms introduced under colonial rule and the values inherent to African 
social systems.’ Chabal and Daloz say that the hybrid state stresses the re-
appropriation and successful adaptation of the Western model of the state to the 
African context. Within the fixed boundaries referred to by Herbst, mentioned in the 
Chapter 3, the African state has been reshaped according to local political practices.332 
The state is then used as an instrument of ‘primitive accumulation’ achieved through 
the monopoly seizure of the means of production by the political elites. 
 
The ‘paradigm of the transplanted state,’ Chabal and Daloz note, is more accurately a 
paradigm conceptualizing the rejection of the transplanted state.333 The wholesale 
transfer of the Western state to Africa, they say, has failed very much because of 
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cultural factors. The development of the modern Western European state, itself the 
outcome of a particular development path, cannot be simply transported to a wholly 
different socio-cultural setting. Both the institutions and the trappings of the Western 
state acquire entirely different meanings and modes of operation outside their original 
Western European habitat. The transplanted state, therefore is generically distinct, and 
large parts of the original model are discarded or cease to function. 
 
Chabal and Daloz advance their own model, the political instrumentalization of 
disorder, as preferable to any of the other three options when analyzing African 
states.334 They emphasize the ‘profit to be found in the weak institutionalization of 
political practices.’ In other words, elites find it advantageous when the state is only 
allowed a certain degree of effectiveness. Political elites gain from a weak state 
because it allows them to maximize their political and economic returns. Chabal and 
Daloz say that the state is both ‘vacuous’ and ‘ineffectual.’ This has profound 
implications for SSR and other types of governance efforts that are commenced by 
Western donor states. Chabal and Daloz rhetorically ask why African political elites 
should dismantle a political system which advantages them so much. ‘The notion that 
politicians, bureaucrats, or military chiefs should be the servants of the state simply 
does not make sense.’335 
 
From these four options, the neo-patrimonial model accurately describes most of the 
features of the African states discussed in this thesis. It also captures many of the 
features of the non-African states examined (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, East Timor, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). DiJohn says ‘neo-patrimonial politics, clientism, 
corruption, and violence are a part of all late-developing states.’336 Therefore in 
conceptualizing weak states both in and beyond Africa, it seems most appropriate to 
remain with the well established neo-patrimonial model. 
 
Chabal and Daloz note however that regarding Africa, the neo-patrimonial model is 
useful only if it is made clear that colonial administrative penetration only went so far. 
Colonial administrators, they argue, ‘never managed to overcome the strongly 
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instrumental and personalized characteristics of ‘traditional’ African administration.’ 
Chabal and Daloz’s warning about not overcoming strongly instrumental and 
personalized characteristics of traditional administration, however, may also be 
applicable to the tribal nature of governance in Afghanistan and Iraq.337 Thus with this 
constraint acknowledged, neo-patrimonial politics can be selected as the chosen 
conceptual lens through which to investigate army reconstruction. One can now 
examine each of the three key concepts and how they should be analyzed. 
 Qualitative Indicators: Utility and Limitations 
 
Political-economic factors, capability enhancement, and the SSR principles are the 
three key concepts that emerge from the literature review conclusions. In order to 
provide a measure for those concepts it is necessary to create an indicator or 
indicators for them. Indicators are something that is devised or already exists and that 
is employed as though it was a measure of the concept.338 Yet indications have 
limitations as well as utility. To sketch a framework for analysis of each key concept, 
the particular opportunities and constraints for indicators for each of the three 
concepts will be addressed in turn. 
 
There are a number of political-economic factors which affect army reconstruction. 
Chief among them are the circumstances of the peace accord and the necessity for 
constructively occupying former combatants. Another relevant question is to what 
extent the new armies were shaped by immediate post-peace accord circumstances, 
and whether and how consideration of longer-term challenges, embodied in 
documents such as national security strategy reviews, began to re-orientate their 
actions. When one delves more deeply into the post-conflict environment, certain 
underlying factors appear again and again, principally the neo-patrimonial type of 
politics already evaluated in the literature review. These dynamics are reflected in the 
selected political frame of analysis. One has to be clear about the reason for creation 
of indicators in these circumstances: in order to create a generic overall framework for 
army reconstruction. Therefore the aim is to identify generally relevant political-
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economic factors. But one must be cognizant of the need to avoid over-simplifying 
the analysis. Each country has differing political-economic factors which drive it, 
though there may be overall similarities.  
 
Another important political-economic question is that of sustainability. It would be 
extremely valuable to determine whether the collapse of army reconstruction causes a 
reversion to conflict. What evidence there is however seems insufficient to give a 
clear answer.  
 
The only real measure of whether a post-conflict reconstruction process is successful 
and sustainable is whether the state has remained peaceful. Seven of the fifteen cases 
examined have reverted to war or significant internal unrest: Zimbabwe, the Congo, 
Sudan, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burundi. In five of those cases, it appears 
that the army reconstruction process was not a significant reason for reversion to 
conflict. For example, in Iraq, the insurgency was bolstered but not created by the 
CPA order dissolving Saddam Hussein-era institutions.339 Breakdown of the post-
conflict army reconstruction process appears to have been a factor in reversion to 
armed conflict in two cases: East Timor in 2006340 and in Burundi, where fighting 
seems to be escalating as of November 2010. It would be extremely valuable to pin-
point the differences between East Timor and Burundi on the one hand, and the 
remaining other eight cases where peace has been maintained. Yet because such 
differences would only be based on two cases, any generalizable theory built from 
such a basis would have very weak foundations. 
 
In addition, even if these type of commonalities could be precisely identified, this 
would only result in a theoretical formulation based on ten cases. This would also not 
adequately factor in associated complexities in the five cases where conflict has 
reoccurred but where army reconstruction problems do not appear to have been 
among the most significant factors. For example, specific army reconstruction issues 
in Afghanistan might have played some part in fanning the continuing insurgency in 
some areas of the country. Furthermore, even surveying the 15 cases covered by this 
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thesis rules out consideration of closely associated cases like Haiti, where an army 
was not recreated. For these reasons, a desk-based survey such as this has neither 
enough detailed information, nor a statistically significant number of cases, to 
produce robust estimates as to whether post-conflict army reconstruction can produce 
stability over the long term. More time and more data analysis will be required to 
produce reliable estimates. 
 
It would be valuable to identify vital and reoccurring political-economic factors, but 
statistical analysis would not produce accurate identification of such vital factors is 
difficult because the number of cases is too small. Most cases have occurred since 
1990, so analysis is based on 20 years’ experience only. More cases will need to occur 
and be analysed in order to obtain statistically significant data. 
 
Developing effective indicators for analysis of capability enhancement requires 
determining what tasks armies need to carry out, and then assessing how to measure 
attainment of those tasks. Broadly there appear to be three main tasks that an army 
may be called upon to carry out. These include defending the state against external 
aggression, defence against internal rebellion and assuring internal security functions, 
and responding to humanitarian emergencies.341 Another task related to humanitarian 
response, with some similarities, is using armies to perform development tasks. 
 
Measuring armies’ success in external defence and the suppression of internal 
rebellion is relatively simple. An army must be successful either in combat, or in 
operations in support of the civil power, to carry out both of these tasks. Since one 
cannot predict the future, there are two available measure to assess whether an army 
will be successful in combat. These are firstly, an analysis of an army’s historical 
combat record, and secondly, assessing an army’s present state of combat readiness. 
 
First, historical combat records can give a good indication of potential combat 
success. The difficulty is that many of the armies in this study have not actually 
fought since their reconstruction process was completed. Three armies have not seen 
combat (Mozambique, Bosnia-Hezegovina, Kosovo); one has not even commenced 
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its reconstruction process (Nepal), while two others (Sierra Leone and South Africa) 
have only conducted peacekeeping operations. Two new forces, the JIUs in South 
Sudan and the Falintil-FDTL in East Timor, have splintered and fought themselves. In 
other cases, armies have fought but their success is unclear. An example is Zimbabwe 
and Namibia’s operations in the war in the Congo in 1998-2002. The involvement is 
publicly confirmed, but how successful such operations actually were is not publicly 
known. In view of these limitations, this indicator will not produce a very precise 
result. 
 
Second, potential combat success can be assessed through current preparedness.  
The British Army uses a three-part delineation of capability in the form of the 
‘components of fighting power:’ the conceptual component, moral component 
(incentivising people to fight), and the physical component. Each could be measured 
by asking whether an army is conceptually likely to succeed in combat, has the moral 
preparations to succeed in combat, and is physically capable of success in combat. 
These questions can only be answered by a survey of the relevant data available about 
each army under consideration. Yet the detailed data required to make such an 
accurate, detailed assessment possible is invariably classified. The quality of available 
public data on such issues varies greatly. Much more is available for developed-state 
armies that for the armies under consideration in the desk phase of this study. In view 
of these information limitations, a broad judgement of potential combat success based 
on the available data will be made. It is important not to attempt fine judgements and 
extensive analysis on case studies where little data is available. Doing otherwise 
would risk impairing internal validity. One’s own internal preconceptions might 
induce incorrect patterns into insufficiently detailed data. In time however, further 
research may fill these gaps in our knowledge. 
 
Crafting indicators for the delivery of humanitarian aid (or development work) is also 
difficult. They have to be situation-specific to the particular aid emergency or 
development task. Different political actors will have differing expectations and goals 
in seeing the armed forces carry out these tasks. The only true test of capability for 
these tasks is whether the armed forces actually achieved the task set. However, as 
with combat success, the level of data required to make an accurate assessment often 
appears unavailable. One factor that might ease assessment is that armed forces’ units 
  
sometimes are required to carry out such tasks only with routine levels of human and 
material resources on hand. This means that if such units are ready for operational 
service, they would also be ready to assist in humanitarian aid work. However, 
making such assessments of operational capability, as explained above, is difficult 
due to lack of data. 
 
It is also important to compare the practice of army reconstruction to the principles of 
security sector reform. Army reconstruction, and defence reform more widely, is 
usually viewed as an integral part of security sector reform. But as noted in the 
literature review conclusions, army reconstruction’s adherence to SSR principles 
appears inconsistent. Some principles are almost always followed, such as increase of 
capacity. Others, such as the people centred nature of programmes, seem to be 
incorporated only rarely. Therefore a detailed comparison of programme features with 
the SSR principles is necessary to create workable indicators. The SSR principles 
introduced in Chapter 1 were reordered as follows to produce a clear list for working 
purposes.  
SSR should be: 
• People-centred and locally owned 
• Based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law 
• A framework to address diverse security challenges, through a broad needs 
assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies  
• A practice promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement 
• Transparent and accountable 
• A practice that enhances institutional and human capacity. 
 
This more simplified formulation aims to preserve the meaning of the OECD 
principles while rendering them into assessable form. It is necessary to illustrate what 
is meant by ‘diverse security challenges’ to make the scope of the SSR requirement 
clear. The most recent National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, issued in 
2010, provides some good examples of the kind of security challenges planners face 
today. Terrorism, hostile acts against UK cyber space, civil emergencies such as 
floods or pandemics, weapons of mass destruction, trans-national organised crime, 
military crises, risks from failed and fragile states, climatic change, disruption to 
  
energy supplies, and disruption to information received, transmitted, or collected by 
satellites were all mentioned.342 
 
Thus the diverse security challenges of today encompass far more than the threat of 
armed conflict. Armies on their own are not designed to address all the challenges. 
Instead, ideally, armies form part of an integrated set of state agencies each with its 
own task and part to play. What this means, however, is that very few armies will 
meet the requirement to be an effective part of a framework that addresses diverse 
security challenges. 
 
Civilian involvement also requires clarification. The OECD Handbook stresses that 
‘control over the military is central to the exercise of political power.’343 The woeful 
coup record which armies have established since wide-scale decolonisation began in 
the 1950s and 1960s emphasises the need for armies to remain under civilian control. 
An army or armed forces is not designed to manage and advance a country’s interests, 
and properly is the servant, not the master, of civil authority. 
 
Yet in a democracy the army (and the whole armed forces) have a legitimate right to 
interact with civilian politicians in order to formulate appropriate defence policies. 
The level to which military personnel influence defence policy (or wider national 
policy) while in the process of formulating policy can vary widely. How much 
influence armed forces’ personnel legitimately can have upon national policies is 
dependent upon each country’s historical tradition.344 Chuter makes the point that ‘the 
very concept of civil-military relations is redundant in traditional cultures (such as 
many in Africa) where every adult male is a warrior.’345 This reinforces the dictum 
discussed in the literature review that SSR efforts should be context-specific. Thus, no 
generalization of indicators about the legitimate level of armed forces’ influence on 
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policy can be made, unless the military as an institution has actually seized political 
power.  
 
This respect for individual states’ situations is partially why the SSR principles only 
specified ‘greater civilian oversight and involvement.’ To achieve transparency, 
scrutiny must come from beyond the executive branch of government. Thus a key test 
of greater civilian involvement is the active involvement of the legislature. There will 
also be a requirement for judicial involvement in certain circumstances. 
 
Of the three key concepts, capability enhancement can be measured relatively well, 
but only if armies have seen combat. The detailed information necessary to make 
precise assessments is often not available. This means that care must be taken not to 
push analysis too far. But because the task of the multiple case analysis is to provide a 
check on the findings of the Liberia case, the multiple case analysis is sufficient if it 
confirms or eliminates broad trends. Since the aim for political-economic factors is to 
assess which factors ought to be represented in the final model, a high level of 
reoccurrence is sufficient.  
 Identifying Cross-Case Processes and Issues 
Selecting neo-patrimonial politics as an overall theoretical lens and critically 
examining the utility of indicators to assess the three key concepts allows the analysis 
to move to the next stage. Once one is clear as to how the key concepts will be 
analytically manipulated, one can move from Research Objective 1 and the literature 
review to Research Objective 2, expressed in the multiple case chapter. 
 
Research objective 2 was to examine a wide range of army reconstruction cases to test 
the relevance of the three key concepts. To gain the best possible picture of the trends 
shaping the field, it was decided to examine all the identified cases which fitted the 
circumstances outlined for post-conflict army reconstruction. As defined in Chapter 1, 
these included the creation of an army after an international intervention which had 
succeeded in establishing control over the entire territory of the entity it had been 
assigned to enter. Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Burundi were borderline cases, but 
were included because they both had the essentials of post-conflict army 
reconstruction occur. 
  
  
One method to accomplish this task would have been a series of visits to each case 
location, and collection of large amounts of both quantitative and qualitative data on 
each army reconstruction process. Then one could apply the quantitative approach 
outlined above to analyse the army reconstruction programmes in exacting detail. The 
qualitative data gathered at the same time would serve to build a fully rounded picture 
of the programme in question. The advantage of this approach would be the creation 
of a very detailed picture of the programme. The disadvantage would be the large 
amount of time and cost this alternative would absorb. 
 
The second alternative, as for research objective 1, would have been a desk review of 
evidence surveying the large amount of previously published data on army 
reconstruction, supplanted by consultation with regional experts when available. This 
necessitates gathering analytic and descriptive writings (books, articles, and ‘grey 
literature’) on each case until a reasonably comprehensive overall picture had been 
made clear. The advantage of this alternative is the shorter time and smaller amount 
of resources required. Where a particular case of army reconstruction has been 
previously well studied, a comparatively full picture of the programme might be built 
from this process. However, where there is little information, only the basic details, or 
not even that, might be able to be collected.  
 
A third alternative would have been to visit the cases of army reconstruction 
considered most important, and to rely on a literature review for the others. This 
attempts to alleviate the disadvantages of the second alternative. 
 
A desk based evidence review, the second alternative, was selected. This was 
primarily because of resource reasons, as finance and time did not allow an extensive 
programme of field visits. Also, the kind of extensive research described in the first 
alternative might often be unwelcome to many military establishments. Very detailed 
data is often considered sensitive and not for release, especially to foreigners. The 
result, both for resource reasons and the difficulty of implementing a full quantitative 
approach, was the reduction in the scope of activity to a desk literature review.  
 
  
The content analysis aimed to supplement the already identified guidance by 
identifying the trends and issues that were most important when such activities were 
actually carried out. Some issues gained in relative importance, such as the 
importance of careful DDR processes for demobilised fighters’ future prospects. 
Other issues were identified as potentially counterproductive, such as imposing the 
empowered non-commissioned officer model on armies with no such tradition. If the 
record appeared incomplete or contradictory, respondent validation was used, where 
possible, to check the data.  
 Applying the Field Experience Test 
The next research objective, Research Objective 3, applies the results of the multiple 
cases analysis in Liberia, a single field case study. It aims to empirically test the three 
key concepts in a single case study, Liberia. It aimed to see whether the desk research 
still remain valid when subjected to the field experience test. In addition, it aimed to 
ascertain whether additional amplification or clarification of those issued could be 
obtained by testing them in on-the-ground reality.  
 
In considering an appropriate site for the detailed case study, the author’s approach 
was guided greatly by his previous experience. Service with New Zealand 
government institutions, at both governmental level and with the Army, provided the 
author with experience within a small developed state framework. In addition, some 
knowledge of small armies after conflict was gained during time spent in East Timor 
working on policy for the redevelopment of the Falintil-Forca Defensa Timor Leste 
(F-FTDL). Finally experience in Liberia gave longer-term exposure to a small 
developing state and the complexities of a post conflict rebuilding process. The thread 
of small political entities – New Zealand, of four million people, East Timor, of 
around 800,000, and Liberia, of roughly three million people – runs though these 
three experiences.  
 
It might have seemed logical to return to East Timor to undertake the detailed study. 
However, while the lingua franca of the army advisors in East Timor was English, the 
army involved is the F-FDTL, steeped in long use of Portuguese from its Falintil 
insurgent roots. It would have also involved translation from Indonesian and Tetum, 
the main languages of the newer, younger recruits. Thus translation would have been 
  
a constant problem. The other consideration was how representative an East Timor 
case study might be. East Timor is located on a small island in insular South-East 
Asia, and many of the countries where army reconstruction is a continuing issue are in 
continental Africa. Much attention in army reconstruction is focused upon areas of 
strategic concern to Western powers – inland in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile in Africa while security for development, involving the recreation of a 
viable army, is vital, less attention is being focused upon the issues at hand. Generally 
speaking, an African case is more applicable to other African cases in the future 
where attention and resources will be more limited. These considerations, as well as 
the fact that the operating language in Liberia is English, tipped the scales in favour of 
Liberia. 
 
The first move in planning interviews was to contact the three key institutional 
groupings, the U.S. Embassy and its military officials, the Liberian Ministry of 
Defence and AFL, and the UN. Key individuals within those groupings were then 
contacted. Snowball identification of further key individuals then followed. 
Interviews, and associated requests for documents once in Liberia, were divided 
broadly into two groupings: those individuals who could provide information on the 
army reconstruction programme, including the assessment and programme design 
phase, and those who could give information about the development of the higher 
preparatory stages. A number of individuals, particularly the UNMIL SSR Advisor, 
were helpful in providing details for both areas. A list of key interviewees is attached 
in Annex B. 
 
To gather data on the army reconstruction programme itself, as many officials as 
possible within the Ministry of National Defense,346 including a serving Deputy 
Minister and former Deputy Minister, were interviewed. A number of military staff, 
starting with the Command Officer-in-Charge of the AFL, were also interviewed, as 
well as academics, parliamentarians, and politicians. Several sections within the U.S. 
Embassy, and the UN Mission in Liberia were consulted as well as the contractors 
implementing the army reconstruction programme and other nations’ military 
advisors. Finally, staff at Star Radio, recommended as one of the best media present 
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in Monrovia, were also interviewed. Some additional primary data was also gathered. 
This comprised MOD annual reports, MOD and DynCorp internal magazines and 
newspapers, Liberian newspaper articles, and biographies.  
 
The key areas that interviews targeted for the higher level process included the 
national security strategy formulation process, with the National Security Advisor’s 
office, and the staff who had carried out the process. Information regarding legal 
changes came from Congressmen and Senators. Key observers such as officials from 
the AU and ECOWAS offices in Monrovia, and two civil society representatives were 
also consulted. 
 
During the fieldwork it became evident that documents such as ministry annual 
reports and the text of laws were going to be difficult to obtain, and thus a series of 
special efforts were made to find other ways in which these documents could be 
found. Eventually after visiting the Centre for National Documentation and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ publications department, most were provided with the 
help of Senator Blamoh Nelson’s office. 
 Risk Analysis and Limitations  
The key risks and limitations encountered during this thesis can be divided into two, 
in the desk work phase and the fieldwork phase. The primary limitation for the desk 
work phase was insufficient data. Without a series of visits to each case location, 
instead of a desk review, much data that would have been required for a full analysis 
could not be obtained. However it appears that even if repeated visits had been made 
to each location, not all the data required would have been obtained. This is because 
of the sensitivity of the type of data required on the military. In order to obtain more 
information to mitigate this problem, numerous attempts were made to contact people 
with specific knowledge. These contacts helped widen the knowledge base available 
for the desk research phase. 
 
There were three main fieldwork limitations. Perhaps the most significant related to 
the timing of the fieldwork. When initially scheduled in late 2008, an early-to-mid 
2009 period for fieldwork appeared to allow sufficient time for determination of 
appropriate research questions. Yet the literature review took longer than expected. 
  
Thus the time for determining questions was significantly foreshortened. However, on 
the ground, all available relevant data to the subject in general was sought, rather than 
just that data specifically associated with the research questions. This allowed a 
degree of insurance if, as actually happened, the research focus changed after the 
fieldwork was complete. 
 
There were two major limitations encountered during fieldwork. Due to his senior 
personal staff being unwilling to schedule an appointment, it was found to be 
impossible to obtain an interview with the Minister of Defense. Attempts to work 
around this blockage via intermediaries or attendance at formal events proved 
unsuccessful. However, as noted above, both the senior Deputy Minister of Defense 
and the National Security Advisor were interviewed. This lack of access prevented 
interviews being possible with any of the new army officers at EBK Barracks; 
interviews were restricted to those staff accessible at the Ministry of Defense. Access 
was discouraged for U.S. uniformed personnel and contractors beyond the senior 
official in each case – the Chief, Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), and the 
contractor programme managers. 
 
The second major difficulty was establishing the exact sequence of events during the 
force reestablishment in 2004-05, due to the U.S. Embassy’s Political Section being 
unable or unwilling to work from their records of the time, and the lack of exact 
records within the Office of Security Cooperation. Repeated efforts were made to 
work around this problem, but were not fully successful by the end of the fieldwork 
period. This hampered efforts to ascertain events in the assessment and programme 
design phase of the process. 
 
The two months allocated for the fieldwork, while shortened from the initial plan of 
over three months, was adequate for the task. This situation occurred despite several 
meetings being rescheduled or long-delayed due to the absence of the interviewee. It 
was initially hoped to make a series of visits beyond the capital, but initial 
investigation found that the vast majority of the people and sites necessary to visit 
were in the in the Monrovia area.  
 
  
A final limitation was an incomplete reliability record. Current guidelines on PhD 
best practice stress the need to document as fully as possible the fieldwork process.347 
One is encouraged to describe ones’ actions so that a hypothetical second researcher 
following could replicate the study exactly, and arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions.348 However, for a variety of reasons at different times it was impossible 
to document fully some periods of the fieldwork.  
 
 Analysis of Data 
Research Objectives 2, 3, 4 and 5 require detailed analysis of data. Research 
Objective 4 will consider the only existing strategic guidance for army reconstruction, 
the SSR principles, to assess their viability. This will generate recommendations for 
possible changes to the principles and thus improvement in their effectiveness. A 
detailed analysis will be carried out, examining the significant issues raised during the 
research. Such an investigation was necessary to lay the foundations for constructive 
answers to the first four research objectives and to provide recommendations for 
interested parties. 
 
At this point it is useful to discuss reliability and validity as it applies to qualitative 
research. How the factors they seek to assess ought to be reflected has been the 
subject of some differing views.349 Bryman and Bell identify two major positions. 
One stance utilizes the same terms, reliability and validity as part of a qualitative 
strategy. Mason, describing the use of validity, for example, says that validity refers 
to whether ‘you are observing, identifying, or ‘measuring’ what you say you are.’350 
Another approach is use of the terms reliability and validity but with somewhat 
different meanings. The most important aspects of reliability and validity for this 
thesis appear to be internal, external, and respondent validity. LeCompte and Goetz 
describe validity in the following ways: 
*Internal validity, meaning that there is a good fit between a researcher’s observations 
and the theoretical ideas they develop.  
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*External validity, also designated analytical generalization by Robert Yin. This issue 
involves the extent to which conclusions in one case can be generalized to others, and 
is discussed below. 
*Respondent validity, where researchers provide the people on whom they have 
conducted research on with an account of their findings. This provides a means of 
confirming the validity of individual accounts.  
This thesis utilizes a reliability and validity approach broadly on the lines of 
LeCompte and Goetz. While it is important to carefully follow procedures to ensure 
both reliability and validity, validity concerns are possibly the more important of the 
two concepts for this thesis. This is primarily because the researcher carried out the 
work alone rather than in a multi-person team, meaning that internal reliability had 
little relevance. Extensive efforts were made to assure both internal and external 
validity. 
 
Given the nature of the data to be analysed, there will be few available alternate 
analysis methods. Statistical analysis, for example, will be effectively impractical 
given the qualitative nature of the data. Preparations will be made, however, to carry 
out a certain amount of basis quantitative analysis if the nature of the data merited it. 
A more sophisticated qualitative approach involving coding data351 was considered 
but dismissed. This was because from the initial research phase onward, it became 
clear relatively quickly that data on political-economic factors and capability 
enhancement was not amenable or sufficiently detailed enough to allow such coding. 
In addition, it will be clear relatively quickly which principles of SSR will be being 
either respected or rejected in each case. Therefore a more methodical coded approach 
was assessed as likely to generate a great deal of extra processing without significant 
benefit. 
 
The content analysis process will take the form of pattern matching.352  Pattern 
matching first ascertains patterns in the data provided, considering varying 
explanations for their formulation, and then deciding upon an explanation which best 
fits the available data (in order to achieve internal validity without being misled by 
inaccurate causal explanations), and, critically the context in which the data was 
                                                 
351
  See for example Berg 2009, 348-365. 
352
  Yin, op. cit, p.26-7 and Chapter 5. 
  
drawn. These patterns were then matched against the initial theoretical proposition, to 
determine whether such patterns are broadly representative of army reconstruction 
programmes.  
 
The manner in which the research is designed, and the data analysis methods, have 
implications for the extent to which the conclusions can be generalised. It was 
essential to design the method so that the conclusions drawn would be able to have 
the greatest applicability possible beyond the single Liberia case study. This is a 
matter of external validity. External validity, LeCompte and Goetz say, refers to the 
degree to which findings can be generalized across multiple contexts. As noted above, 
Robert Yin utilizes the term ‘analytical generalization,’ described above, to refer to 
the same concept. In qualitative research, this can be a problem because of 
researchers’ tendencies to employ case studies and small samples. The reason this 
thesis employs multiple case desk research preceding the Liberia chapter was 
specifically to ensure that the findings of the Liberia case were authenticated by a 
wider survey of multiple cases’ data. 
 
However, because of the inherent limitations of desk-based research, and the limited 
amount of fieldwork possible, the present author does not believe it is wise to claim 
wide-ranging generalizations from the data gathered. Thus he only will argue that 
army reconstruction can be well understood by the interleaved usage of political-
economic factors, capability enhancement, and the SSR principles. Data organized 
under these three headings provides a robust basis for reevaluating the SSR principles 
as a whole. 
 
The fifth research objective was to identify other broad areas of knowledge that might 
be examined in future research. Examination of other disciplines might shed more 
light on how to carry out army reconstruction effectively and efficiently. This was 
achieved by reflection on material considered from the literature review stage of the 
project onwards. 
  
  
 Ethical Issues  
Ethical issues involve the consideration of values in social science research.353  
Bryman and Bell note that such issues revolve around a number of questions, of 
which they specifically cite two. These two questions are worded to effectively 
encapsulate the ethics debate. First, they say, there is the question of how researchers 
should treat the people upon which research is conducted. Second, the other major 
question is whether there are activities that researchers should or should not engage 
in, in their relations with those being studied.  
 
Bryman and Bell begin their discussion on ethics by citing four reasons why writings 
over ethics in the social sciences are frustrating.354 Three are especially important. 
First, they say that a wide range of ethical stances are taken. These range from 
universalism, that ethical precepts should never be broken, right across to the other 
end of the spectrum which argues that a ‘certain amount of flexibility’ should be 
allowed in ethical decision making.355 
 
Secondly, debates over ethics have often focused on widely-known cases of ethical 
transgression.356 Yet Bryman and Bell argue that the attention to these type of high 
profile cases may induce a belief that ethical concerns only relate to such an  extreme 
end of the spectrum. They emphasize again that ‘the potential for ethical transgression 
is much more general than this.’ Ethical considerations need to be taken account of in 
all research work. The Economic and Social Research Council argues that even the 
secondary use of some existing datasets requires ‘light touch ethics review.’357    
 
Bryman and Bell’s third point also refers to the ‘extreme and notorious cases of 
ethical violation’ by which they describe Millgram’s 1963 experiment and, also, the 
well-known Stanford prison experiment of 1973.358 Extreme cases are not the only 
problem; particular methods are, as well. Most prominently, disguised observation 
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and the use of deception in experiments may be most closely associated with ethical 
violations. Bryman and Bell say that an impression can be gained that other methods, 
such as overt ethnography, can be immune from such problems. Again, this is not the 
case; all research methods require some form of ethical scrutiny. 
 
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Framework for Research Ethics 
is also among the most widely endorsed ethic frameworks utilized in British 
universities. Because SSR research appears to be significantly influenced by the 
ESRC, this author believes that the ESRC guidelines are perhaps the most appropriate 
to utilize in a discussion over ethics.  
 
The ESRC Framework of Research Ethics includes six principles:359  
*research should be designed, reviewed, and undertaken to ensure integrity, quality, 
and transparency. 
*research staff and participants must normally be informed fully about the purpose, 
methods, and intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the 
research involves, and what risks, if any, are involved. Some variation is allowed in 
very specific research contexts for which the ESRC provides detailed guidance. 
*the confidentiality of information supplied by research participants and the 
anonymity of respondents must be respected. 
*research participants must take part voluntarily, free from any cohesion.  
*harm to research participants must be avoided in all circumstances. 
*the independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest or partiality 
must be explicit. 
 
The ESRC also says that research involving primary data collection will always raise 
issues of ethics that must be addressed. In order to analyze the ethical issues that will 
be raised in the course of this research, a discussion of ethics related to both the desk 
and field case studies will be organized under the ESRC’s six principles. 
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The first ESRC principle is that research should be designed, reviewed, and 
undertaken to ensure integrity, quality, and transparency. This places significant 
emphasis on research design from the beginning of a research project. During the 
course of doctoral study, for example, ethical considerations should be considered in a 
fashion appropriate to the stage the research has reached. During the research for this 
thesis, ethical considerations began to be introduced through research methods 
courses, and ethical considerations were a constant issue during fieldwork. During the 
extended write up period in New Zealand, a considerable amount of contacts with 
field informants were planned, and therefore the same type of considerations needed 
to be taken into account. 
 
The second ESRC principle is that research staff and participants must normally be 
informed fully about the purpose, methods, and intended possible uses of the research, 
what their participation in the research involves, and what risks, if any, are involved. 
Some variation is allowed in very specific research contexts for which the ESRC 
provides detailed guidance. As noted above, much attention focuses upon high profile 
cases such as the Millgram psychological study. Yet more common examples include 
the covert nature of a researcher’s presence in a study area. Opinions on covert 
research range from complete opposition to the view that, depending on the 
circumstances, covert research is both necessary and ethical.360 Misrepresentation of 
the researcher’s status was not a factor during this study. At all times the researcher 
was clear about his aims and objectives. 
 
The third ESRC principle is that the confidentiality of information supplied by 
research participants, and the anonymity of respondents must be respected. Bryman 
and Bell note that ‘privacy is very much linked to the notion of informed consent.’361 
This can be seen in the case of an interview, for example. Once informed consent has 
been given, a research participant in a sense has acknowledged that the right to 
privacy has been surrendered for that limited period. But this does not mean that the 
research participant’s right to privacy has been totally abrogated. Certain questions 
may be refused by research participants.  
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Bryman and Bell note that minor breaches of informed consent may be relatively 
common.362 Examples they give which this researcher has encountered include not 
giving ‘absolutely all the details about one’s research for fear of contaminating 
people’s answers to questions.’363 For this research, care will be taken to inform 
interviewees about the nature, demands, and intended use of data during the fieldwork 
phase. Particular care will be taken when informants were at risk of professional harm 
from employers or former employers.  
 
The fourth ESRC principle is that research participants must take part voluntarily, free 
from any cohesion. Wolfer describes mandatory steps to ensure potential research 
participants’ rights are respected.364  They are not required to participate in a study, 
that they can decline to answer questions, and that they can decide to withdraw from 
participation at any time. It is anticipated that both during the telephone interviews on 
the desk cases and during the fieldwork, there will be a number of situations where 
interviewees may not wish to answer certain question or may withdraw altogether. It 
is anticipated that this will necessitate two steps being taken. First, these potential 
refusals to answer certain questions reinforce the necessity to reach out to as great a 
number of people informed on army reconstruction as possible. Second, there is a 
requirement to conduct as thorough search as possible for literature, both on the desk 
cases, and on the contractor phase of the reconstruction of the AFL. 
 
The fifth ESRC principle is that harm to research participants must be avoided in all 
circumstances. This is perhaps the most fundamental tenet of ethical social science 
research – avoiding physical and psychological damage. Harm can involve a number 
of facets: physical harm; harm to participants’ development or self-esteem; stress; and 
harm to career prospects or future employment.365 During this research, the principal 
risk of harm identified will be to interviewees’ prospects and safety should interview 
comments be seen as hostile by others within their professional environment. It will 
be possible for some comments to be attributed to interviewees by name, because 
consent has been obtained. However a number of interviews and other data gathering 
                                                 
362
  Ibid., 543. 
363
  Ibid. 
364
  Wolfer, Real Research: Conducting and Evaluating Research in the Social Sciences, 65. 
365
  Bryman and Bell, Business Research Methods, First Edition, 539. 
  
exercises will have to be conducted under promise of anonymity. The researcher will 
take a number of measures to make sure that the identity of these interviewees was 
not disseminated.  
 
The sixth ESRC principle is that independence of research must be clear, and any 
conflicts of interest or partiality must be explicit. During the desk research phase there 
will be limited contacts with key informants so this issue was not very significant. 
Efforts will be taken during the field research to make clear that the researcher was a 
New Zealander with no particular national bias on Liberian army reconstruction. 
However, in the atmosphere of suspicion and doubt in Monrovia these may not be 
effective.  
 
 Summary  
The security sector reform principles form a key backbone for much post-conflict 
international intervention around the world. This chapter has established the 
methodology by which army reconstruction programmes will be analyzed in order to 
identify potential areas of improvement to those principles. An important starting 
point is that of positivism, a scientific paradigm which has aimed to investigate the 
social sciences with methods as close to the natural sciences as possible. However, 
positivism as a scientific approach has weaknesses. It may require, for example, 
significant amounts of quantitative data. Because the data available for this thesis was 
not detailed or comprehensive enough to conduct a quantitative analysis, an 
interpretivist approach will be adopted.  
 
The interpretivist paradigm, which acknowledges that one constructs one’s perception 
of objects and phenomena, arose partially in reaction to positivism. This 
epistemological position has its partner in a constructivist ontological paradigm. 
Within the general field of interpretivist qualitative approaches, a phenomenological 
technique will be adopted. To make the analysis possible, a comprehensive literature 
review was undertaken, focusing on the factors which shape post-peace accord army 
reconstruction. 
 
  
All studies face risks, limitations, and threats to validity. Where the initial record 
appears contradictory or incomplete, repeated efforts will be made to unearth 
additional data. Respondent validation will be utilized as the primary tool to ascertain 
whether data is accurate. Given the limitation and risks inherent in this thesis 
methodology, it is important to avoid overambitious claims. The thesis will produce 
an overall model for how post-peace accord army reconstruction ought to take place, 
but it is based on one case study. Theory testing in a second or third environment will 
be important to validate the thesis results. 
 
A narrowing case study approach will be adopted. Three key concepts – capability 
enhancement, political-economic factors, and SSR principles – need to be assessed. 
A wide range of army reconstruction cases will be examined through a desk based 
review in Chapters 5. This review will measure attainment of capability enhancement, 
to the extent possible with the data available, and identify capability enhancement 
lessons. It will also identify relevant political-economic factors and assess compliance 
with the SSR principles. This process will be repeated in the single field case study, 
Chapter 6. Chapter 6 will examine the reconstruction of the Armed Forces of Liberia 
in the contractor-implemented phase, which began in 2004 and concluded at the end 
of 2009.  
 
  
 
 Chapter 5: Lessons derived from Army 
Reconstruction Experience 
 
The literature review shows that a significant amount of high-level guidance on army 
reconstruction has been compiled over the past twenty years. This includes 
practitioner and academic writing, compilations like the OECD Handbook on SSR, 
and military doctrine. This material is very valid and represents a significant amount 
of theoretical analysis backed by practical experience. However, its’ attention to 
specific cases of army reconstruction is inconsistent and incomplete. This chapter 
aims to help fill that gap by focusing on a range of army redevelopment and 
reconstruction cases. 
 
This chapter examines the army redevelopment and reconstruction experience in an 
introduction, three main sections, and a conclusion. The introduction reintroduces the 
definition of army reconstruction used in this thesis, and summarizes previous 
discussion of the subject. It appears from the literature review that there are three key 
concepts which significantly affect the army reconstruction debate currently: political-
economic influences, capability enhancement, and available strategic guidance. 
The approach that will be taken to analyzing these three key concepts is briefly 
discussed, drawing upon the method chapter's framework. The three identified types 
of army redevelopment and reconstruction will then be introduced: ‘military merger,’ 
institutionalization, and single state force. Within the three groupings a general 
overview will be provided, efforts to enhance capacity analyzed, political-economic 
influences on the current status of the force sketched, and the effect of SSR principles 
assessed. The conclusions then sum up what has been learned from these different 
army reconstruction approaches. 
 
Army reconstruction was defined in the introduction as ‘the process of establishing an 
armed state land force which has previously all but dissolved, or is so decayed that it 
has effectively lost the character of a state institution.’366 A number of case studies 
that fit the definition of army redevelopment and reconstruction in a post conflict 
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context have been identified. The dividing line between less fundamental 
redevelopment and transformative reconstruction is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. 
However for the purpose of this thesis the operative question is whether a new 
institution has been created. If such a new organization has been formed, then the 
process has been characterized as army reconstruction; if not, it is described as army 
redevelopment.  
 
Discussion on post-peace accord army reconstruction is predominantly recent. The 
subject has only really surfaced since the explosion in international interventions in 
civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Prior to that time, comparable literature 
often focused on support for armies against insurgencies, rather than wholesale 
reconstruction aimed at the creation of a democratically controlled institution.367 
During the Cold War, Western armies applied their own procedures and doctrines in a 
literal and derivative fashion in restructuring partner land forces.368 Discussion 
directly relevant to army reconstruction has mostly been confined to the peacekeeping 
and security sector reform literature. Much discussion has taken the form of articles 
examining the status of SSR in one state. To the author’s knowledge, the only cross-
case analyses of post-peace accord army reconstruction have focused upon mergers of 
previously warring factions.369  
 
Drawing from the conclusions of the literature review, this author argues that a more 
accurate analysis would also reflect the multiplicity of political-economic factors that 
shape outcomes in a post-conflict environment and army reconstruction’s historical 
emphasis on capacity enhancement. As noted in earlier chapters, one of the important 
political-economic factors frequently involved is internationals' commitment to the 
liberal peace project. Once these factors are more fully appreciated, it becomes clear 
that expectations for governance over, and capacity of, defence forces in these 
contexts may have been frequently overestimated. 
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There are a number of political-economic factors which affect army reconstruction. 
Chief among them are the circumstances of the peace accord and the necessity for 
constructively occupying former combatants. Following discussion of varied models, 
the method chapter justified the selection of a neo-patrimonial governance 
framework. In this framework the state essentially operates informally, and its 
resources are the chief prize for political elites.370 Struggle between elites can be very 
personalized. These features are present in most of the case studies examined in this 
chapter. However, it would be a mistake to press a single analytical conception too 
far. Each case is unique, and one, South Africa, has reasonably robust democratic 
institutions. SSR theorizing has repeatedly been justly accused of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach. Therefore this framework can only be used as a general guide. 
 
Effective analysis of capability enhancement requires the use of indicators to assess 
performance. It also requires assessing what missions an army is given, explicitly or 
implicitly. The utility and limitations of indicators for capacity enhancement were 
discussed in the methodology chapter. Missions include remaining subject to civilian 
authority, defend against external aggression and internal rebellion, and responding to 
humanitarian emergencies. In most cases, the international intervention force was the 
only available military capability provider in the immediate post-conflict period. 
However, efforts were usually quickly initiated to develop indigenous capability.  
 
The principles of SSR appear to form the only existing strategic guidance for army 
reconstruction. The OECD’s SSR principles, reordered as explained in the method 
chapter, indicate that SSR should be: 
 People-centred and locally owned 
 Based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law 
 A framework to address diverse security challenges through a broad needs 
assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies 
 A practice promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement 
 Transparent and accountable 
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 A practice that enhances institutional and human capacity. 
 
Using SSR principles to assess army reconstruction programmes allows for judgments 
on their relative worth and place. It appears from the literature review however that 
there are significant potential weaknesses in the SSR principles. They appear to 
reflect Northern aspirations rather than the reality of post-peace accord countries.  
 
Army reconstruction and redevelopment since 1980 can be categorized by subdivision 
into specific variants. Categorization of the different varieties does not appear to have 
been attempted beforehand in the literature, but related work has been done. In 2003 
Call and Stanley made a distinction between different models that have been used in 
recent years to reform the security sector.371 They identified two models. The first 
model, ‘demilitarization and police reform,’ requires reducing the military’s power 
while strengthening the police. The military usually has its budget and power reduced, 
and is confined to external defence missions. The police take on the bulk of internal 
security responsibilities. The second, ‘military merger,’ seeks to combine all armed 
groups into one single army. At the very least, all parties will have a presence within 
the armed forces and be aware of any threatening moves. These models are not 
exactly applicable to army reconstruction, as they deal with other security forces as 
well. However, they appear to be the only previous thinking on the topic. 
 
The term ‘military merger’ describes the process which 10 of the 15 armies analyzed 
have gone through clearly, if the subject is narrowed to armies only, instead of Call 
and Stanley’s usage, involving all security forces. Therefore, that term will be used, 
with the clarifications described below. Some works (such as Licklider) have used the 
term 'military integration,' but the present author argues that such usage is 
terminologically inexact. Several of the armies under consideration have been 
'merged' but in no sense can really have been considered to have been 'integrated' – 
for example, the current army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the Joint Integrated Units in 
southern Sudan. Effectively these armies have been multiple instutitions grouped 
under one title. Therefore the term 'military merger' is preferred. 
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Examination of army reconstruction cases since 1980 indicates that the ‘military 
merger’ model is predominant as the concept accounts for 10 of the identified 15 
cases. Yet other variants exist. One could argue that ‘military merger’ has a hybrid 
variation – ‘institutionalization,’ where only one rather than several warring factions 
are institutionalized. The other major variant is the ‘single state force,’ an army rebuilt 
from new recruits.  
 
The ‘Military merger’ appears to be the most common approach taken in army 
reconstruction. ‘Military merger’ brings a majority of the demobilizing groups into 
the new armed forces, and then attempts to professionalize them. It was first used in 
Zimbabwe from 1980, and then in Namibia, South Africa in the 1990s, Sierra Leone, 
partially with the Kosovo Protection Corps, in the South Sudan, and in the  Congo. 
The resulting force is less effective for some time, but goes some way to solving the 
immediate security problem. Fighters are cantoned under military administration in 
specified areas, and given food, accommodation, and training, which occupies their 
time. Therefore they will be far less likely to create disturbances and prey on the 
population. ‘Military merger’ is also politically neat, is a confidence building 
measure, and effectively extends time available for the DDR process.372 A good 
example of the last characteristic was in Sierra Leone, where the force size expanded 
to take in ex-fighters who were regularized. Thus the ex-fighters could be monitored.  
 
Kosovo and East Timor serve as examples of military mergers where only one army is 
involved. These hybrid cases have been designated ‘institutionalization’. In both 
cases, an insurgency had been carried out by a nationally acknowledged liberation 
army, with popular support. When the international intervention force arrived, the 
liberation army was screened and a great many of its personnel became the core of a 
new national army for the now independent territory. In East Timor there was a 
sixteen month delay period. Falintil cantoned itself at Aileu amid the violence of 
September 1999 to avoid accusations that it was fighting a civil war against the 
Indonesian-backed militias.373 Falintil eventually had to wait until 1 February 2001 
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for the ceremony by which it became the core of the new East Timorese national 
army. In Kosovo’s case, the delay was ten years, and involved passage through the 
chrysalis Kosovo Protection Corps stage. 
 
The single state force approach demobilizes all existing armed groupings and starts 
again from square one with a new state army. All prospective soldiers have to meet 
high entry standards. The resulting force is well positioned to be of reasonably high 
quality. This policy has been applied in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia (though 
through contractors in the last case). However the fighters left out of the process 
constitute an ongoing security threat.  
Armies rebuilt by ‘Military merger’ 
The ‘military merger’ variant of army reconstruction encompasses the following 
cases: 
• Zimbabwe 
• Nambia 
• South Africa 
• Mozambique 
• Sierra Leone 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (referred to as ‘the Congo’ throughout) 
• Bosnia-Herzegovina 
• Burundi 
• South Sudan 
• Nepal 
 
These ten identified armies are very diverse, and can be subdivided in a variety of 
different ways, chronologically, geographically, or by state strength or success. Here a 
division by success seems most appropriate. This is due to the assumption that a state 
must remain intact for its army to remain a legal armed state land force. If the state 
splinters, an army can lose its legitimate force through no action of its own. This 
categorization results in three main groupings: the four early cases in southern Africa, 
which were generally successful, later programmes that appear partially successful, 
and cases where integration has failed. The first group consists of Zimbabwe, where 
  
the programme began in 1980, Namibia from 1990, Mozambique and South Africa 
from 1993. The partially successful group includes Sierra Leone, effectively from 
2001, Bosnia-Herzegovina, effectively from 2003, and Burundi from 2003. The last, 
unsuccessful group includes the Congo from 2003, the South Sudan from 2005, and 
Nepal, where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in November 2006. 
Since that point, long-running discussions have been held as to how to incorporate 
Maoist combatants within the national army. The integration of ex-Rwandan 
Government combatants into today’s Rwandan Patriotic Army, which commenced 
from January 1995,374 also followed the ‘military merger’ pattern.  
 
Because eight of these ten cases are African, it is useful here to remind ourselves of 
some of the general characteristics of African armies since the colonizers departed. 
Before the outbreak of civil wars, these armies often did not have a great degree of 
internal solidity and coherence. Many African personal regimes have initiated or 
greatly expanded military corruption, employed ethnic criteria to recruit soldiers, and 
created parallel military forces to counterbalance the regular armed forces.375 These 
measures weakened the cohesion of the armed forces. Leaders initiated rapid 
promotions in the early years of new states to fill gaps left by departing colonial 
officers. This too-quick Africanization of the officer corps had severely destabilizing 
effects.376 Quick mobility between postings disrupted the expected career pattern and 
weakened the chain of command, while promotion blockages created frustration in 
more junior officers. Similar problems affected other African armies, though their 
exact nature depended on the specific country concerned.377 As a result, in Decalo’s 
words:378 
 
‘many African armies bear little resemblance to a modern complex organisational 
model and are instead a coterie of armed camps owing primarily clientelist 
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allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething 
with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and personal grievances.’ 
 
The truth of this can easily be seen in the internal feuding that characterized the Sierra 
Leonean and Liberian armed forces.379 For example, the Armed Forces of Liberia 
were ethnically factionalised under Samuel Doe in the 1980s. Doe brought in 
members of his own ethnic group, the Krahn, into the AFL who refused to take orders 
from others.380 Thus when internal wars began, West African armies were already 
vulnerable to disintegration. 
Political-Economic Factors in Military Merger Cases 
There are a number of reoccurring political-economic factors that have influenced the 
evolution of military merger cases. Several of these factors have been evident in one 
form or another since the merger of the warring groups in Zimbabwe started in 1980. 
These factors include the necessity for a viable political settlement; the intervention of 
foreign parties, playing a political role, to ensure stability (Zimbabwe, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Bosnia); the already identified necessity for constructive occupation for 
former fighters; indigenous actors’ preference for certain political groups, often on 
ethnic lines (Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Bosnia etc); and the potential value 
of reconciliation policies. 
 
Firstly, for military merger integration to be effective, there must be a functioning 
political settlement. Apart from the 1980 settlement in Zimbabwe, these have 
invariably incorporated Western liberal-democratic ideas, often due to strong 
international involvement. The political settlement, and the principals and objectives 
of the army reintegration process need to be embodied in clear policy documents.381 
Lack of such a settlement viable for the long term has been a factor in the Congo, 
Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Nepal. Peace accords can create temporary armed 
services, such as the Joint Integrated Units in South Sudan. But peace accords do not 
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necessarily make such services viable. While a lack of resources has impeded the 
effectiveness of the JIUs, South Sudan is one of the clearer examples of political 
factors making an integrated army unattainable. Prospects for North-South unity are 
poor, as the two sides retain incompatible interests. The same factors are at work in 
the Congo. The South African experience shows the value of a political debate on the 
future size, shape, and tasks of the army. 
 
Most of the obstacles to successful army reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina stem 
from political weaknesses in the peace settlement. While the international community 
may have induced the three sides to come to terms, creating effective combined 
institutions requires willingness to work together over the long term. The Serbs and 
Croats have resisted the creation of a unified central state, including security 
institutions, because its creation would, in their eyes, guarantee Bosniak rule as the 
Bosniaks form the majority.382 
 
Sierra Leone shows that army reconstruction needs to be addressed not only as part of 
post-peace accord SSR, but within civil institutional redevelopment of a wider nature 
still.383 If this is not done, a reformed army may have its effectiveness made useless 
because civil institutions misuse it, or fail it. Yet Mozambique’s experience with a 
crippling lack of resources demonstrates that a viable political settlement between 
combatants does not guarantee the creation of an effective military force. A realistic 
transition plan, a continuing political consensus, and sufficient resources are also 
required. 
 
Secondly, foreign commitments to support such a political settlement very often play 
a significant role,384 but do not appear to be necessary in all cases.385 In Zimbabwe, 
the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) made repeated early 
adjustments to the integration process to ensure stability within the nascent new state 
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as best it could.386 Following experience in Zimbabwe and Namibia, another BMATT 
was sent to South Africa in 1994. Officially they were said to have essentially 
certified that the process was fair, both for individuals attempting to take their rightful 
place in the new armed forces, and for the process as a whole.387 However, Kriger’s 
research in Zimbabwe indicates the British preoccupation at that time with the 
country’s future stability, and it is very likely that the same desire for future stability 
influenced BMATT decisions in South Africa. It seems likely that while making 
decisions in South Africa on which individuals would be able to enter the new armed 
forces, and in what positions, the BMATT personnel specifically took account of 
whether internal organizational tensions would be exacerbated or alleviated as a 
result. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian faction had had a significant military 
advantage during the civil war. After the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, the United 
States sponsored military training and integration assistance for the Muslim-Croat 
faction in order to better balance the military playing field in their favour. 
 
A rarer version of this kind of involvement is the commitment of significant amounts 
of funding. In Sierra Leone, what has been achieved was in large part accomplished 
because of the UK’s persistence and willingness to invest a significant amount of 
resources. Advisors doubt that the Sierra Leonean government can assume the 
security sector financial burden after UK assistance ends.388 
 
Thirdly, the size of the post-peace accord army is almost always influenced by the 
need to constructively occupy former combatants. Sometimes the army provides a 
framework within which discipline can be maintained temporarily over combatants 
who will eventually leave government service. Many armies have initially been of an 
unsustainable size, including those of Zimbabwe, the three armies in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and the Congo. In Zimbabwe the necessity to 
occupy former combatants led to many more units formed initially than was 
affordable or necessary.389 In Namibia again a future needed to be found for both 
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sides’ combatants, but emigration to South Africa and the alternative of police service 
eventually aided the stability of the new force by providing alternate options for 
former apartheid government personnel. South African integration was aided by 
designing the army integration process to be all-inclusive, to avoid factional 
dissatisfaction and thus the potential creation of spoilers.390 While this increased the 
size of the SANDF temporarily, quickly a steady stream of personnel began to leave, 
reducing the burden. The value of temporarily including all ex-combatants, which 
might potentially reduce the level of resentment caused by exclusion from the post-
peace accord army, has been identified in analyses of the East Timorese 
programme.391 In Sierra Leone former rebel combatants were brought into the army, 
where they could be monitored. This was done by granting them a blanket amnesty, a 
pre-emptive pardon for any crimes they might have committed.392 However there was 
a realization that the resulting 15,000 strong force size would be unsustainable. A 
series of cuts reduced the force to just under 8,500 in 2010.393 
 
Because the primary raison d’etre of a post peace accord army has often been the need 
to employ former combatants, forces have often struggled to find a clear post-peace 
agreement role.394 Effectively their purpose has been achieved by bringing them into 
existence. The fact that states’ formal frontiers are often assured by customary legal 
precedent or legal agreement, as in the case of Africa, also reduced the real need for 
external defence forces. Military merger armies affected by a lack of role include 
Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone,395 and possibly Namibia, though fragmentary 
information makes a proper assessment difficult.396 Others include East Timor and 
Kosovo. 
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Political concerns, either in the form of large armies to employ ex-combatants, or 
temporary force structuring requirements such as in South Sudan, make it difficult to 
incorporate long term concerns into immediate post conflict planning. In any case, the 
strategic situation often remains fluid during the uncertainty prevailing after a peace 
accord is signed. The strategic situation may also change dramatically. Defence 
reviews in major Western countries, which can occur as often as every four to five 
years, acknowledge this fact. Defence organizational structures formulated in the 
immediate aftermath of a peace accord, often by foreign advisors, can sometimes be 
left substantially unchanged for a long period (for example, the army structure in 
Namibia). This does not remove the value of periodic defence re-appraisals to adjust 
force structure. An example is the Timorese Force 2020 plan whose strategy differed 
substantially from earlier planning.  
 
Fourthly, politicians’ preference for certain parties or factions is an inescapable part 
of army reconstruction. This factor is part of what makes it such a political, rather 
than technical, process. Ethnic preferment is widespread in the fragile contexts in 
which army reconstruction often occurs. Post-peace accord examples abound. In 
Zimbabwe, the government preferred ZANLA over ZIPRA, which eventually led to 
former ZIPRA combatants being completely marginalized by 1987.397 This lead to a 
decline in effectiveness, as ZANLA was permitted to operate as they wished 
regardless of capability decline or rises in corruption.398 In Namibia, black PLAN ex-
combatants eventually became the mainstay of the new armed forces. In South Africa, 
it appears that the necessity for a political reorientation of the new SANDF has had 
negative effects on operational effectiveness. Since 1994 many competent white 
personnel have left, due to the affirmative action imperatives now operating within 
the force.399 
 
Fifthly, reconciliation processes, if promoted actively by the state, can assist 
establishing and maintaining stability throughout the transitional period. This policy 
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was initiated in Namibia, as a specific task for the army, and followed in South 
Africa. Reconciliation in Namibia was to be promoted by integrating the two former 
warring factions together. The President of Namibia said at the twelfth anniversary 
celebrations that reconciliation had been the primary task of the armed forces, and that 
this had led to the early consolidation of a strong nation.400 In South Africa, it was the 
spirit of reconciliation pioneered by Nelson Mandela that enabled the disparate armed 
groupings to come together as peacefully as they did. At the military level, the 
personal qualities of a number of officers who believed in integration helped bring the 
force together.401 
Capability Enhancement in ‘Military Merger’ cases 
 
Given the wide variety of ‘military merger’ cases, they have been divided here into 
three groups. The first includes those countries, most in southern Africa, in which the 
state reconstruction process, including the army reconstruction programme, was 
relatively successful. The second group’s army reconstruction programmes have seen 
some success, but a reversion to conflict involving the state, threatening the new 
army’s integrity, remains a possibility. The third group includes those countries 
whose army reconstruction processes have essentially failed for one reason or another.  
 
The first four ‘military merger’ cases in southern Africa had strong similarities. 
Following a peace accord facilitated with the assistance of outside powers, the former 
enemy armies were melded. In three of the four cases, this meant merging black and 
white opponents, who had been fighting along racial lines.  
 
The first case began unfolding in 1979 in what was then Rhodesia. The Lancaster 
House agreement brought the African guerillas’ liberation struggle which had lasted 
over a decade, to a negotiated end. The two contending guerilla armies, the mainly 
Shona Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and their opponents 
the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), were merged with the 
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Rhodesian Army into a new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).402A joint high 
command was formed from senior officers of all three parties to integrate, 
standardize, and develop the army. However there were severe divisions between the 
Rhodesian forces and the two guerrilla movements and between the two guerrilla 
movements themselves. This culminated in factional fighting at Entumbane outside 
Bulaweyo from November 1980.403 A complicating factor was the introduction of a 
separate North Korean training effort to assist in suppressing unrest in Matabeleland. 
Two divisive factors degrade professionalism, the political division between the three 
factions and the difference between two foreign separate advisory efforts (the British 
BMATT and the North Korean effort which followed).404 
 
In Zimbabwe, the British trainers of BMATT attempted to raise an effective, 
operational, army that was also accountable. Yet according to Kriger’s research, they 
had little success; corruption became widespread.405 There was an initial lack of 
interest in military affairs by ZNA senior personnel during the 1980s, also recorded 
by Kriger. This disinterest in military affairs was tolerated by the ZANU government 
in exchange for the army remaining subordinate to civilian authority. The army 
showed that it was capable of external defence operations in the fighting in 
Mozambique, and later in the Congo war from 1998.406 Later it became involved in 
suppressing internal opposition during the electoral campaigns of Mugabe’s ruling 
party. It is clear that the army enhanced its capacity to a reasonable degree. Capability 
then probably declined as the economic crisis worsened. Exact capacity assessments 
are effectively impossible to obtain due to the secrecy of the Mugabe regime.407 
 
                                                 
402
  Martin Rupiya, ‘Demobilisation and Integration: ‘Operation Merger’ and the Zimbabwe 
National Defence Forces, 1980-1987, African Security Review, Vol. 4, No.3, 1995. 
403
  Brigadier T P Toyne-Sewell, "Zimbabwe and the British Military Advisory and Training 
Team," Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 121, no. 1 (1991), and Alao 1996, 107, 109. 
404
  Abiodun  Alao, "The Metamorphosis of the Unorthodox: The Integration and Early 
Development of the Zimbabwe National Army " in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, ed. Nguabi 
Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds) (London, : James Currey, 1996), 114. 
405
  Norma J. Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe : Symbolic and Violent Politics, 
1980-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 132. 
406
  Stephen F. Burgess, "Fashioning Integrated Security Forces after Conflict," African Security 
2, No. 1 (2008): 75. 
407
  While reporting on the capacity of ZNA is scarce, a good 2010 discussion of the general 
status of the force is Paul Sorensen, “Zimbabwe's Security Services,” The RUSI Journal, 155: 4, 58 — 
68 (September 2010). 
  
In Namibia the new Defence Force was formed by bringing together the two former 
combatants, the black insurgent People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and 
the South African supported South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) and 
Koevoet special police. However, many of the Koevoet personnel elected to relocate 
to South Africa, while many SWATF personnel joined the police force. Eventually 
former insurgents made up two-thirds of the new Defence Force.408 The main 
planning for integration in Namibia was done by a further British Military Advisory 
and Training Team, 57 strong, which worked together with the government to 
formulate a plan for a 10,000 strong force.409 The British team had two main 
functions: to provide advice on the creation of a Ministry of Defence and Army 
headquarters, and to assist in training and selecting officers and NCOs.410 The British 
team ran a series of eight-week leaders’ cadre training courses. These courses were 
designed to ‘produce instructors capable of training their own battalions, and leaders 
capable of commanding soldiers in barracks and in the field.’411 The British advisors 
then gradually reduced their activities, handing over to newly trained Namibians. The 
Army has conducted both external defence operations in the Congo and Angola and 
operations against internal rebellion in the Caprivi Strip, as well as peacekeeping 
tasks. Specific descriptions of these operations are however difficult to find.412 It has 
also carried out humanitarian operations - fighting wildfires. Clearly a significant 
level of capability has been created, but it is very difficult to assess how combat 
effective the army is.  
 
South Africa gained a broadly representative democratic government through a 
peaceful rather than a warlike process. From 1994, the former apartheid South 
African Army, a thoroughly professional land force on the Western model,413 began to 
incorporate former guerrilla fighters of the African National Congress, Pan-Africanist 
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Congress (PAC), and the former ‘homeland’ armed forces.414 This process melded 
very disparate elements into what has not been an easy partnership. After a planning 
phase, most of the rank and file of the MK, PAC, and homeland armed forces were 
effectively absorbed into the structures of the old SADF.415 The SADF was renamed 
the South African National Defence Force. While the name changed, the former 
SADF leadership continued to dominate the force. Absorption would not effectively 
begin to be reversed until several years had passed. Two main reasons led to a gradual 
change in the character and control of the force.416 First, the Ministry of Defence, 
utilizing a small group of former MK and liberal SADF officers, succeeded in 
delivering the Defence White Paper and later the Defence Review, which led to 
significant change. The other was that many non-SADF officers had been prevented 
from taking up key positions because they had had to attend Western style training 
courses. As they returned, the balance within the SANDF began to shift. 
 
South Africa still has ‘the best trained and equipped army in Sub-Saharan Africa,’417 
despite losses of skilled personnel. Following the formation of the SANDF, South 
African forces have been in heavy demand for UN peacekeeping missions. Much 
more information is available on South Africa than for other African cases. Yet the 
army has not been tested in combat, and directly relevant information is not available. 
It has however conducted humanitarian operations, in Mozambique, Lesotho, and 
during domestic civil service strikes. But growing finance, morale and discipline 
problems hamper retention of capability. Capability has actually declined since 1994. 
In 2010 there were been repeated reports of crisis from the South African media.418 
 
By 1992 the civil war in Mozambique had been underway for fifteen years. The 
government and rebel combatants had reached exhaustion point, and both armed 
forces had been debilitated by the struggle.419 The environment of exhaustion in 
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which the peace accord was signed bears some resemblance to 2005 in Sudan, when 
the accord was signed there. In October 1992, a peace accord was signed.420 As part 
of the agreement, the government – Forcas Armadas de Mocambique (FAM) – and 
opposition Resistacao Nacional de Mozambique (RENAMO) combatants were to be 
integrated into a single armed force. The new Armed Forces were Lusophone, and 
Portugal and France played a significant role in their creation. A 50:50 integration 
principal between government and rebels was adopted.421 
 
After negotiations, a target of 30,000 for the new FADM was eventually adopted. 
However, poor conditions led to more combatants wishing to be demobilized than 
wanting to join the new force. Pay, rations and other essentials had long been scarce 
or late in the FAM. Therefore most soldiers were skeptical of the new force’s future, 
and corruption made matters worse. By February 1995, the new FADM had only 
12,000 personnel, and this number was decreasing. This prompted descriptions such 
as ‘the creation of the FADM was not so much a practice of integration, but one of 
disintegration.’422 Flood relief operations in 2000 exposed multiple FADM capacity 
problems. The FADM has continued to suffer from severe capacity deficiencies due 
to continuing rivalries between the two sides, lack of skilled personnel, and lack of 
funding.423 The FADM appears to have a very low level of overall capacity for any 
external, internal, or humanitarian mission. This mirrors the apparent outcomes with 
the JIUs in Sudan, and with the FARDC in the Congo. 
 
All four of the armies discussed above were initially recreated by assembling and 
training former enemies together. However the process showed a number of 
variations. In Zimbabwe and Namibia, the British Army provided training, with the 
aim of turning the former guerilla movements into professional armed forces. In 
Zimbabwe from 1980, the BMATT trained both officers and enlisted soldiers. The 
two black factions together nominated 300 potential leaders for each battalion, and 
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then 400 more personnel each who formed the rank and file, and the two groupings 
were integrated in a training programme supervised by BMATT. From 1990 in 
Namibia, the BMATT sent there had a reduced role, which was adopted on the basis 
of experience in Zimbabwe. The British there trained only the identified potential 
leaders in a series of eight-week leaders’ cadre courses. For Mozambique, potential 
leaders were trained in Zimbabwe by the Zimbabweans, who had had their own army 
operating for twelve years by that time, and the remaining British advisors.424   
 
It appears that capability was enhanced successfully in these four integration exercises 
because the task was relatively easy. The ease of training infantry to the company 
level has been noted above in the literature review. With a relatively successful state 
reconstruction process unfolding across the rest of a country, the political context 
appears to have been positive enough for former enemies to work together to create 
new institutions. The institutional strength of the state also played a role, especially in 
South Africa, the only developed state. Elsewhere international assistance filled part 
of the institutional gap. Logistics capability has been harder to create, partially 
because of lack of resources, and in some cases, disinterest.  The level to which 
institutional and technical capabilities go beyond infantry skills will always be an 
unavoidable function of the skills base in a country as a whole. 
 
The next process that started, in Sierra Leone, along with following programmes in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Burundi, falls into the partially successful category. Such 
countries may have made substantial progress towards creating a new army post-
peace accord, but are vulnerable to a resumption of fighting. Events in East Timor in 
2006 and in Burundi from late 2010 demonstrate that a country whose army has been 
created after a peace accord can revert to conflict. This can in turn split that army in 
the process. Both Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina are vulnerable to such a 
reversion. The Mano River region’s instability threatens Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina now-unitary state may be split by a Serb withdrawal. Reports of fighting 
in late 2010 indicate that the Burundian integration process may also be threatened. 
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The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991, with severe fighting continuing even 
after a peace accord was signed at Lome in July 1999. However, by June 2001 it was 
possible to commence the Military Reintegration Programme (MRP), 425 which 
effectively marked the beginning of the army reconstruction process. The MRP aimed 
to integrate all ex-combatant groups into a single military force. The MRP began with 
the countrywide DDR exercise, progressed through individual screening and basic 
training, and culminated in the new soldiers being posted to army units as individual 
replacements.426 Around 2,400 former guerrilla combatants eventually joined the 
Sierra Leone army. After 2003, three rounds of downsizing were completed, reducing 
the armed forces to a more manageable size.427 
 
The army has not seen combat since the reconstruction process began, but with 
support and international advisory assistance has developed a great deal. In 2009 a 
peacekeeping deployment began to the UN/AU Mission in Darfur.428 Therefore 
capabilities have been raised from near-disintegration in 2001 to some level of 
effectiveness in 2009. The Sierra Leonean army can now dispatch troops to UN 
missions. While overall capability has improved, the force continues to be hampered 
by lack of equipment, low levels of operational activity and welfare, and low 
morale.429 
 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended the civil war in 
1995. The DPA left the country with three armies under two commands: the Bosniak 
(Bosnian Muslim) and Bosnian Croat armies within the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, facing their recent adversaries the army of the Republika Srpska, the 
Serb entity. These three armies together had around 419,000 personnel in regulars and 
reserves.430 Some U.S. aid was given to help integrate the Federation armies, but it 
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appears little was achieved beyond the transfer of arms.431 By 2004, the Federation 
and Srpska had reduced their forces to 12,000 regulars and 240,000 reserves but had 
made no effective progress in integrating the two into one new force, though the basis 
of a state defence ministry had been put in place.432 Conscription for periods of 
around four months continued, the costs of which were weighing down the two 
entities.  
 
In 2003 the Office of the High Representative, effectively the international 
community’s proconsul in Bosnia-Herzegovina, initiated defence reforms. After 
further international pressure, an integration agreement was approved by 
parliamentarians in July 2006.433 It ended conscription, increased the powers of the 
state Ministry of Defence, and decided to form three ethnic administrative regiments, 
each split among three operational brigades. A single state defence budget and single 
chain of command were also created. Implementation of this new structure has 
proceeded slowly. However in 2010 fears have been expressed that if senior Serb 
officers publicly leave the army, the force might split again along ethnic lines.434 
In capacity terms, the force is not designed to defend against external attack, and the 
police handle internal unrest. Army led humanitarian deployments within Bosnia-
Herzegovina have taken place, mirroring deployments by the South African Army, 
Mozambique Armed Forces, Namibian Defence Force, and many of the other armies 
examined in this study. The army’s long-term operational focus is to deploy on 
NATO, EU or UN-led operations.435 Small deployments of this type have already 
taken place.  
 
The army reconstruction programme which began in Burundi in 2003 initially had 
sufficient similarities to be grouped with the other successful set of countries.436 The 
civil war in Burundi ended in 2000 after a prolonged struggle made worse by its 
interplay with the violence in neighbouring Rwanda. However it took until 2003 to 
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settle on the force merger details between the Tutsi government and Hutu rebels.437 
The new army was to be a 50:50 mix of Tutsi and Hutu, but also open to other former 
rebel fighters. South Africa provided an initial government protection force which 
was superseded by an African Union peacekeeping mission, AMIB. As an interim 
measure, joint military units were created. In 2006, the third rebel faction, the Forces 
Nationales de Liberation,438 appeared to be integrating successfully within the armed 
forces. But from August-September 2010, FNL elements appear to have started 
further attacks, and UN representatives have expressed concern of a return to 
violence.439 The two original factions appear to have integrated effectively enough, 
because the unified army is now conducting operations against the FNL. However late 
2010 indications suggest that the state may fragment again, destroying what the army 
integration process has gained. 
 
The problem for these three states lies in a possible return to war. In Sierra Leone, the 
armed forces may be stronger than at any time since 1990, but the Mano River region 
remains unstable. Guinea-Conakry’s political future is uncertain, and the states in the 
region retain some of the vulnerabilities that led to conflict in the 1990s. It was 
reported in 2006 that Sierra Leonean ‘transformation is painfully slow and continues 
to be undermined by systematic corruption and a lack of will to steer change.’440 This 
is despite a number of identified incompetent/corrupt senior officers having been 
persuaded to leave. These officers were paid the total salary that they would have 
received if they have stayed until retirement age.441 The problem is systemic. The 
continuing presence of the international military training team does however help 
deter creeping de-professionalization. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the army 
reconstruction process, despite the progress achieved, is hostage as is all else to entity 
politics. There is a real possibility of a Serbian attempt to withdraw from the 
developing unitary state. In Burundi, the FNL appears to have abandoned the 
integration process. 
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The third military merger sub-group includes those states whose army reconstruction 
process has been delayed or disrupted enough to be considered failed. For the 
purposes of this discussion, failure can be understood as the inability to create a 
unified and reasonably combat capable army. It appears that the major reason for 
these failures is that enough powerful actors prefer the status quo. For example, in the 
Congo, effective reform is actually neither desired nor necessary for the governing 
elite. Certain parties in Sudan and Nepal have too much invested in the status quo to 
wish to implement their peace accords.   
 
The second of the Congo’s two recent wars ended with a peace accord, the Global and 
All-inclusive Agreement, in December 2002. The negotiations which led to the 
accords proposed that the new armed forces be built through integration of the six 
warring factions. In late 2003 as an initial step all the six former warring factions were 
declared to be part of the new armed forces, but it took until 2005 to formulate a 
reform plan.442 The 2005 reform plan envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated 
brigades, drawn from all the warring factions, as the first of three stages. Due to a 
multitude of delays in the DDR and integration process, forming the eighteen brigades 
was delayed over three years. Deadlines for the second and third stages have also 
been repeatedly delayed.443 The integrated brigades had to operate alongside a variety 
of former warring faction groups. Then in 2009 the trained integrated brigades were 
broken up and melded with former rebel CNDP fighters and Mai-Mai local militias. 
UN reports in 2009 indicate the resulting force has former rebel parallel command 
chains operating within it, and its effectiveness and internal cohesion is low.444 The 
army is not effective against external enemies, internal rebellion, or for humanitarian 
tasks. 
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An effective army may actually be neither desirable nor necessary for the Congo’s 
ruling oligarchy.445 An effective force would threaten the survival of the government 
and impede individuals’ ability to enrich themselves. In any case, the government 
does not need to control the whole country. A group of presidential advisors deals 
with the sensitive security issues. This group runs a parallel decision-making system 
to the formal structure. Lack of donor coordination only worsens the situation, with 
the UN and the EU vying for SSR leadership,446 and the Congolese playing off varied 
donors against each other.  
 
Two separate army reconstruction processes have taken place in the Sudan. One 
process spans the North Sudan/South Sudan divide, and the second is attempting to 
unify and professionalize the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).  
  
Attempts to integrate the Northern and Southern armies began following the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005 which aimed to end the 
Sudanese civil war. Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) were created, comprised of both 
Northern and Southern troops.447 The Joint Integrated Units were to have had the 
functional purpose of filling security vacuums caused by Northern and Southern 
withdrawal from contested areas, and symbolically, were intended to demonstrate 
national unity and serve as a confidence-building mechanism. However, due to 
tensions between North and South, problems over the integration of regional militias, 
ethnic tensions, and lack of funding, their potential capability was limited. Effectively 
they remained ‘little more than collocated units of SAF and SPLA troops’ with 
separate chains of command.448 Capability for any task is low. The JIUs actually 
fought each other in Abyei in 2008.449 The JIUs probably broke up after the 9 January 
2011 South Sudanese referendum vote. These problems, along with many other 
issues, threatened implementation of the peace accord. Yet because prospects for 
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future North-South unity are poor, there was little interest in integrating the units 
further. 
 
The South Sudanese programmes are not the product of an agreed peace accord. The 
SPLA process is an internal state-building process and is not associated with an 
international intervention force. Therefore they do not fall under the scope of this 
thesis. If South Sudan was an international recognized state, however, the South 
Sudanese programmes would represent a form of the institutionalization method. 
Because South Sudan is not such a state, some brief details of the programmes are 
noted here to keep the discussion regarding Sudan in one place. A number of separate 
programmes to aid the SPLA are being funded by the United States and the United 
Kingdom. All appear to be being implemented through contractors; Burton Rams 
International funded by DfID through Adam Smith International,450 and U.S. firms451 
are among the commercial companies involved. The U.S. contracts are probably 
implemented through the AFRICAP (Africa Peacekeeping) contractual arrangement 
that the Department of State uses to carry out military contractor activities in Africa. 
The difficulty is that the SPLA appears to be a force fractured between different 
tribes, of which the Dinka and the Nuer are possibly the most important.452 South 
Sudan appears to be vulnerable to political fragmentation for some time to come.453 
This may lead in time to the failure of the SPLA reconstruction process for the same 
reasons as in the Congo. 
 
The roots of Nepal’s present conflict date to 1996, when the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) began a revolt against the Nepalese royal government. Following a 
military stalemate between the Maoists and the government, a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) formally ended the war in 2006.454 The transformation of the 
security sector was envisaged as one of the key parts of the Nepal peace process. 455 
The CPA agreed that the Maoist fighters were to be ‘integrated and rehabilitated,’ 
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with some to be incorporated into the state security forces. On the other side, the 
Royal Nepalese Army was to be ‘democratized’ and its national and inclusive 
character developed. It was to be trained in democratic norms and values.456 Finally 
the appropriate size of the army as a national force was to be determined. While the 
process was under way no new recruitment for either army was to take place. 
 
However since 2006 there has been little progress towards these objectives.457 Both 
sides have filled vacancies in defiance of the recruitment ban. The Nepalese Army has 
resisted the imposition of democratic civilian control. After the dissolution of the 
royal palace military secretariat, the Armed Forces have been more autonomous than 
ever. Negotiations on the restructuring process have been continually stalled. As of 
November 2010, the parties in Nepal are still debating how and whether the two 
forces are to be integrated.   
 
The major reason for the failures in Sudan and Nepal appears to be that the parties 
will damage their own power base if they implement the integration agreements. This 
feared loss of power and influence is also a major factor in hampering reconstruction 
efforts in the Congo. Improving the effectiveness of the army and other state 
institutions there would reduce the governing oligarchy’s leverage.  
 
If failure can be defined as the inability to create a unified and reasonably combat 
capable army, these three cases can be described as failures. These cases show the 
necessity for a viable peace settlement if reconstruction (including army capability 
enhancement) is to take place. Three directly applicable capability enhancement 
lessons can be identified. These are the avoidance of differing foreign armies’ 
philosophies and practices in the same indigenous force, the necessity and great 
difficulty of transferring logistics and administrative skills, and the need for realistic 
rather than unattainable transformation plans. Experience in Zimbabwe and the Congo 
shows the problems caused when differing military procedures are introduced within 
the same army. Diversification of military equipment supplies for political reasons has 
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also lowered capability in other African states.458 Lack of capability within military 
merger armies is often due to the difficulty of maintaining logistical skills, rather than 
combat skills. This has been a problem in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the Congo, and 
probably elsewhere. The last lesson draws upon South African experience. A realistic 
assessment needs to be made of the institutional capability for transformation within 
the armed forces, and objectives set accordingly.459 Mozambique and the Congo 
represent examples of these types of over-ambitious goals. In Mozambique, both a 
navy and an air force have been retained in the face of crippling resource difficulties, 
when not enough money is available to fund the army properly. In the Congo, creating 
eighteen effective integrated brigades has just about proven beyond the state’s 
capability. One lesson identified from Zimbabwe, which has now been integrated into 
current practice sufficiently to be considered a ‘lesson learned’, is the need for an 
overall army strategic and budgeting plan.460 Such planning, or, at least, attempts to 
put such planning in place, is now a feature of virtually all army reconstruction 
programmes. However, as will be shown in Chapter 7, hurried last-minute changes 
can still occur. 
 
The fact that only three widely applicable lessons can be drawn from this survey 
makes more obvious the limitations of programmes focused on capability 
enhancement alone.461 This result emphasizes again the truth of Trotsky’s dictum that 
an army is a mirror of its society. The potential power inherent in any army is a 
function of a society’s ability to educate and train the army’s personnel. The more 
sophisticated the concepts an army’s personnel can manipulate, the more potent the 
‘conceptual component of fighting power,’ in the British Army’s words, will be.462 
The conceptual component enables the moral and the physical components of fighting 
power. Because of this many of the most important issues affecting capability 
enhancement actually reflect the deeper political-economic factors already covered 
above. Capability enhancement itself, though, is a one of the factors specifically 
covered by the SSR principles, and it is to these principles that we now turn. 
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Applicability of SSR principles to the military merger model 
 
Six criteria were formulated in the method chapter which expressed the OECD 
principles of SSR. These criteria will be used to assess whether military merger 
reconstruction programmes have been a success in SSR terms.  
 
The first criterion is whether the programme was people-centred and locally owned.  
In general, military merger programmes do not appear to be people-centred. While the 
reintegration component of DDR programmes may primarily focus on improving 
former combatants’ lives and bettering their welfare, army reconstruction programmes 
do not. State military security is the dominant concern. Regime security has become a 
significant factor in Zimbabwe and the Congo. 
 
Local ownership of ‘military merger’ programmes has been mixed. In Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, and Sierra Leone, significant British elements have been introduced or re-
introduced. In Zimbabwe, the programme was designed to produce a British style 
army, drawing clear precedents from the British Army. Strenuous efforts were made 
to transform the guerilla groupings into a bureaucratic institution. Army 
reconstruction in Namibia appears to have blended elements of local ownership with 
British practices. However older South African and East Bloc techniques inculcated 
earlier will have retained some influence.463 Army reconstruction in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was not locally owned. International pressure drove most of the process. 
Locally owned armies include South Africa, the Joint Integrated Units in South 
Sudan,464 and Nepal. In the Congo foreign prompting was necessary to initiate the 
process. At the field level however, once the initial involvement by several donors 
had ceased, the Congolese ran virtually all aspects of the integrated brigade creation 
programme. The reason army programmes remain locally owned appears to be 
connected with the level of major power interest. South Africa was a strong 
industrialized state, organized along Western lines. Little foreign involvement was 
necessary or desired. In the Congo there is little major power interest in assuring the 
strength of the state structure. Finally the nature of the new FADM in Mozambique is 
not clear enough to indicate whether the process was meaningfully locally owned. 
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The second OECD criterion was a programmatic basis upon democratic norms, 
human rights, and the rule of law. Army reconstruction programmes have only met 
such aspirations where major Western powers have been significantly involved. 
Such cases include South Africa, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The army reconstruction 
process in Sierra Leone aspired to all these three goals. However the neo-patrimonial 
condition of the state continues to obstruct these objectives. The Defence Reform 
Commission process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while operated according to the three 
aspirations above, was led by foreign actors. In Zimbabwe, South Sudan, the Congo, 
and Nepal such principles have not been respected. Most egregiously, soldiers of the 
new Congolese integrated brigades have carried out multiple human rights violations, 
mass killings, rapes, extortion, and other crimes. Less serious crimes have been 
reported in South Sudan. In Namibia the army has been accused of torture and of 
disappearances.465 In Nepal, the democratic norms and principles expressed in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement have been subverted by the participants. However 
there have been no widely reported human rights violations. 
 
The third OECD criterion was that SSR should be a framework to address diverse 
challenges through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies. 
As noted in the method chapter, comprehensive SSR requires more than policies for 
DDR and army reconstruction. Such policies must also be integrated with policies that 
address policing, justice, intelligence, and national security policy formulation. In 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa, this did not occur because the 
concept had not yet been formulated. The priorities were catering appropriately for 
the future of the former security personnel, and creating new armed forces. Army 
reconstruction in Zimbabwe did not effectively meet its ostensible requirement, 
exterior defence, let alone more diverse challenges. Instead an army ‘which the 
country neither needed nor could afford’ was created.466 South Africa was among the 
first countries to address such diverse challenges through wide-ranging consultation 
processes, but these processes began after the decisions on army integration had been 
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made. In all these four countries, army reconstruction was incorporated into Defence 
Sector Reform, but not wider SSR.  
 
Since the principles of security sector reform were formulated, significant major 
Western power involvement has been vital to force the adoption of multi-sectoral 
policies. Sierra Leone is the only country in this category in which a holistic approach 
has been attempted with some relative success, compared to other SSR efforts. 
Significant efforts were made there to implement holistic policies and an integrated 
approach. Attempts to implement a holistic policy in Sierra Leone were a result of 
efforts by the British interveners to put their comprehensive concept of SSR into 
practice. In South Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Congo, and Nepal army 
reconstruction appears to have become isolated from wider SSR efforts. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina this was due to the entities’ resistance to change. In the Congo the 
programme has been ineffectually linked to DDR but has not functioned as part of any 
wider SSR strategy. In Nepal political agreement has not been reached on army 
reconstruction, let alone integration with wider security policy. 
 
The fourth OECD criterion is that SSR should be a practice promoting greater civilian 
oversight and involvement. Four countries have seen promotion of democratic civilian 
involvement. In Namibia and South Africa,467 both greater civilian oversight and 
significant democratic civilian oversight was introduced. In both countries this 
process was locally dominated. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, significant foreign pressure 
was also required. In Mozambique, civilian oversight has been promoted but only to a 
limited degree. While the armed forces seem to accept their subordination to civilian 
authority, changing mental attitudes takes time.468 The democratic governance of the 
sector is ‘so far, embryonic,’ according to a 2007 assessment.469 In two countries 
Zimbabwe and the Congo, civilian oversight has been focused on personalised 
presidential control. Little growth in civilian oversight is evident for the JIUs in the 
Sudan. In Nepal, the army is acting with a significant degree of autonomy. In 
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summary, most army reconstruction processes do promote civilian involvement. Few 
programmes have introduced significant levels of democratic civilian control, 
however, because such control is usually not in the interests of political elites. 
 
The fifth OECD criterion is that SSR should be transparent and accountable. The level 
of transparency and accountability that army reconstruction has achieved can be 
divided into three groups. There is a group which has aspired to or achieved 
transparency, a group which has not achieved transparency, and a group where the 
situation is unclear. The first group consists of South Africa, Sierra Leone, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The South African integration process appears to have been 
carried out in a transparent and accountable manner, assisted by the presence of 
BMATT. Transparency and accountability have been an aspiration in Sierra Leone, 
but has been severely hampered. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, transparency and 
accountability have slowly improved, often due to international pressure. The second 
group consists of Zimbabwe, Namibia, the Congo, Burundi,470 and Nepal, which have 
not achieved transparency. Significant corruption became entrenched in Zimbabwe,471 
and both corruption and massive human rights violations have been endemic in the 
Congo. The army’s autonomy in Nepal means there has been little transparency or 
accountability. The Namibian Defence Force has also been affected by corruption. 
472For the JIUs in South Sudan, there is not enough information available to form 
judgments. The State Department Human Rights Report for Mozambique describes 
impunity for the police and corruption as endemic.473 Other recent reporting also 
indicates that transparency and accountability is low there.474 As with other SSR 
principles, significant involvement by Western powers is necessary if SSR standards 
are to be inculcated. 
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The final, sixth criterion was that SSR should enhance institutional and human 
capacity. As noted above, this has been the dominant factor throughout the history of 
bilateral military aid. Much greater effort has been focused on it than any other SSR 
principle. Capacity has been clearly increased in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sierra Leone, 
the Congo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Zimbabwe475 and Namibia training saw 
institutional and human capacity raised, and both armies later saw combat in the 
Congo. In Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina, capacity has been significantly 
enhanced, and both armies are now capable of deployment abroad. In the Congo, 
institutional and human capability has been enhanced, but only to a limited degree. 
 
It is difficult to determine whether capacity has been enhanced in Mozambique.476 
Lack of resources and skilled personnel, accentuated by political disagreement, were 
the root cause for both the difficulties during the integration process and the problems 
evident today. The South African process was a success for reconciliation, but it is not 
clear whether both institutional and human capacity was enhanced. Many less skilled 
personnel joined the SANDF. An uncomfortable atmosphere was created for white 
former SADF personnel and well before 2008 it was clear many were leaving.477 In 
South Sudan, given the underfunding and intra-unit hostility, it seems that little 
human and very little institutional capacity has been added. Capability has not been 
increased in Nepal; the recruitment of unskilled young people may have degraded it 
instead. 
 
In summary, few ‘military merger’ programmes have been conducted in accordance 
with SSR principles. South Africa is perhaps the only clear example. Yet capability 
appears to have degraded there. The other seven cases cannot be accurately assessed 
as fulfilling all the SSR criteria. In many cases, governments have resisted many of 
the core tenets of SSR. In Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, the foreign nature of the army 
programme, and corruption, makes it impossible to deem these programmes 
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meaningful SSR. Army reconstruction in Mozambique does not appear to have been 
conducted in accordance with SSR principles. With some exceptions, such as local 
ownership, the South Sudan process has not developed in accordance with SSR 
principles. The dysfunctional process in the Congo, which has led to multiple severe 
human rights violations and war crimes, cannot really be considered SSR. In Bosnia 
the process has been foreign dominated and has lacked transparency. In Nepal, 
preparations for army reconstruction have suffered from lack of transparency, civilian 
oversight, and an integrated multi-sectoral policy. Thus the preparations for army 
reconstruction in Nepal have not met SSR principles either.  
 
Surveying the ten military merger cases, it becomes reasonably clear that the SSR 
principles alone do not offer comprehensive guidelines for successful army 
reconstruction. Political-economic factors are of great importance, and capability 
enhancement has been very important historically.  
 
Armies rebuilt by the ‘ Institutionalization’ method 
East Timor, together with Kosovo, represents the ‘Military merger’ model in 
operation with only a single force to be integrated. This single force is then pared 
down, and is then institutionalized to become the new national army. Therefore this 
simpler variant of ‘military merger’ has been designated ‘institutionalization.’ 
 
Political-Economic Factors in Institutionalization cases 
The political-economic factors that have shaped the East Timorese and Kosovo 
armies share a number of commonalities with those encountered in ‘military merger’ 
cases. Common important factors include the reality of political preferment, the 
influence neo-patrimonial linkages can exert, and the difficulty of creating a long-
term viable force structure within the first few months of an intervention.  
 
Political preferment in East Timor and Kosovo, as in a number of previous cases 
influenced who was selected for the new armed forces. The first 650 personnel 
selected for the new F-FDTL were apparently weighted towards those who were 
‘Easterners.’ These selection decisions created resentment among former Falintil 
  
‘Westerners’ who were not selected for the F-FDTL. There was also a generational 
gap between the survivors of Falintil and new, young, recruits.478 
 
Kosovo, like East Timor, demonstrates the significant difficulties faced in trying to 
transform guerrilla forces, run often on a neo-patrimonial logic, into Western-style 
professional armies. The KSF, mostly drawn from the former KPC, is part of the 
wider Kosovo Albanian political network which now runs Kosovo in a less than 
transparent fashion.479 Significant political power continues to be held by KPC 
personnel. One clear outcome of this power was in 2009, when the Italian KFOR 
commander decided to allow absorption of non-selected KPC personnel, reversing his 
previous policy.480 Trying to strengthen the transparency and accountability of the 
KSF will be very difficult without broader measures to do so throughout Kosovo. Yet 
such measures are unlikely to success in face of the deep rooted political-economic-
criminal linkages which dominate the territory.  
 
The development of new armies after peace accords can be simplified if their design 
can be agreed upon early but be appropriate for the long term. Neither in Kosovo nor 
in East Timor did political-economic factors allow a long-term design to be put in 
place quickly. Kosovo is the more straightforward example; political considerations 
forced the creation of a temporary disciplined service, the KPC, with some parallels to 
the JIUs in South Sudan. Both were government disciplined services explicitly 
responding to a temporary situation. Both have been or will be superseded by 
permanent arrangements.  
 
The situation in East Timor, on the other hand, demonstrates the complex situation 
that can be created by such aspirations. The accepted force structure for East Timor 
was the result of a King’s College London report. The report proposed three options, 
ranging from Option I of 3-5,000 personnel, which the Timorese preferred, to Option 
III, of a 3,000 strong force, half each regular and reserve.481 Option III was adopted in 
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September 2000. Later, the reserve component was dropped for lack of funds. The 
Force 2020 proposals made public in 2007 advocated a 3,000 strong structure, with a 
reversion to company level units. Company-sized units had been preferred by the 
Timorese since their predecessors were serving with the Portuguese colonial militia. 
In 2010 recruiting of a larger force is ongoing, but a third battalion is being 
considered, rather than company structures.  
 
It could be argued that the renewed aspiration for a 3,000 strong force represents a 
return to the posture best suited for the long term. However, given the size of Timor’s 
neighbour Indonesia, whether Timor has a force of 1,500 or 3,000 is irrelevant.482 If 
another invasion took place, any army would quickly become a mountain guerrilla 
force once more. If a force of 3,000 rather than 1,500 is created, expenses will be 
increased with little added military value. Thus what this chain of events shows is not 
really that a long-term Timorese strategic aspiration has been revived. Rather, armed 
forces have high value as symbols of statehood. Post-conflict states can be willing to 
maintain armed forces at a larger than justified size for political rather than strictly 
security requirements.  
Capability Enhancement in Institutionalization Cases 
The two cases of institutionalization present very different histories of capability 
enhancement. Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 after the Portuguese colonial 
governor withdrew. Prior to the invasion the dominant political party, Fretilin, had 
created an army, Falintil, which drew many of its members from the former 
Portuguese colonial militia. Falintil then fought the Indonesian military at varying 
levels of intensity from 1975 to 1999.  
 
As the international intervention force INTERFET arrived in 1999, Falintil cantoned 
itself at Aileu in the centre of the island. The UN administration could not produce a 
workable future for the force quickly, and dissatisfaction began to surface.483 
Eventually Falintil would wait sixteen months in the cantonment for decisions. It was 
finally decided to form a small national army (Falintil-FDTL or F-FDTL) of 1,500 
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personnel, plus reservists, and the core of the new force was raised by selecting 650 of 
Falintil’s 1,736 personnel. The rest of Falintil were demobilized in a process which 
failed to satisfy ‘their expectations or economic needs.’484 
 
The dissatisfaction caused by the selection decisions exacerbated already existing 
regional and factional tensions within the Falintil community. A government 
commission’s recommendations to resolve problems within the defence force, 
submitted in August 2004, appear to have been ignored.485 These problems led to 
protests by soldiers from the West part of East Timor over soldiers’ from the East 
part’s better treatment. 593 ‘petitioners’ eventually appealed directly to the Chief of 
Defence Force. Attempts to resolve the dispute were made, but broke down. 
Eventually the 593 protesters were dismissed in March 2006. A crisis developed, 
which split both the army and the police. Westerners and Easterners in both forces 
fought each other. Stability was only regained after Australian, New Zealand, and 
Portuguese troops arrived. 
 
Since 2006 much Timorese military attention has been focused on an ambitious 
recovery and expansion plan, ‘Force 2020.’ The army component of the plan foresees 
a buildup to a force of 3,000 and acquisition of heavy equipment such as armoured 
personnel carriers. The Australian foreign minister, amongst other commentators, 
described the plan as too expensive for East Timor to fund.486 However, almost 600 
new recruits graduated from recruit training in December 2009, and efforts continue 
to expand the force to the 3,000 mark by 2020.487 The Timorese government is 
determined to implement Force 2020 despite international and UN disapproval.488 
In the aftermath of the 2006 events and the rebuilding process the F-FDTL is 
undergoing, it is probable that capability levels are low. In 2007 at least one senior 
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officer said that he could not retire because of the incapacity of mid-level officers 
demonstrated during the 2006 crisis.489 
 
The disintegration of the F-FDTL was primarily due to the poor handling of 
unresolved grievances within the security sector. Internal tensions were not actively 
addressed and managed until they could be resolved. Several opportunities to address 
F-FDTL problems seem to have been lost. Not enough attention was focused on the 
institutional and mental changes required to transition a guerrilla force into a regular 
army.490 However, the pressure on the nascent army was not aided by emphasis on 
technical ‘train and equip’ considerations.491 At the implementation level, relatively 
sophisticated systems were established, sometimes without proper preparation. For 
example, a computerized personnel system was created to track pay, promotions, 
leave, special training arrangements, etc. However it was little used after the foreign 
advisor that established it left. The East Timorese personnel stopped inputting data for 
anything but soldiers’ pay.492 
 
In East Timor, as with Sierra Leone, the option of creating a reserve force, which 
might well have diverted some of the resentment of ex-combatants denied entry into 
the new army, was not taken up. Creating a reserve in this kind of situation remains a 
potentially useful policy option for the future. 
 
In the Balkans, the origins of today’s Kosovo Security Force (KSF) lie in the Kosovo 
Liberation Army that fought Serbian repression in 1998-9. After the UN became the 
interim administration of Kosovo, the force was converted into the Kosovo Protection 
Corps (KPC). The KPC was to carry out emergency civil support duties such as 
firefighting, search and rescue, de-mining, and reconstruction. Of the KLA’s 25,000 
personnel registered during demobilization, 5,000 found a home in the KPC.  
 
Despite long discussions with Serbia, no negotiated solution could be reached over 
independence for the province. As a result Kosovo made a unilateral declaration of 
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independence on February 17, 2008. While those discussions had been taking place 
however, the UN administration had in 2006 initiated what became a national security 
strategy review, named the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR).  
The ISSR aimed to craft an integrated security policy for Kosovo. 
 
On June 12, 2008, NATO agreed to take responsibility for supervising the dissolution 
of the KPC and the creation of the new Kosovo Security Force. It was decided that the 
KSF would be a lightly armed force, with no heavy weapons, of 2,500 with 800 
reserves. The UK decided to provide assistance in the creation of the new force. 
However there were significant problems encountered. Inappropriate personnel were 
picked due to staff errors (such as those who had committed war crimes).493 Only half 
of the KPC’s well-regarded de-mining team was selected for the KSF. At the same 
time, those who were not selected pressured politicians. Of the KSF’s initial strength, 
about half were former KPC, but as of June 2009, the proportion of former KPC had 
increased, to 1,412 out of 1,818.494 The KSF attained initial operational capability on 
15 September 2009. It is heavily reliant on foreign aid for its training, equipment, and 
its core budget. When fully operational, it will consist of a Rapid Reaction Brigade, 
an Operations Support Brigade, a Land Force Command, and a Training and Doctrine 
Command.495 
 
The KSF has not been designed to be capable of external defence tasks. To avoid 
antagonizing Serbia, the force will not be permitted heavy weapons for at least five 
years. The presence of KFOR effectively provides a guarantee against external threats 
for the time being. The KSF has some level of capacity against internal rebellion, but 
whether it has such a task is unclear. It has been assigned ‘security functions not 
appropriate for the police,’ but the emphasis is on humanitarian missions such as de-
mining.496 The KSF’s immediate ambition is to contribute to peacekeeping missions 
beyond Kosovo’s borders.  
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Armies recreated by institutionalization have been the subject of some of the most 
innovative thinking on force structure. In the East Timor case, serving advisers have 
asked whether the country actually needs infantry battalions, or whether engineers or 
horse-mounted militia might be a better option.497 As noted above, several armies 
have appeared to lack a clear role. Instead of creating a threat-based army, 
development tasks – with engineers, for example – might give an army a clearer role. 
In the Timor case, one advisor argued for engineers on the basis that they would ‘have 
met some immediate national needs, provided a demobilization path for old guerrillas, 
and been a longer term tool to build a national skills base (because of the training 
institutions that support such a force structure).’498 However, this goes against advice 
from Western thinkers such as Bonnemaison, mentioned earlier in the literature 
review. Bonnemaison specifically argues against a development role for an army. 
 
The issue is, however, that in most cases armies will be retained, they often appear to 
lack a clear role, and as Herbst explains, often national borders are secured by treaty 
and precedent in any case. Therefore, if an army is to exist, the author considers that a 
primary development role with a secondary defence role might be worth considering. 
The development role would keep the army busy from day to day, while the defence 
role would justify the existence of the army to those actors who see a military force as 
necessary. 
 
This brings the argument to Kosovo, the only region in the world where a post-peace 
accord army is being discouraged from appearing too ‘military.’ Instead such 
formations as a ‘Rapid Reaction Brigade’ are being created. This orientation appears 
to stem from the KLA/KPC inheritance and regional sensitivities (especially those of 
Serbia). However there is a chance with the KSF to trial the idea of an army not 
primarily orientated towards defence functions. This experiment should be monitored 
with a view, if successful, to trial the idea in other post-peace accord contexts. 
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Applicability of SSR Principles to Institutionalization Cases 
This section will briefly compare the SSR principles as used above to the Kosovo and 
East Timor practice, and then summarize adherence to the SSR principles. The first 
OECD criterion is that SSR be people centred and locally owned. Neither process was 
people centred. Both were centred on state security. How locally owned the army 
reconstruction processes were is difficult to tell conclusively. However it appears 
there was a significant degree of local ownership in both cases.499 The second 
criterion was a basis on democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of 
law. In Timor the process aspired to democratic and human rights principles; it is 
unclear to what extent their misuse contributed to the crisis of 2006. Partially due to 
heavy international involvement, the Kosovo process was extensively founded on 
these three tenets.  
 
The third criterion was that SSR should be a framework to address diverse security 
challenges, both through a broad needs assessment and integrated, multi-sectoral 
policies. The army programme in East Timor did not take place as part of an 
integrated multi-sectoral policy. Part of the result was uncertainty over the F-FDTL's 
role.500 But between 1999 and 2006, when the future of Kosovo’s security forces 
came under serious consideration, thinking on SSR had moved forward significantly. 
A review of Kosovo’s security arrangements, the Kosovo ISSR, was initiated before 
decisions had to be made on the future of the KPC. The ISSR noted that ‘Kosovo is 
the first example of a holistic review prior to security sector engagement,’ noting that, 
for example in Sierra Leone, a review was only commenced after the reform process 
had started.501 However, the dominant army requirement was to create a future for the 
KPC, as both an institution and as individuals. Without a well-supported future for 
their members, the KPC might effectively have become a spoiler for Kosovo’s 
peaceful future development. 
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The fourth criterion was the promotion of civilian involvement and oversight. There 
were difficulties inculcating Western ideas about civilian oversight in East Timor as 
the F-FDTL was created. Disagreements over how, and in what manner, civilian 
oversight and involvement would be implemented appear to have contributed to the 
breakdown of 2006. Later, in Kosovo, a strong civilian oversight structure was set in 
place.502 The fifth criterion was transparency and accountability. While there is no 
evidence of corruption in Timor, the army reconstruction process has shown little 
transparency or accountability. In Kosovo significant corruption exists within the 
KSF, despite repeated international action against it. 
 
The sixth principle is the enhancement of institutional and human capacity. In Timor, 
capacity was enhanced, but degraded again by the 2006 crisis, and it is not clear how 
much of the new capability built is sustainable. In Kosovo it is clear that institutional 
and human capacity was developed during the KPC period. Yet the mistakes made 
during the KSF formation process seem to have degraded capacity. 
 
In East Timor, because of lack of a multi-sectoral strategy, any effective growth in 
civilian oversight, and lack of transparency, the army reconstruction process did not 
follow SSR principles. It should be remembered however that these principles had not 
yet been formulated, and that SSR as a concept was only two years old in 1999. Later 
in Kosovo there were significant international attempts to follow SSR principles, 
including the holistic development of a security strategy. The KPC was a venerated 
force that was expected by Kosovar Albanians to eventually form the basis of a 
national army. Yet it intimidated its enemies, was corrupt, and was heavily involved 
in manipulating the government of Kosovo.503 The picture is therefore mixed. Yet 
local outcomes are the most important final part of SSR. Therefore, since the KPC 
and KSF did not reflect SSR principles, one cannot say the outcome followed those 
principles. 
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Single state forces 
When the United States has become involved in army reconstruction, it appears that 
its preference has been to rebuild forces from the ground up, rather than integrate 
existing bodies into a new army. Many of the processes created have drawn their 
inspiration from U.S. army procedures.504 These processes have included the creation 
of an all volunteer force, attempts to introduce empowered non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) and heavy use of advisers to create a U.S. style army. Analysts have 
identified these elements in Afghanistan from 2002, Iraq from 2003, and Liberia from 
2005.505 
 
In both Afghanistan and Iraq the new armies were built on a very weak basis. During 
the long Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, from 1978 to 1989, the communist 
regime’s army began to disintegrate, and the confusion and lawlessness following the 
Mujahedin victory of 1992 completed the process. The previous state army was ‘de-
modernized,’ lost most of its professional characteristics, and effectively deteriorated 
into a militia.506 The U.S. attacks which followed the al-Qaeda assault on September 
11, 2001, toppled the Taliban government and destroyed the nascent Taliban central 
army. Following the removal of the Taliban, in early 2002 there had not been a 
cohesive state army in Afghanistan for over ten years. Along with remnants of al-
Qaeda, the Taliban pose the main insurgent threat to Hamid Karzai’s new 
government. In Iraq, Paul Bremer, Administrator of the combined US-British 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), disbanded the whole of the existing Iraqi 
armed forces in May 2003. The prevailing administrative chaos throughout the 
country and the growing insurgency made establishing all new state bodies difficult. 
Efforts to reconstruct both armies were focused on training and equipping; 
governance concerns were secondary at best. 
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Political-Economic Factors influencing Single State Forces 
Political and economic factors influencing single state forces display both similarities and 
difficulties with those in military merger and institutionalization cases.  
Similar factors include the role of the peace accord, provisions for the gainful occupation of 
ex-combatants, the influence of neo-patrimonialism, and the difficulty of implementing 
quickly a force structure effective for the long term. Other relevant factors include an 
emphasis on ‘train and equip’ over governance, ethnic cleavages, and Arab military-cultural 
influences on Iraqi military effectiveness.  
 
The circumstances of the peace accord, and decisions that closely follow it still play a 
dominant role. Perhaps the clearest example was the disbandment of the existing Iraqi Army 
in 2003. In Liberia, the wording of the peace accord that declared the armed forces 
would be restructured was superseded.507 Instead the programme disbanded the armed 
forces and recreated them in toto. This created resentment as the rump of the 
government’s army did not receive the privileged place in the new force they sought. 
Instead, they had to go through the selection process along with all the other civilian 
and former rebel candidates. Few were successful. This has caused continuing 
resentment, and the old military’s sense of entitlement may yet, it appears, prompt it 
to launch a coup. 
 
Methods used in single state force cases to assuage the threat of idle ex-combatants have 
varied. Afghanistan had a variety of semi-official military forces controlled by regional 
warlords existing in parallel with the new ANA, and these forces only slowly declined in size. 
In Iraq, the dismissed soldiers quickly began to be paid by the United States, but not without 
the men involving feeling severely humiliated by the disbandment decision.508 
 
Neo-patrimonial modes of operation have significantly influenced security sector governance 
in all three ‘single state force’ cases. Giustozzi describes the process of SSR in Afghanistan as 
a ‘complex compromise’ between Western SSR ideals and Afghan wishes.509 Faced with 
powerful demands that institutions be reformed in accordance with Western standards, reform 
efforts were carried out on the surface, ‘leaving patrimonial and patronage relations to 
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dominate the core of the security establishment.’510 The Ministry of Defence and the 
revitalised Army below it attracted more U.S. effort and was more deeply affected by reform 
than any other security sub-sector. However, even here, subvention of the ministry and army 
by influential Afghan actors hampered efforts to induce thorough-going reform. This has 
resulted, at least until mid 2008, in the disproportionate influence of Army Chief of Staff 
Bismillah Khan’s faction and, more generally, Tajik rather than Pashtun officers.511 In Iraq, 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has consolidated his personal authority over the 
armed forces.512 This move reflects Iraq’s history of authoritarian control. 
 
The reconstruction of ‘single state force’ armies has been focused on immediate post-
intervention security challenges, rather than any hypothetical post-insurgency requirements. It 
does not appear that either the Afghan or Iraqi armies were designed with a long-term 
orientation perhaps different from immediate needs in mind. Contact with designers 
of the initial Afghan army reinforces the notion that the immediate insurgency 
challenge was the dominant factor in the design of the new ANA.513 No transition 
between roles was initially anticipated for the new Iraqi army either. It is clear that 
initially the army was to be orientated to what the Americans hoped would remain its 
mission: exterior defence.514 Only the rapidly developing insurgency forced a change 
of orientation. In addition, neither the Afghan or Iraqi armies were future-proofed in 
size. The Afghan force size target was increased from 50,000 in 2001 in stages to 
240,000 in 2010, the last figure to be achieved by 2014. In Iraq, the force size jumped 
from three divisions to 10, and later 14, as the insurgency gained pace. Liberia is a 
somewhat different case. It was acknowledged that the affordable force size was too 
small to adequately meet the country’s needs, but it was thought better to have an 
affordable rather than sufficiently large army. Again, immediate circumstances 
shaped the force structure, rather than anticipated long-term requirements. 
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The development of the revitalized Afghan National Army was dominated by training 
and equipping priorities rather than concerns over security sector governance.515 
Arguably this is both a result of traditional U.S. practice and the difficulties of 
inculcating a full SSR agenda in the country. As discussed in the literature review, 
Cold War U.S. practice emphasized army assistance that would win the United States 
political favour. Because of this heritage, it is arguable that, whatever the 
circumstances, training and recruiting would have attracted more U.S. attention than 
governance concerns. Creating Western-standard management and accountability 
practices would have been a sensitive matter. Here traditional U.S. priorities in 
military assistance met Afghan resistance to Western SSR ideals in a mutually 
reinforcing manner. The result could almost have been predicted in advance, given the 
history of U.S. military assistance efforts. A year later in Iraq, the same factors began 
to emerge. Cordesman notes the over emphasis on the quick quantitative ‘train and 
equip’ expansion of forces at the expense of quality.516 
 
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, ethnic cleavages within the new army were rife. The 
Afghan Army, as noted above, saw mutual resentment between Tajiks and Pashtuns. 
The Iraqi Army was internally politically fractured between Shia, Sunni, and 
Kurds.517 Cordesman hi-lights the need for religious and ethnic diversity, so that no 
one group feels persecuted by the rest.518 
 
The difficulties in building a Western-style army in Iraq, an industrialized state unlike 
so many considered in this study, gives one pause. Even in Iraq, it has proven 
extremely difficult to build a fully modern army, with all its panoply of bureaucratic 
support structures. Kenneth Pollack analyzed historical Iraqi military effectiveness as 
part of a wider investigation of Arab military effectiveness in his book Arabs at War. 
He describes continuing failure at the tactical level and poor maintenance throughout 
Iraq’s wars. He attributes the failure record that Iraq shares with its Arab counterparts 
primarily to poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor 
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maintenance and junior tactical leadership.519 Levels of effectiveness even in a long-
established Iraqi Army may therefore tend to be low. 
 
Capability Enhancement in Single State Forces 
Since 2002 the aim of capacity enhancement in these three cases has been 
predominantly been to build counter-insurgency capability, rather than on exterior 
defence of borders. By 2004 the undisputed focus of both the new Afghan and Iraqi 
armies was fighting the internal insurgency. Exterior defence had however been, 
briefly, the initial focus for the creation of the new Iraqi Army, and was the principal 
projected task for the new Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The overriding importance 
of counter-insurgency in Iraq was relatively quickly realized. But it may have taken 
until 2009 to change the focus of the AFL away from hypothetical external invasions. 
 
In 2002, efforts to recruit an Afghan army to support the new government and to aid 
the counter-insurgency campaign began.520 After some consideration, the initial force 
target became 9,000 men, to be trained by November 2003. U.S. planning at the time 
aimed to begin reform of the central apparatus and establish a Central Corps in 
Kabul.521 From the Central Corps, the programme was expanded to the other regions 
of Afghanistan. Four other corps headquarters were established in 2004. A 
programme of building up combat forces in the regions followed. By February 2010, 
the force aim, after repeated increases, was 240,000 by 2014.522 Reviewing the 
literature, the ANA appears to have little external defence capability and severe 
weaknesses in facing the Taliban rebellion. These weaknesses include poor human 
resources, widespread corruption, and bureaucracy fostered by political rivalries.  
 
The rebuilding of the Iraqi Army eventuated uniquely as first a contractor-
implemented and then a U.S.-government implemented single state force. First plans 
for the new army in June 2003 envisaged an army focused on exterior defence, to 
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make a clean break from the past. The CPA’s initial concept for the new army called 
for ‘three divisions of light or motorized infantry to be built by September 2006’- a little over 
3 years.523 Vinnell Corporation was given the initial contract to start the rebuilding of 
the army. Vinnell was directed to train nine 900-soldier battalions from 1 July 2003 to 
30 June 2004, and the contract contained an option to expand the training to the 
projected full size of three divisions.524 The programme suffered from severe internal 
and external obstacles. The training was over-theoretical and too short.525 Constricted 
government resources, especially pay, and slow equipment procurement were the 
principal external limitations.526 While trained for external defence, the battalions 
were immediately committed to counter-insurgency operations on being deemed 
operational. The result was that units disintegrated as they entered combat527 and 
desertion rates were very high.  
 
Unfortunately the initial contractor programme only created a small force slowly. 
Reassessment of the threat posed by the growing insurgency led to a massive 
expansion of the planned new Iraqi army. Called ‘Phase II,’ the revised plan moved 
the effective date for the three new divisions forward to September 2004, and 
explicitly made the new army part of the internal security effort. The reconstruction 
programme was effectively delegated to the U.S. and Coalition military formations 
within their specific areas of operations, with attention to the central military 
bureaucratic framework only being given priority later on.528 The newly established 
units were in dire need of further mentoring and support to improve on their poor initial 
performance. The force was expanded from three to ten divisions by 2006, but few units were 
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effective.529 All suffered from lack of equipment, delays in training, and absenteeism.530 
Force quality slowly improved, aided by extensive U.S. mentoring. However with the 
reduction in U.S. adviser numbers, a sophisticated counter-insurgency approach may 
have ended. In 2010 there appears instead to be disinterest, incompetence, and a wish to 
revert to an external defence mission.531    
 
In Liberia, after thirteen years of intermittent civil war, a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement was signed in August 2003. As part of the agreement, the United States 
was given responsibility for restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), in 
conjunction with the UN, ECOWAS, and the Liberian Government.532 The 
contractors DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers began to create a 2,100 
strong AFL, with recruiting starting in late 2005. The recreation of the AFL went 
ahead despite criticism that the armed forces should have been abolished.533 The 
success or failure of the programme will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. The 
most significant issue however is the sustainability of a model fundamentally based 
on non-locally owned, expensive American practices. This situation risks 
dissatisfaction and possibly even revolt.  
 
Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq include, in contrast to the southern African 
experience, the ability of the coalition to create the new army while fighting was 
underway. The identifiable difference in these cases is between the military merger 
model and the single state force. All currently identified cases where a reasonably 
effective army has been able to be created while fighting is underway are single state 
forces. This means, theoretically, that if a single state force were to be created in a 
country where fighting is ongoing such as Sudan or the Congo, it might be more 
successful and sustainable than present military merger efforts. However, this 
correlation cannot be definitively determined as causation. Put differently, it is 
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possible that military merger or institutionalization armies might be able to be made 
effective in the midst of large-scale fighting. As yet, however, no cases support this 
contention. The very large amount of resources which the United States is prepared to 
commit also probably make a significant difference here. A single state force 
reconstruction programme where fighting is ongoing would probably fail for lack of 
long-term donor funding. 
 
The experience of ‘single state forces’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia is greatly 
influenced by the unique, enormous effort the United States has made in building 
them up. Dependency on US support developed in Afghanistan,534 Iraq, and Liberia. 
Yet it is difficult to imagine how both the Afghan and Iraq wars could have been 
continued with the indigenous involvement without creating such a dependency. In 
combat, units of the Afghan and Iraqi armies have had great difficulty without foreign 
advisors. Unit training, rather than simply individual training, and post-training 
partnering in the field have not been sufficient emphasized. Introducing non-
commissioned officers who have significant levels of responsibility appears to be very 
difficult in some cases. ‘It is far easier to try to introduce [empowered NCOs] in 
different cultures and developing states than to make it actually work.’535 A 
deficiency shared with the African rebuilding armies is that logistics capability is 
weak;  transition to full Afghan logistical responsibility, especially with a much 
expanded strength target, will be a long process.536 Analysts worry that the Afghan 
security forces will collapse again due to fiscal pressures537 or weak human 
resources538 as they have in the past. This would result again in de-modernization and 
an intensification of civil conflict. This reinforces the already discussed importance of 
restricting goals to make programmes achievable.  
Applicability of SSR principles to single state forces 
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Generally speaking, army reconstruction on the ‘single state force’ model has not 
followed SSR principles. The process has not been people centred in any of the three 
cases. The United States has accorded very little importance to local ownership in any 
of its army reconstruction efforts. Instead many United States practices have been 
introduced. The United States allowed less local control over the Afghan Army than over 
any other part of the rebuilding Afghan security apparatus. ‘Models alien to the Afghan 
tradition, like a highlighted role for non-commissioned officers or Western disciplinary 
practices, and practices resisted by most of the MoD, like voluntary recruitment and the stress 
on light infantry as the core of the ANA, were forced upon the Afghans.’539 Against loud 
opposition from the Afghan Ministry of Defence, the decision was taken to develop a small 
volunteer rather than a large conscript army.540 The gradual increase in the target number, 
from 70,000 eventually to 240,000 by 2014, may have placated those who wanted a large 
army to some extent. However, the character of the force remains alien to Afghan 
traditions.  
 
In Liberia, as will be further discussed in Chapter 5, the U.S. model adopted is 
fundamentally too expensive for Liberia’s resources. Perceptions of local ownership 
were also significantly influenced by the Department of State decision to utilize two 
contractors, DynCorp and PAE. Contractors were chosen over U.S. Army trainers 
because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq required the active duty personnel. The 
contractor decision was extremely controversial, which led to unceasing questioning 
and criticism within the Liberian Congress and civil society.541 The contractors were 
not accountable to the Liberian Congress, though compromises were made so 
contractor personnel accompanied U.S. officials giving evidence before it.542 
 
Democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law have not usually 
followed. In Afghanistan, patronage and power relationships have dominated the 
process. In Iraq, sectarian fighting has taken place within the army, and army units 
have committed human rights abuses. However in Liberia, following years of security 
forces’ misbehaviour, a number of measures were put in place to improve standards. 
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The most important safeguard was the extensive vetting programme, coupled with 
much increased international oversight. Army reconstruction has not been designed to 
address broad security challenges, and has been more focused, in Afghanistan at least, 
on combating the insurgency.543   
 
Army programmes have not stemmed from a broad needs assessment, and have not 
resulted in integrated multi-sectoral policies. Civilian oversight and involvement 
haves been effectively restricted to the executive and defence ministries in all three 
countries. Iraq has seen a continuation of the historical trend of centralised, 
authoritarian power. In Liberia, contractor personnel sometimes refused to provide 
information to the host legislature. Transparency and accountability have been 
limited. In both Afghanistan544  and Iraq, corruption and factionalism have marked the 
process. In Liberia the contractors were very transparent and accountable to the U.S. 
government but much less so to the host states. 
 
The final OECD criterion is the enhancement of institutional and human capacity. 
This criterion has been the primary U.S. objective, and much has been sacrificed so 
that capacity enhancement is prioritized. As a result, institutional and human capacity 
have clearly been enhanced. In Afghanistan, the army is combat capable, though not 
usually without heavy coalition support. Virtually all ANA formations operate as 
adjuncts to coalition forces.545 In Iraq, Vinnell Corporation arguably mishandled what 
was admittedly a very difficult task in 2003-04. However, by 2010 a new army had 
been created and had responsibility for most security operations. In summary, both in 
Afghanistan and Iraq SSR principles have not been the guiding factor. The aim has 
been the creation of a new bureaucratic institution with significant combat capability. 
The institutions have been successfully recreated. The Iraqi Army is combat capable, 
and the ANA has some capacity. DynCorp has trained a small new force for Liberia 
well, but its long-term sustainability is in question. 
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Conclusions  
These conclusions will address the degree to which army reconstruction has enhanced 
capability, been affected by significant political-economic factors, and been 
implemented in accordance with SSR principles. All three sets of interactions need to 
be considered when identifying areas of potential improvement for the SSR 
principles. 
 
As noted above, a number of general lessons influencing capacity enhancement are 
more deeply rooted in the political-economic factors that shape a state’s potential, and 
thus are addressed below. However, some key trends directly applicable to capacity 
enhancement can be identified. Generally, sustainable capability enhancement is very 
difficult to achieve. The impediment to capability enhancement inter-mixage of 
different foreign philosophies and practices can bring is visible in Zimbabwe and the 
Congo. The difficulty of transferring logistical and bureaucratic skills in a neo-
patrimonial environment is also reinforced by experience in southern Africa and 
elsewhere. Yet these skills and the associated attitudes are fundamental to building the 
types of armies most donors desire. There are no easy answers for this particular 
conundrum, except perhaps to reduce expectations. Reducing expectations, or, put 
another way, formulating realistic rather than unattainable transition plans, is another 
lesson identified from African experience. Finally two heretofore unexplored policy 
options can be identified. Reserve forces may provide a useful method for 
constructively occupying former combatants, as has been studied in Sierra Leone and 
Timor. It may also be possible to create effective armies while fighting is ongoing, if 
a single state force model is adopted. 
 
Political and economic factors influencing army reconstruction, and the trends that 
emerge from them, have had significant effects. Aspects can be identified that are 
common to most cases. The peace accord and its provisions create the political 
framework within which post-peace accord reconstruction will take place. Sometimes 
the peace accord is never fully implemented and the process stalls, as is happening in 
Nepal and, to some extent, in Bosnia and South Sudan. Related decisions on army 
reconstruction have had significant effects in Iraq and Liberia. 
  
Foreign parties play a significant role in assuring the success of integration processes.  
 
Political preferment between or within factions has had a significant impact on army 
reconstruction. This can see leaders accepting loyalty from their chosen personnel at 
the expense of effectiveness, as in Zimbabwe, and probably in other cases. On the 
other hand, if a strong move is made toward reconciliation, the army can benefit 
significantly, as appears to have been the case in South Africa.  
 
Almost invariably, the necessity to maintain discipline over and constructively 
employ former combatants affects the composition of the new army. The only 
possible exceptions appear to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the post-2003 period, and 
in Liberia. Often the army is enlarged with fighters who would otherwise not be 
chosen. Even when the army was disbanded in Iraq, soldiers and officers were quickly 
back on government payrolls and soon afterwards were being recruited to join the 
new force.  
 
There is very little evidence to suggest that an evolution from immediate concerns to 
potentially different long-term requirements has been part of army reconstruction 
planning. The lack of a clear role for the post-peace accord armed forces exacerbates 
the difficulty in formulating the most appropriate post-peace accord structure. There 
are strong indications that a clear role has been lacking in several cases (Zimbabwe, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Timor, Liberia, Kosovo). Implementing such an appropriate 
structure is then a separate task. The fifteen cases surveyed tend to fall into two main 
groupings. First are armies that are the wrong size for their circumstances. This means 
either unsustainably large (Zimbabwe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Burundi, 
the Congo, and, ambiguously, Timor) or deliberately too small (Liberia). The 
Namibian Army has grown slightly since its formation. The other major grouping is 
where a temporary structure of one kind or another is explicitly adopted in order to 
fulfill an immediate requirement. This can involve a temporary disciplined service 
(South Sudan, Kosovo), armies whose capabilities are deliberately restricted (South 
Africa) or armies with immediate challenges where consideration of long-term 
requirements must be postponed (Afghanistan, Iraq). These ambiguities reinforce the 
need for a robust framework to better inform discussion of the SSR principles. 
  
Attempting to assess whether army reconstruction has followed SSR principles can be 
difficult. The SSR principles are ambiguous. One example is the democratic norm 
criteria. In Sierra Leone, to pick one case, many British advisers tried to implement 
these principles, but the essentially neo-patrimonial condition of Sierra Leonean 
society made this difficult. Some successes were achieved, and some were not. A 
definitive ‘success’ or ‘failure’ judgment thus has the ability to obscure as much as it 
illuminates. Choosing the assessment time frame also creates ambiguity: East Timor 
could have been judged a partial success, as, up to 2006, a new army had been created 
and trained. Army reconstruction in Nepal may still be a success if the parties 
involved change their behaviour and negotiate constructively. Finally, there are 
inherent limitations in a study limited to desk research. 
 
Ambiguities aside, a number of general conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
influence of SSR principles. Because of the small number of cases and the 
measurement ambiguities involved, a statistical evaluation would not aid analysis. 
Thus the conclusions have been limited to qualitative factors. The chart below 
presents the level of adherence to SSR principles by category of army reconstruction. 
The chart indicates green for adherence to SSR principles, red for non-adherence to 
SSR principles, and blue for partial adherence. The levels of adherence vary within 
each category. In deciding which colour to assign, a ‘pessimistic’ approach has been 
taken. Thus if any country does not clearly adhere to SSR principles, the blue or red 
colours have been selected. This ensures that for any box coloured green, a reader is 
assured that all countries within that category do adhere scrupulously to that principle.  
 
As shown below in Figure 1, none of the categories of army reconstruction examined 
have been people-centred. None have placed the welfare of the soldiers, families, 
former insurgent fighters, and others involved in the process above concerns over the 
security of the state. Local ownership of the army reconstruction process has been 
rare. Only in two cases within the ‘military merger’ category, South Africa and Nepal, 
have indigenous hierarchies maintained clear control and implemented the process 
along their own chosen lines. In East Timor there appears to have been a significant 
amount of local ownership. In each of the other eight cases the army reconstruction 
process does not appear to have been locally owned.  
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Figure 1: Adherence of Army Reconstruction to SSR Principles 
 
As regards democratic norms, human rights, and the rule of law, the picture is not 
fully clear. Some states in the ‘military merger’ category have not attempted to 
implement such policies, such as Zimbabwe and the Congo. Others have, and thus the 
‘mixed’ indicator has been chosen. East Timor and Kosovo, the two cases of 
‘institutionalization,’ have tried but have not succeeded to a great degree. As regards 
single state forces, in both Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. forces have faced significant 
obstacles to implementing the SSR principles. However in Liberia, DynCorp focused 
significant effort on respecting human rights principles during the vetting process and 
thus achieved significant success.  
 
Assessing whether army reconstruction has been a framework to address diverse 
security challenges through more integrated policy is a multi-faceted question. 
Diverse security challenges were defined in the method chapter as broad, non-military 
security, national security challenges which SSR seeks to address in its widest sense.  
None of the armies in this survey were designed to address such challenges, with the 
possible exception of anti-terrorist response units in the Afghan or Iraqi armies. Such 
broader security challenges are more the responsibility of other agencies. 
  
 
The more important issue, therefore, is the other half of the requirement – the 
integration of policy. It is difficult to make a clear decision on at what point military, 
police, and other programmes are meaningfully integrated together. It is the author’s 
view that policies are not fully integrated unless there is very clear evidence to the 
contrary. This has resulted in only Sierra Leone being judged a clear case of army 
reconstruction being part of an integrated policy. In other cases such as South Sudan, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo, such integrated policy has been attempted, but for various 
reasons, has fallen short. At times international actors have urged policy integration 
upon local leaders in cases where it does not suit the locals’ particular interests. 
Effective integration into multi-sectoral strategies has only rarely been achieved. 
Therefore for the first two categories the judgment is mixed. As regards single state 
forces, the judgment has been negative. Army reconstruction programmes in this 
category have been isolated from wider SSR.  
 
Most cases of army reconstruction have resulted in greater civilian oversight and 
involvement, but rarely has this extended to the ideal of democratic civilian control. 
Of the fifteen cases, only four have clearly enhanced democratic civilian control: 
Namibia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are only four of 
the nine cases in the ‘military merger’ category, and thus the overall category 
indicator is mixed. In the other ten cases, executive dominance rather than democratic 
civilian control has usually prevailed.  
 
Army reconstruction has usually been neither particularly transparent nor accountable. 
Only South Africa, Bosnia, and Kosovo are clear exceptions. In Sierra Leone, 
transparency and accountability have been the aim. Yet while advisors have tried to 
implant such practices, it has been difficult to sustain them in the country’s neo-
patrimonial environment. Therefore the ‘military merger’ indicator is mixed. For the 
institutionalization and single state forces, the indicator is negative. 
 
The final criterion is the oldest and most fundamental to army reconstruction: whether 
capability has actually been improved. Because this task had most priority before the 
concept of SSR was formulated, it has usually seen the most progress. Most of the 
‘military merger’ armies achieved an increase in human and institutional capability. 
  
However the addition of ANC-MK and ‘homeland’ army personnel to the South 
African Defence Force may have induced a decline in military capability. As regards 
institutionalization, capacity was enhanced but then degraded in East Timor by the 
2006 crisis. In Kosovo, several administrative errors were made in selecting personnel 
for the Kosovo Security Forces in late 2008. Therefore the institutionalization 
indicator is mixed. Capability has been both enhanced and degraded at various times, 
so no single judgment can be made for the entire category over the entire period. 
Only the most powerful state in the world, the United States, has demonstrated the 
ability to create combat-capable armies while significant civil conflict is under way. 
Capacity was enhanced in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia. Therefore the single state 
force indicator is positive.  
 
Surveying the SSR principles reveals that a ‘people-centred’ approach is unrealistic, 
at least for such a state-focused programmatic area like army reconstruction. 
Democratic norms and human rights were not emphasized in many early programmes, 
but can pay off in force quality terms. Integration of army reconstruction programmes 
into wider security policy has clear benefits.  Yet the U.S. style of army 
reconstruction places less emphasis upon such policy integration. The disconnection 
of the Liberian programme in comparison to the integrated efforts in Sierra Leone and 
Kosovo shows this clearly. It will require much repeated persuasion to inculcate such 
approaches more widely in future programmes. Surveying actual experience tends to 
support the view that civilian involvement is usually more limited than SSR principles 
would warrant. Two factors mean however that this situation is likely to only change 
slowly at best. Programmes to put in place wider civilian involvement and oversight 
will often threaten host leaders’ power. Also, the U.S. tendency is to conduct ‘train 
and equip’ programmes focused upon transference of equipment and skills, with little 
attention to governance.  
 
The discussion above shows that army reconstruction programmes do not reflect a 
number of key SSR principles. The historical nature of army reconstruction is not 
likely to change quickly. Virtually all cases where SSR principles have been heavily 
incorporated have been dominated by Western influences. In South Africa, the 
institutions of a Western state were already in place. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sierra 
Leone, heavy international involvement assured ample Western influence.   
  
 
Changes in political-economic factors, and the relative level of respect shown for SSR 
principles, have mutually reinforcing effects. If political/economic conditions 
improve, with greater resources and tolerance possible, there will be more political 
space available for more respect for SSR principles. From the other end of the 
spectrum, if greater respect is shown for SSR principles, such as human rights, 
democratic norms and the rule of law, and increasing civilian involvement, there will 
be greater political space created for parties to better represent themselves. Adverse 
political and economic conditions usually, in turn, lower respect shown for SSR 
principles. 
 
It appears that army reconstruction will only significantly reflect SSR principles 
where Western approaches are dominant. Elsewhere, in states such as the Congo, 
army reconstruction is likely to retain a focus on improving capability and 
effectiveness. This orientation reflects dominant political-economic factors in post-
peace accord states, and suits elites who do not wish to have their power threatened. It 
also reflects the historical U.S. orientation in this type of military aid.  
 
These conclusions resonate with messages arising from the literature review and other 
recent research. Army reconstruction SSR appears very much unrealistic in its 
immense scope and self-deceptive in its claims to be driven by local priorities. 
The principles of SSR may be the only existing strategic guidance for army 
reconstruction. However the field experiences analyzed in this chapter underline that 
the principles reflect a supply-side approach unwelcome in many contexts and thus 
unsustainable. Northern wishes to aid the security sector in developing countries may 
be better served by less ambitious guidelines, more open about being reflective of 
donors’ national interests. 
 
It may, however, be possible to ameliorate the ambiguities that a strict interpretation 
of SSR principles introduces. The advantages of utilizing political-economic 
influences to render the debate more realistic are supported by the discussion in this 
chapter. In the process of drafting the principles, it appears that some of the very 
relevant political factors influencing army reconstruction may have had their effects 
rendered less vital than they actually are. It is not very clear how flexible and 
  
applicable the SSR principles are in developing state contexts. The SSR principles, as 
they have been rendered for generalized use, are sufficiently generic that it is hard to 
measure the level to which they have been implemented. Quantitative analysis is 
impeded because the principles lack precision. This is cause for concern, because 
precise policy discussion and implementation is impeded if the SSR principles are 
strictly interpreted.  
 
Introducing the additional concepts of political-economic influences and capability 
enhancement allows for a more realistic analysis of army reconstruction. Introducing 
these two other factors helps to address gaps induced by a SSR principles-only 
analysis. Incorporating the other two factors together also helps explain why army 
reconstruction almost always falls short of its goals.
  
 
 
 Chapter 6: The Liberian Army Reconstruction 
Process 
 
This thesis aims to suggest modifications to the OECD DAC SSR principles based on 
a rigorous examination of post-conflict army reconstruction. This has been done in a 
series of sequential steps. Initially the literature review identified existing practice and 
guidelines which are relevant to understanding the reconstruction of land forces. The 
multiple case chapter then surveyed a wide range of army reconstruction programmes 
to identify the mix of factors that contributed to each outcome. However the data on 
the interplay of capability enhancement, political-economic factors, and adherence to 
SSR principles is the result of desk research only.  It would constitute much stronger 
evidence for theory formation if this theorization were empirically validated in the 
field. This chapter will carry out such testing, based upon fieldwork in Liberia carried 
out in mid 2009.  
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part assesses the political and 
economic drivers that shaped the force creation process in Liberia. The second part 
describes and then analyses the process of capability enhancement in the chosen army 
case study, the reconstruction of the Liberian army, the Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL), from 2003 to December 2009. The third part examines each SSR principle to 
ascertain whether it was adhered to during the Liberia army reconstruction 
programme. Each has been discussed in some detail to analyze whether they have 
been respected. The fourth part summarises and draws conclusions. 
 
The analysis unfolds within a neo-patrimonial governance framework. In 2003, 
Liberian formal administration had been destroyed by fourteen years of civil war. 
Furthermore, in the wider West African region, informal processes and networks had 
always been more important than formal structures.546 As will be explained further 
below, the AFL has always been a political arena since it was created in 1908. The 
relative impotence of the AFL during the 1989-2003 civil war did not change this 
situation, though the new warring factions were more powerful. In October 2003 a 
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transitional government, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) 
was installed in Monrovia. The reconstruction plan for the AFL was negotiated amidst 
jostling for power within the transitional government in Monrovia and the hinterland. 
As details were settled, a very strong U.S. political agenda, the creation of an effective 
and well-governed army, began to move forward. This agenda was very well funded, 
in comparison with indigenous Liberian actors. Nonetheless, indigenous Liberian 
political actors continued to have a significant effect on the programme.  
 
The AFL reconstruction process thus occurred within a very weak state, where control 
of the means of violence was split between UNMIL, non-state security groupings, and 
nascent rebuilding state security institutions. The new state institution appear to have 
had the least power. Politics was also highly personalized, and NTGL members and 
other elites extracted rents from public resources.  
 
Political-Economic Factors shaping the Current Force 
Reconstruction of the AFL formed part of a wide-ranging effort to promote the liberal 
peace in Liberia. Beyond the security sector, democraticisation efforts, free market 
reforms, and efforts to improve human rights were all attempted. This effort 
potentially therefore neglected the needs of civil society and individuals' social and 
economic needs.547 The inherent shortcomings within the liberal peace effort become 
more apparent when neo-patrimonial and local ownership factors are considered. 
 
There were at least seven major political-economic factors which shaped the 
evolution of the current force from 2004 to December 2009. In addition the general 
devastation of the country and the armed forces’ facilities and infrastructure meant 
that there was virtually nothing to build upon when the first U.S. assessment team 
visited in May 2004. A lack of human and physical infrastructure, administrative 
chaos, and political infighting formed a backdrop to the entire process.  
 
The significant political-economic factors shaping the force can be divided into 
factors that stemmed from both U.S. and Liberian decisions, U.S. decisions and 
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constraints, and internal Liberian factors. These three major strands will be examined 
in turn. The first combined U.S.-Liberian driver was the decision as part of the CPA 
to give a leading role to the United States in the reconstruction of the AFL, was a 
confluence of both U.S. and Liberian wishes. As described in the literature review, the 
United States often gives significant parts of its foreign assistance in the form of 
military aid. From 1912 to 1990, the United States had given aid to the AFL. 
Liberians revered the United States and wished to emulate its practices. As former 
U.S. ambassador John Blaney describes, no other willing donors came forward to 
fund reconstruction of the armed forces during the Accra peace conference.548 These 
factors all contributed to the decision in the CPA to request a U.S. lead role in 
restructuring the AFL.  
 
The other political-economic driver that stemmed from both U.S. and Liberian 
decisions was the isolation of AFL reconstruction from other SSR efforts. This was 
the result of several converging factors. First, the U.S. assessments of AFL rebuilding 
needs were solely focused upon the Armed Forces, as police development was left to 
the United Nations. Existing AFL personnel exerted significant pressure to resuscitate 
the prewar force without significant changes.549 Partially as a result of these factors, 
no thoroughgoing defence review process took place before the shape of the force was 
agreed upon. A national security strategy development process did begin, but not until 
a year after DynCorp began operations.550 As the national security strategy process 
evolved, there was no ability for the Liberian-led process to alter the AFL 
reconstruction programme, which was dictated by the terms of the contract. 
  
There were at least four political-economic factors influencing the rebuilding of the 
AFL that stemmed primarily from the United States. These included, first, the 
rejection of a military merger option in favour of a single state force created from the 
ground up; second, United States determination to keep the force size to an affordable 
level; third, slow and inconsistent funding; fourth, the decision to utilise contractors 
instead of active duty military personnel. The rejection by the United States of a 
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merger of former ex-combatants into a new army, the debate over the army’s size, and 
the slow financial flows, will be discussed here. The debate over contractors will be 
addressed in the SSR civilian involvement and transparency sections below. What is 
important to note here is that the contractor decision made the process significantly 
more controversial than it might otherwise have been. The contractors’ commercial 
status led to their motives and activities being widely questioned, sometimes 
frivolously.  
 
While the initial discussions over army reconstruction were underway in Monrovia in 
2003-04, the United Nations and other interested observers suggested that a new army 
be formed by incorporating former rebel fighters, on the military merger model. A 
similar process had taken place in Sierra Leone. This kind of proposal was antithetical 
to the U.S. tradition and to the way in which the Afghan and Iraqi armies were being 
reconstructed at the same time. When offered the example of the South African 
military that had absorbed ex-combatants in the same way, U.S. officials ‘pointed out 
that the ‘South African model’ destroyed the South African military and was too 
expensive for a country like Liberia.’551 With the United States providing the army 
funding unilaterally, it was decided to remain with the single state force model. As a 
result, there were a higher number of ex-combatants which had to seek a new 
livelihood without significant outside support. Yet the number that might have been 
absorbed may turn out to be less important than the chance of effectively employing 
numbers of pre 2003 AFL personnel.  
 
The officers of the pre 2003 AFL believe that they have not been granted proper 
retirement benefits. They remain dissatisfied and may pose a continuing threat. 
The dissolution of the former AFL was conducted into two parts; about 9600-9800 
war service soldiers, enlisted during the 1990-1997 period, and around 4500 regular 
AFL personnel who had been part of the army since before the civil war started.552 
The regular AFL personnel were repeatedly promised significant pensions by political 
leaders, including Taylor and Chairman Bryant. As they were organised on the U.S. 
                                                 
551
  Email correspondence with U.S. expert, 12 June 2008. 
 
552
  Interview with Joe Wylie, former Deputy Minister of Defense-Administration, 5 April 2009. 
  
 
model, they came to expect U.S. style retirement benefits.553 Instead they viewed the 
separation payments they did receive, a one time payment of up to $4,000.00, as 
insufficient. It appears that if not carefully handled, they may revolt.554 
 
The United States government was determined to keep the new army’s size 
affordable. This kind of economic factor affects whether an army can meet not just 
immediate post-peace accord needs, but also respond to long-term challenges. As 
noted in the multiple case chapter, this can often be a difficult task. Armies are often 
forced by the immediate needs of the peace settlement to be the wrong size for 
anticipated long-term tasks. In many cases, armies have been perceived as too large to 
be sustainable over the long term. Liberia is an exception. In 2004-05 U.S. funders 
acknowledged that Liberians wished to build an army approximately the size of the 
pre-war force of 6,000. However, the decision was made to restrict the force size to a 
level that could be sufficiently funded. The desire to expand the army’s size was not 
reached later, on the basis of a re-evaluation of long-term requirements. On the 
contrary, the wish to build a larger size army had always been present.   
 
Liberian wishes for a large force were backed by very little explanation as to what 
missions this larger force would exist to carry out.555 However, the rough size 
requirement was validated by draft national defence planning carried out by a Western 
military advisor.556 This planning postulated a requirement for a total of five 
battalions to assure Liberia’s long-term security, four deployed around the country 
and one as force reserve. Acknowledging Liberia’s fiscal weakness, this scheme 
called for three of these battalions to be provided by other West African states, as 
semi-permanent, stationed troops. 
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The wider issue for army reconstruction remains whether there is an opportunity for 
armies to be designed from the inception to have the right orientation, structure, and 
size to respond to long-term challenges without significant changes. Liberia here 
provides another example of the need to think in terms of strategic and defence 
planning cycles. Both in developed and developing countries, for all kinds of reasons, 
whether fiscal or due to a changing threat environment, defence planning needs to be 
periodically reassessed. In Liberia’s case, forces may be expanded over the long term 
or foreign troops made available. In Sierra Leone, the force size was gradually 
reduced. In Iraq, forces are being re-orientated towards defence from exterior threats. 
Armies cannot remain static in orientation for decades without finding that their 
original posture is unsuited for changing challenges. 
 
Inconsistent U.S. government funding slowed the contractor programme. Funding 
was allotted in small portions spread out over a long period. Training stopped entirely 
between December 2007 and July 2008 due to funding delays, as will be elaborated 
on further below. This was partially due to the Bush administration’s seeking much of 
its funding for Liberia through supplemental emergency requests that would not count 
against the regular budget ceiling, as part of severe disagreements with the 
Democratic Party-controlled Congress over fiscal policy.557 As the supplemental 
appropriations were separate from the regular budget request and were primarily for 
Iraq and Afghanistan costs, the time the funds actually arrived for use in Liberia did 
not necessarily suit the programme’s timetable. Several interviews confirmed the 
problems that had resulted from delaying the programme. 
 
The economic constraints affecting both parties caused some significant problems, 
perhaps the most important being problems keeping AFL soldiers adequately fed. 
For example, it appears that there was controversy generated at the point when 
DynCorp transferred responsibility for the first group of soldier trainees to PA&E.558 
This transfer also involved a physical site move, from Camp Ware, the former VOA 
transmitter site, to EBK Barracks, the former Camp Schiefflin. When Camp Schiefflin 
was rebuilt, it did not include a mess hall (dining facility) for soldiers, a basic fixture 
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in military camps worldwide. It also appears that uncertainties over exact contractual 
responsibilities between the two companies and the U.S. government meant that 
soldiers had to rely solely on their pay to feed themselves.559 Yet AFL pay levels 
appear to be insufficient to feed soldiers on a regular basis.  
 
AFL soldiers’ dissatisfaction at this point culminated with staged performances for 
the benefit of Liberian media. A journalist asked soldiers whether they were being 
driven to knock plums off trees to feed themselves.560 Frank discussions between the 
Liberian and U.S. parties involved appear to have occurred at this point.  
 
Whatever the exact scale of the feeding controversy generated by the DynCorp/PA&E 
transfer of responsibility, continual action took place since at least June 2008 to 
address the feeding issue. Then-U.S. Ambassador Donald Booth wrote a letter on 
June 9, 2008, setting out the following details. The U.S. government would pay:561 
“*June 1, 2008 – April 30, 2009 – two meals per day (breakfast and lunch) at a cost of 
USD 3.00-3.50 per soldier per day. 
*May 1, 2009 – November 30, 2009 – one meal per day (breakfast ??) at a cost of 
USD 1.50-1.75 per soldier per day. 
*December 1, 2009 – The Minister of Defense assumes responsibility for providing a 
subsidy of at least $20 [handwritten change] per month per soldier for one bag of rice 
each month.” 
 
The letter also includes a number of housing improvements to be completed at EBK 
Barracks by the U.S. side, and possibly most importantly, plans for the construction of 
outdoor cook stands, to be funded by the Liberian MOD. Construction of cook stands 
was an important step to allow soldiers to feed themselves, with the supplement to 
their pay noted above. In addition, as of at least September 2010, a Logistics 
Command is being established within the AFL.562 
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The way the AFL feeding issue was handled demonstrates the difficulty of 
administering very complex contracts over a long period. It also demonstrates the 
importance of close attention to logistics and administration issues. The disturbances 
which took place at EBK Barracks in late 2008 probably had their root cause in 
soldier service conditions such as feeding and housing. These same issues contributed 
to the problems of the East Timorese F-FDTL which led partially to the crisis of 2006. 
This experience underlines assessments in the multiple case chapter. In many cases, 
logistical and administration support of soldiers appears to suffer from lack of enough 
attention. 
 
The neo-patrimonial nature of Liberian politics, appears to have been the dominant 
indigenous political-economic factor. Liberia was founded by black American former 
slaves in 1847, who became known as ‘Americo-Liberians.’ From 1878 to 1980, 
Liberia was governed by the single True Whig Party. Personalized clientelism was 
implanted during the True Whig Party era, especially by President Tubman (1944-71). 
It appears these methods did not substantially change under the rule of President 
Tolbert (1971-1980). During the Tolbert era, Ellis describes the Liberian political 
style as follows:563 
 
“Becoming part of a clique, faction, or network, or even of as many such groups as 
possible, was the best way for those with ambition to secure preferment… . ..One 
young opposition politician [of the Tolbert era] later recalled how ‘status was 
bestowed by coterminous leadership or membership in associations together with 
senior positions in government. The value of membership in an association derived 
from how many members of such associations were in senior government positions. 
Social, political and religious and professional groups became indistinct; no arm’s 
length transactions were possible among them, for memberships were interlocking’ “ 
 
Ellis notes further that this interconnected set of linkages was, ‘and still largely 
remains’ [as of 2001] the context of Liberia’s politics.564 Furthermore, ‘..to this day, 
Liberians are expected to visit regularly whichever rural area their family originally 
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came from, and to provide benefits and to disperse largesse to the kinfolk who still 
live in their rural area.’ Leaders of rural communities exert pressure on sons and 
daughters of the village to assist financially, even when these offspring are in 
Monrovia or the United States. ‘…The moral system of the village continues to exert 
an influence over Monrovians, and even in national politics, in spite of the high 
degree of centralization which was the legacy of Tubman’s party-state.’565 
 
This neo-patrimonial network of governance subverts ostensible legal-bureaucratic 
facades such as ministries and department very effectively. Informal connections are 
far more important than formal arrangements.  
 
The same clientelist methods were used by Charles Taylor to run his enclave during 
the civil war. Taylor ran the ‘Greater Liberia’ enclave from Gbarnga, where he used 
external commercial networks to help control internal patronage networks, and to 
discipline and play external supporters off one another.566 This system was extended 
by Taylor to Monrovia when he won the presidency. 567 Taylor accumulated all 
resources and then redistributed them. Formal government was re-imposed from 2003 
and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has made determined attempts to make the formal system 
work. But these efforts appear to have had very little impression on the political-
economic patterns described above. The International Crisis Group decried the 
‘intensely personalized and mercenary nature of politics’ in 2002;568 it seems likely 
that little has fundamentally changed below the surface.569 In this environment, even a 
well-funded attempt to create a formally functioning army appears destined to slowly 
decay. The gradual re-emergence of impunity for security personnel, and the 
weakness of the formal pay process for the AFL appear to be symptoms of this 
phenomenon. As these symptoms are both directly relevant to several SSR principles, 
they will be discussed in later sections.  
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The neo-patrimonial network of governance active in Liberia has inevitably had an 
effect on the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense. In Liberia, there are differing 
points of view as to whether the army’s primary role is serving and protecting the 
people or acting as an agent of bureaucratic influence.570 The wording of the 
Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Liberia, which laid out 
the AFL’s mission, did not explicitly delineate the AFL’s role, merely saying the new 
AFL would be ‘sufficient for the defense of the Republic of Liberia, and, as 
appropriate to respond to natural disasters.’571 Up to the end of the contractor training 
period (December 2009), the President had not clearly stated what she sees as the 
AFL’s principal role.572 
 
There is evidence to suggest that illegitimate means are being used to increase the 
defence sector’s bureaucratic power. Defense Minister Brownie Samukai has been 
reported to have had soldiers manhandle a Finance Ministry official in August 
2008,573 though this allegation was made by former warlord Prince Johnson. In April 
2010, it was confirmed that Samukai was collecting monies from two cellphone 
companies, reportedly a total of up to $25,000 a month.574 Internet forum chat 
however suggests that Samukai may own a firm of private security guards. These 
payments from cellphone companies could be legitimate payments to his commercial 
enterprise.  
 
It should be noted in considering evidence of potential corruption by Defense 
Ministry senior officials that President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has dismissed multiple 
officials for corrupt practices since her government took office in January 2006.  
Within the Ministry of National Defense, this has allegedly included the ministry 
comptroller, who was dismissed in August 2009. There are strong suspicions that he 
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was dismissed for diverting $50,000 intended for soldiers’ pay.575 Utilizing public 
offices for private gain is the historical norm in Liberia. The picture is clearly 
incomplete, and there is insufficient data available to put matters in their proper 
context. However, the available information suggests the Defense Ministry has 
considerable bureaucratic influence. It seems readily possible that this influence is at 
least partially obtained through illegal practices. The unusual element here is neither 
bureaucratic influence nor illegality, but the potential extent of the Defense Ministry’s 
power in comparison to other bureaucratic actors.  
 
Before rendering a judgement on the effects of neo-patrimonial networks of 
governance on the AFL reconstruction programme, one qualification needs to be 
made. Ellis was writing his book in 2001 and before. The nature of Liberia’s political 
culture may have changed in the decade since 2001, but it appears unlikely. If the 
political culture described by Ellis remains substantially unchanged, then the 
measures being employed within the Ministry of National Defense appear to represent 
‘business as usual.’ If persons within the Ministry are raising additional funds through 
extra-budgetary measures, then this may represent historical continuity with previous 
Liberian culture. This explanation appears to fit the known cultural trends and the 
observed media reports. 
 
What this study does not show, as it focuses on the armed forces, is the probable 
mirroring of this behaviour throughout the Liberian governmental sector. It seems 
highly likely that these kind of neo-patrimonial networks are replicated throughout the 
other ministries, para-statal departments, and county governments. Reports actually 
suggest that the Ministry of National Defense may only be implicated in corruption on 
a minor scale in comparison to other government departments.576 Credible reports of 
such continued neo-patrimonial activity only reemphasise that SSR expectations are 
unrealistic. Whether the U.S. aid effort lasts five or fifteen years, it seems unlikely to 
change Liberian political culture. 
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Political-economic factors, in conjunction with the U.S. priority on capacity 
enhancement, appear to have played the major role in shaping the current AFL. The 
references to sections of this chapter below make it clear how many of the SSR 
principles are interwoven with and dominated by these factors. Perhaps the most 
significant political-economic factor present in other cases of army reconstruction, the 
need to find worthwhile activity for former combatants, was also present in Liberia. 
As in other ‘single state force’ cases, the potential for disruption by dissatisfied ex-
combatants is significant. The pre-2003 AFL officers and soldiers may yet revolt. 
The economic factors affecting the programme also make clear the need to emphasise 
the development of logistics and administrative skills. 
 
Postwar Army Capability Enhancement in Liberia 
This section will describe the background to the army reconstruction programme in 
Liberia, describe the programme itself as it took place between 2004 and December 
2009, and then evaluate how much capability enhancement has been achieved. 
 
Any assessment of Liberia’s armed forces needs to take into consideration their long 
involvement with the United States. After independence in 1847, Liberia’s only initial 
military force was a provisional militia drawn from the settlers. Formal armed forces 
were only created in February 1908. A joint resolution of the Liberian Congress and 
Senate authorized the President to ‘establish a military police force to be called the 
Liberian Frontier Force’(LFF).577 It was a 500-man force, whose mission was 
originally “to patrol the border in the Hinterland.”578 The LFF would also prevent the 
sorts of indigenous disorders that had invited earlier British and French 
intervention.579 
 
Initially three British officers were recruited to command the force. However in 
February 1909 the British officers were dismissed as they had attempted to coerce the 
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government. Americo-Liberians were substituted. American negro officers arrived to 
take command of the Frontier Force in 1912 and did so until 1922.580 Once command 
was handed over to the Americo-Liberians, a U.S. military advisory mission was 
created to assist in training and operations. U.S. military advisors appear to have been 
consistently present in the country ever since.581 
 
The LFF was reorganized as the Liberian National Guard Brigade in 1956 and later 
became known as the Armed Forces of Liberia. Also in 1962, the somewhat inactive 
Militia was revitalised. A major reason for the revitalization of the Militia was as a 
check on the National Guard. Mathews says that with the Guard’s increasing 
professionalism, political ambitions had begun to appear among certain officers. 582 
Yet the skill level of the armed forces, even with U.S. military advice, never rose very 
high. Officers, all Americo-Liberians for most of the first part of the twentieth 
century, were often ‘inexperienced and unprofessional.’583 There was little training, 
up until at least 1964, apart from that provided by the U.S. advisory mission.584 The 
political potency of the army was made clear by a number of incidents in the 1960s 
and 1970s. They included reports of a planned coup in 1963; arrests of senior officers 
in 1969 and 1970; the discovery of a further conspiracy in 1973; and early dismissals 
of senior leadership in 1977.585 Some of these incidents may however have been pre-
emptive purges by the True Whig Party leadership. The Liberian armed forces began 
to become a potential political threat to the government if not handled carefully, in 
common with other Sub-Saharan armies. 
 
Together with the limited professionalism of the existing force, the effects of the 
Liberian civil war caused the Armed Forces of Liberia to lose the characteristics of an 
organised armed state land force. The civil war had its origins in the turbulence of 
Samuel Doe’s regime, which began in 1980. Master Sergeant Doe had been the senior 
ranking NCO of the seventeen soldiers which killed President Tolbert during the 
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soldiers’ coup of April 1980.586 Doe’s rule created significant resistance due to his 
harsh actions, which included pogroms after a revolt of AFL origin in 1984. As a 
result, resistance coalesced. Armed resistance began when Charles Taylor led about 
100 fighters across the Cote d’ Ivoire border into Nimba County on 24 December 
1989.587 At the time the AFL was about 6,000 strong. During the first civil war, which 
lasted until 1997, the AFL lost most of its military characteristics and degraded into 
more of a warring faction than a professional army.588 The first civil war ended in an 
agreement to hold national elections, which Taylor won in August 1997. In 1998, a 
force restructuring proposal was submitted to Taylor, recommending a force of 
6,000.589 The proposal was not implemented, and the remnants of the AFL were run 
down in favour of NPFL militias. Fighting broke out again within two years, and 
continued until 2003. With rebel forces nearing Monrovia, in June 2003 a peace 
conference was convened at Accra in Ghana. 
 
In August 2003 the Accra conference culminated with the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA included provisions for the 
establishment of a transitional government drawn from all the warring factions. It 
outlined provisions regarding the armed forces in Articles VII and VIII of Part 4. 
Article VII, section 1(b) directs that ‘the Armed Forces of Liberia shall be 
restructured and will have a new command structure. The forces may be drawn from 
the ranks of the present Government of Liberia (GOL) forces, the LURD, and the 
MODEL, as well as from civilians with appropriate background and experience. .. 
The parties also request that the United States play a lead role in organizing this 
restructuring program.’590 A United Nations peacekeeping mission, which was to 
become the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was to secure and support 
the rebuilding process. A force of 15,000 troops provided the military component of 
the force, effectively acting as the country’s interim defence force as well as 
peacekeeping. 
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The National Transitional Government of Liberia, as outlined in the CPA, was 
inaugurated on October 14, 2003. It was made up primarily of members of the three 
previous warring factions. The immediate international imperative was to establish 
security, and thus the expansion of UNMIL’s forces was given priority. Among the 
measures put in place to maintain the cease-fire was the creation of the Defence 
Advisory Committee (DAC), made up of the chiefs of staff of the AFL, LURD and 
MODEL.591 The DAC was located within the Ministry of National Defense. In late 
2003 and early 2004, there was some support for the idea of abolishing the armed 
forces entirely.592 The UN Mission head, Jacques-Paul Klein, publicly wondered 
whether a border guard might be sufficient, though such an idea was never formally 
considered.593 The border guard-only concept was not discussed widely because it 
was ‘impractical,’ said Joe Wylie, Liberian Deputy Defence Minister at the time. 
Then U.S. Ambassador John Blaney said that it would have been impossible to obtain 
funding for a militarized border guard because there was no exact U.S. agency 
equivalent.594   
 
On February 5-6, 2004, the Reconstruction Conference on Liberia was held in New 
York. At this donor’s conference the Results Focused Transitional Framework 
(RFTF) reconstruction plan was created. The first of nine RFTF priority clusters 
identified was assigned to security and the restructuring of the AFL.595 The donor’s 
conference was an important precursor to efforts to rebuild the AFL.596 
 
Liberian initial recreation proposals embodied in a March 2004 DAC paper, aimed at 
a recreation of a force much the same as the pre-1990 AFL.597 The DAC 2004 paper 
was a slightly revised version of the 1998 plan submitted to Charles Taylor, and 
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appears to be an endorsement of former AFL officers’ vision for a recreation of the 
pre-1990 force. It was produced well in advance of the dialogue on SSR that began 
later in 2005.598 The March 2004 paper outlines a proposed strength of 6,500. Initial 
April 2004 requests from transitional Defense Minister Daniel Chea to UNMIL senior 
political officers were for a force of 8-10,000.599 One of the first identified UN 
documents on the issue, in May 2004, recorded initial discussions between UNMIL 
and Chea in which a desire for a force not exceeding 4,000 was indicated.600 
 
Also in May 2004, U.S. personnel from the Department of Defense, the State 
Department, and U.S. European Command (responsible for West Africa) made a ten 
day assessment tour.601 They found that there was no professional military to build up, 
neither infrastructure nor equipment.602 This absence of resources, as well as the 
limited reach of the state, created an environment significantly more adverse than in 
many contexts in which SSR programmes had been attempted. As a result, it was 
determined that the new military should be built from the ground up, and former 
warring factions’ personnel, including the AFL, should not be absorbed without a 
qualification process.  The force design process was heavily influenced by U.S. Army 
organizational concepts, which most of the U.S. advisors and contractors had 
experience of, but not, it appears, any specific doctrinal manuals.603 
 
Initial efforts to formulate a defence policy also began within UNMIL at this time. 
Senior political officials within UNMIL drafted the ‘Blue Paper,’ a defence policy 
proposal.604 However, the draft defence policy developed had little lasting impact.  
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While the Liberian parties wanted a 4,000 or stronger force, the ultimate decision on 
force size was made by the United States. There was significant concern that a large 
force would be beyond the Liberian Government’s ability to sustain. The thinking ran 
that if the force was unsustainable, left unpaid, it might revolt.605 Thus the decision 
upon contract signing in July 2004 was that 2,000 men only, not any larger number, 
were to be trained.606 This decision was not announced at the time; it was October 
2004 before Africa Confidential reported that DynCorp had secured a ‘contract to 
restructure the Liberian national army’ with very few further details.607 It was 
acknowledged that this size of force was insufficient to defend the entire country or 
relieve the entire UN peacekeeping mission initially.608 However, the U.S. said that if 
the Liberians wished, they could expand the force after the U.S. funded programme 
ended.  
 
The discussion over the alternative numbers is important because it appears to have 
substituted for any debate on the army’s mission or tasks. It appears an exterior 
defence, conventional orientation was adopted almost by default, rather than counter-
insurgency. There was no established mission statement in existence when a U.S. 
ODC chief changeover took place in mid 2007.609 However, in 2007-2008 Samukai 
was constantly vocal in private about the need to defeat internal insurgency threats. 
The factors that finally militated toward an exterior defence orientation included the 
conventional heritage of most of the U.S. military and contractor personnel involved. 
From mid 2007 the new U.S. ODC chief began to indicate publicly that the mission 
would focus on external defence. The other significant factor appears to have been the 
Liberian heritage of the civil war. Liberians appear to have shied away from an overt 
role for the armed forces in internal stability, partially because of the human rights 
abuses that all factions had committed. 
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In designing the AFL reconstruction programme it was decided that private 
contractors would deliver the training. Due to the pressures of overstretch on the U.S. 
armed forces (principally due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) not enough U.S. 
military personnel were available. The task was finally split between contractors 
DynCorp and PAE in two task orders signed in July 2004.610 The Liberia task orders 
formed a component of the larger multi-year State Department Africa Peacekeeping 
contract. DynCorp was to carry out recruiting, vetting, and individual training while 
PAE was to run unit training after the individual training concluded. “The 
straightforward initial DynCorp proposal consisted.. of putting 2,000 men through 
boot camp and supplementing their training with a significant rule-of-law and human 
rights component.. .”611 DynCorp specifically intended at the time to go beyond a 
straightforward ‘train and equip’ approach. Indeed, the International Crisis Group 
reported that the reason DynCorp won the individual training contract over PA&E 
was because it placed legal and human rights training at the centre of its’ proposal. 
 
The decision to allocate the programme to contractors echoed U.S. practice elsewhere.  
Vinnell Corporation had been granted the initial contract to rebuild the Iraqi Army in 
2003, as seen in the previous chapter. In Africa itself, multiple U.S. security 
assistance efforts had been delegated to contractors through the Africa Peacekeeping 
contract. Support to African armies originally under the African Crisis Response 
Force initiative, now the African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance 
(ACOTA) programme, often is carried out through contractors. The problems faced 
by Vinnell in Iraq might have been expected to give some pause in this second effort 
to reconstruct an entire army using contractors. But Vinnell, DynCorp, and PA&E 
were competing companies, and lessons identified from the Iraq experience might 
have had commercial value. Thus it appears that lessons potentially identified in Iraq 
may have had to be learned and possibly relearned in Liberia. 
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The restructuring concept was briefed by the American side to interim Chairman C. 
Gyude Bryant on 22 September 2004.612 The briefing document still states a 4,000 
number as a strategic goal, with ground, air and maritime components, but states that 
for initial stages, recruiting of around 2,000 to 3,000 personnel would be possible. In 
November 2004, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) completed a 
study of Liberia’s budget and laid out three broad options for the future force’s size. 
U.S. military public briefings in 2008 presented this study’s results as ‘determin[ing] 
that over the [2004-09 period] Liberia could only afford to sustain a military force of 
approximately 2,000 personnel.’613 Despite Samukai having said that the force size 
was set as a result of the MPRI budgeting exercise,614 it is clear that the force size 
decision had been made by the time the contract was signed, five to six months 
before. Later then-U.S. Ambassador John Blaney said the 2,000 strong figure was the 
result of his own personal 'back-of-the-envelope' calculations of what Liberia could 
afford, and not the result of the MPRI studies.615 
 
In January 2005, Blaney gave the instruction to his staff to initiate the programme.616 
However, before the recreation of the army could start, other concerns intervened. 
The Liberian government had agreed that demobilisation of the former AFL was to be 
a Liberian government responsibility. However, DynCorp and US Embassy staff had 
to initiate the process, at least partially because of lack of capacity within the Liberian 
Ministry of Defense.617 In conjunction with the U.S. Embassy staff, DynCorp 
personnel advised the interim Ministry staff on how to proceed with demobilization. 
Thereafter in March-May 2005, they wrote the two orders required, the executive 
order on demobilization, which became Executive Order No.5, and the AFL 
Operations Order for Demobilization. Executive Order No.5 was signed by Chairman 
Bryant on 15 May 2005, and stated that the demobilization exercise would begin on 
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31 May. The demobilization process actually commenced in July 2005 and was 
completed in January 2006. 
 
While the demobilization preparation process was under way, a round of consultations 
took place with major stakeholders as to the mission and composition of the new 
AFL, sensitization campaigns for civil society, and potential locations for training 
bases. A recruiting and vetting plan was also prepared. By May 2005 the State 
Department could initiate the programme, and did so by releasing money to DynCorp 
to start recruiting and facility construction.618 DynCorp working under direction from 
Daniel Chea drafted and redrafted different options for the land forces’ organization, 
for example, including an agricultural battalion.619 However, U.S. disapproval meant 
that no agricultural unit was included in the structure approved in 2005. On July 15, 
2005, the U.S. government received the initial organizational table for the AFL’s 
future force structure from the DynCorp contractors who had written it. It was 
approved soon afterwards.620 The original organizational table, which had been the 
subject of repeated consultation with transitional Defense Minister Chea, laid out a 
seven component structure. There were to be a brigade headquarters, two infantry 
battalions, an engineer company, a military police company, a brigade training 
company, and a band.621 No service support units were to be created, as the 
contractors were to provide basic support services at the bases, at least during the 
training programme. With minor adjustments, this force structure was carried through 
into reality.  
 
Recruiting and vetting for the new force began in October 2005, which attracted 
thousands of applicants.622 In January 2006, the newly elected Liberian government 
was installed, and former UN police official Brownie Samukai became Minister of 
National Defense. The first basic training class was induced in July 2006, much 
delayed by disagreements over the Liberian contribution to the budget and training 
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and barracks sites. This first class, selected for their leadership potential, was about 
110 strong, and graduated in November 2006. From June 2007 formulation of plans to 
end the training with a final assessment exercise began to get underway. The just-
arrived U.S. ODC chief was tasked to “give the MOD a plan on the building of the 
force and timeline on turnover.”623 Classes halted entirely from December 2007 to 
July 2008 due to funding constraints on the U.S. side.624 The first class was trained at 
the Barclay Training Center in central Monrovia because the planned training site was 
not ready. The following classes went through the process at the long-planned 
location, the revitalised Camp Ware near Careysburg, a former Voice of America 
transmitting station. Camp Ware later became the home of the brigade training 
company, which was re-designated the Armed Forces Training Command (AFTC) in 
late February  2009.625 Meanwhile Schiefflin Camp, one of the most important 
Liberian barracks, located on the airport road between Roberts International Airport 
and Monrovia, was earmarked for renovation as the main base for the new force. On 
completion it was renamed Edward Binyah Kesselly Barracks, known to all 
concerned as ‘EBK.’ However, concentrating all the units except the training unit 
there has led to overcrowding, which played a part in fomenting later troop protest, as 
will be elaborated on below. 
 
Once sufficient personnel had undergone initial training, unit training became the 
priority, but this was hampered by a lack of middle-ranking and senior officers. For 
internal Liberian political reasons, it was decided that choosing an army commander 
should be delayed. It appears all factions were worried about having a Liberian of 
whatever political affiliation in the position.626 Thus a Nigerian officer was requested 
to serve as interim chief of staff, and Major General Luka Yusuf arrived in 2006. 
Sierra Leone had earlier had a Nigerian officer, Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe, 
serve as chief of staff in 1998-99. A number of ECOWAS officers were posted into 
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the AFL to fill some of the gaps in late 2007- early 2008. Thus initial unit formation 
for the infantry could begin, and the first three companies were formed in December 
2007.627 The company commanders were provided by Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and 
Ghana. Several former 1990-era Liberian officers, at least two of which who had 
previously served under Brownie Samukai in the ‘Black Berets’ provisional police 
force of 1994-95, were also re-commissioned in early 2008 to fill MOD staff posts, 
and later command appointments.  
 
Also in early 2008, earlier Liberian wishes for a larger force were reasserted. After 
discussions with the Ministry of National Defense, the Marine Colonel who was 
acting as Senior Defense Advisor at the Ministry formulated a plan for a 4,500 strong 
force,628 which was later to grow still further. Without coordination with the U.S. 
Embassy and the U.S. Office of Defence Cooperation, the plan was briefed to the 
President. The Marine colonel in question, who had been operating far beyond his job 
description, was later reprimanded by the U.S. Ambassador.629 With the fiscal 
limitations the two sides were under, such a large amount was unaffordable. Instead 
defence planning began to consider the long-term presence of other West African 
troops in Liberia after the United Nations had left. 
 
The two infantry battalions were activated in August and December 2008. There had 
been long-term U.S. planning that active duty U.S. personnel would be despatched to 
bolster the contractors.630 However, in December 2008, poor PA&E performance 
during a platoon-level defence exercise emphasised the immediate need to improve 
the quality of training, and encouraged the despatch of active duty personnel as soon 
as possible.631 All operational units of the army were concentrated at EBK Barracks in 
2008-09, overloading the facilities there. A number of factors had prevented further 
planned housing from coming to fruition, including the United Nations taking over 
land which was planned to house about 20% of the planned housing units, and a late 
MOD decision that resulted in officers being allocated buildings previously 
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designated as NCO housing. Previous wishes to develop other barracks, such as Camp 
Tubman at Gbarnga, founded due to lack of funding. But the need to disperse the 
army across more bases took on more urgency after soldier-initiated disturbances in 
late 2008.632 
 
Throughout the first half of 2009 PAE conducted collective training, and in the 
second half of 2009 the two battalions underwent their final assessment exercise. This 
was an adapted U.S. Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The 
ARTEP assessment exercise was completed in December 2009.  Passing the ARTEP 
satisfactorily was one of the core benchmarks to allow UNMIL to proceed through its 
Consolidation, Drawdown, and Withdrawal process, so that other military forces 
would be available to supplement UNMIL’s troops.633 
 
In January 2010 the contractors handed over responsibility to the Liberian Ministry of 
National Defense. At the same time, 60 U.S. Marine mentors began arriving to assist 
further training for the army. As of March 2010, ’50-odd’ of the 60 had arrived.634 
According to the chief of the Office of Security Cooperation in the U.S. Embassy, the 
mentors are assisting officers one to two ranks higher than them, but often know more 
than the Liberian officers. With the departure of the contractors, the overall advisory 
programme for U.S. support to the AFL is now under Defence Department leadership. 
From January 1, 2010, the new programme, ‘Onward Liberty,’ will last for five 
years.635 
 
The decision to transfer mentoring responsibility fully to active duty personnel was 
the result of the new unified command, U.S. Africa Command, having the ability to 
assess the mission fully.636 As noted above, U.S. military operations in West Africa 
had previously been the operational responsibility of European Command. European 
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Command had been responsible for Europe and most of Africa. Two other commands, 
Central Command (covering the Horn of Africa) and Pacific Command (covering a 
number of islands in the Indian Ocean) had previously partitioned responsibility for 
U.S. operations on the continent. Africa Command was announced in 2007 to 
rationalize and consolidate these three commands’ activities into one. Africa 
Command assumed responsibility for the AFL programme on 1 May 2008.  Initially, 
the command had almost no one on staff to respond to queries from U.S. officials in 
Monrovia, let alone formulate future plans. Over time, it became clear that active duty 
personnel were required to provide a consistent standard of mentoring. This 
eventually resulted in the contractor-active duty transition that took place at the end of 
December 2009. 
 
Assessing Force Capability  
 
The method chapter established a three-part assessment for assessing capability in the 
absence of a historical combat record. Fighting power can be assessed in terms of a 
the conceptual component, moral component, and physical component. To assess the 
success of the process, each will be discussed in turn. 
 
The conceptual component of fighting power includes an army’s doctrine, 
organization, and its training, among other factors. Creating capability in this area was 
a matter of reemphasising the strict observance of U.S. procedures in Liberia. While 
the prewar AFL had been generally organized on U.S. lines, there had been minimal 
adherence to U.S. standards. After 2003, doctrine and organization was introduced by 
the use of retired U.S. military personnel to carry out the training. As all soldiers 
entered the army at roughly the same time, doctrine could not be passed on from 
senior to junior. Instead it was introduced as part of the initial training process, at a 
relatively simple level. NCO and officers’ courses, as well as adoption of U.S. 
manuals, then began to introduce more complex elements. As noted above, unit 
training has been restricted to the squad/platoon level. Because of the limited amount 
of unit training possible, as well as the inexperience of all ranks, conceptually, it 
appears capability is low. 
 
  
 
The moral component of fighting power refers to an army’s personnel. Issues include 
education, integrity, morale, and incentivising soldiers to fight. With few documents 
available to substantiate recruits’ academic standards or criminal records, the Joint 
Personnel Board interviewed candidates at length.637 The quality of soldiers at entry 
was high, due to the intrusive vetting process. However, low pay and poor 
management has since sapped morale. As noted above, 17 soldiers were dismissed 
after protests in 2008. A former U.S. official attributes the morale problem to the 
absence of empowered and sufficient unit leadership638 - which, if true, would reflect 
historical AFL norms since the 1950s. Drug use appears to be common, and two 
soldiers have been dismissed in 2010 for marijuana possession.639 Due to these 
factors, moral/personnel capability appears to be low. 
 
The physical component of capability includes equipment, logistics, and facilities. 
Equipment was provided by the United States with the exception of weaponry, 
donated by Romania. Logistics and facilities support have been provided continuously 
by the U.S. contractors. In January 2010 a further contract was awarded to continue 
facilities support by DynCorp, potentially until 2012. The contract included power 
generation, water supply, waste disposal, and vehicle maintenance.640 Physical 
capability therefore is supplied to a great degree by the United States. Without U.S. 
support it appears there would be a very low level of physical capability. 
 
Most of these deficiencies would be expected of any new small army, only four years 
old in 2010. Capability is low, but this is to be expected. But Liberia has little ability 
to raise the standard from the level it has now. Due to the U.S. model adopted, the 
capability is not sustainable without continuing outside assistance. Sixty mentors are 
providing key support to the army. It is likely that the level of capability the army 
retains may be directly proportionate to the level of U.S. support that endures.  
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This situation reflects a widespread phenomenon: developing-country officials 
desiring, for whatever reason, the adoption of standards that simply do not reflect 
reality. Whether such officials desire a Northern standard or not, unless Northerners 
are prepared to remain for very extended periods, the standards so expensively 
reached will deteriorate, because the developing society cannot sustain them. For 
example, it seems unlikely that new recruits joining to replace losses will be given the 
same kind of rigourous basic training given to those trained by the contractors. As of 
mid 2009, there also does not seem to be the interest in maintaining the vetting 
capability to carefully check records of new applicants in the future.641 Over time, it 
seems likely that the educational standards of the new AFL will gradually decline 
unless a rigourous entry standard is maintained. Once part of the force, the finance 
and equipment will not be available to train new soldiers to the same standard set 
during the contractor programme, nor allow them to conduct operations to the same 
standard. Therefore, to this author, it seems wasteful to try to build a island of 
developed-world military competence within a society that does not have the 
educational, fiscal, and institutional resources to sustain it. 
 
The Liberian capability enhancement experience validates a number of the lessons 
identified in the previous chapter. The importance of the terms of the peace 
settlement, the benefits of minimising the number of different foreign military 
philosophies which influence the new force, and the need to restrict reconstruction 
programmes to realistic, rather than unreachable, goals, are all evident from the 
history of the 2004-2009 programme. 
 
Adherence to SSR Principles  
From the above description, it is clear that traditional regional security concerns, as 
well as considerations as to how SSR should best be carried out, had great influence 
over the Liberian army reconstruction programme. The traditional U.S. approach to 
security assistance focused on training and equipping security forces, as discussed in 
the literature review. This situation was exacerbated by ‘war on terror’ imperatives in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. This meant that it was 
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unlikely that the OECD’s SSR principles  would command great attention as the U.S. 
programme was designed. As the principles were only promulgated in 2004, 
knowledge of their existence may also have been limited. 
 
If U.S. attention to the OECD’s principles of SSR was limited, Liberian recognition 
was, it appears, even smaller. The neo-patrimonialist framework of Liberian politics 
limited severely the likelihood that a number of the principles would be respected. 
Yet the AFL programme was specifically designated the ‘Joint U.S.-Liberia SSR 
Program,’ and, as noted above, human rights concerns were specifically incorporated 
within the programme. Thus it is not unreasonable to assess this programme 
according to the standards set by the OECD. The method chapter established six 
criteria for determining whether a programme reflected SSR principals. SSR should 
be people-centred and locally owned; based on democratic norms, human rights 
principles and the rule of law; a framework to address diverse security challenges 
through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral policies; a practice 
promoting greater civilian oversight and involvement; transparent and accountable; 
and a practice that enhances institutional and human capacity. Each principle will be 
examined in turn. 
 People Centred and Locally Owned  
This section will examine whether the AFL reconstruction programme was people 
centred and locally owned. The evidence indicates that the AFL reconstruction 
programme was not people-centered, rather, that it was focused on concerns of state 
security.  
 
If the programme was centered upon assuring the welfare of the people involved with 
the former and reformed armed forces, one would expect to find extensive support 
and welfare programmes for the former army personnel running throughout and after 
the DDR process. One would also expect the new armed forces personnel and their 
families to be well looked after. Yet families were essentially ignored. The former 
AFL personnel have not received benefits that they have been repeatedly promised.  
The reconstruction of the new AFL has not been people-centred either. Neither the 
salary scales nor other conditions of service were adequate to support soldiers and 
  
 
their families.642 Salaries began at $90/month for a private, rising to sergeants, on 
around $100-150 a month, and reach around $250/month for colonels. This is not an 
adequate wage in Liberia, especially for soldiers with large families. The feeding 
issue discussed above was one of the consequences of this pay scale. Apparently this 
initial pay scale was always intended to be temporary. Yet budget pressures have 
prevented any increases. Nor are living conditions adequate. For a number of reasons,  
insufficient family accommodation has been made available, and as a result, barracks 
rooms intended for two single soldiers are being shared by both soldiers’ families.643 
Samukai has also been unable to initiate promised university education for soldiers.644 
 
The feeding issue described above may be the most important issue affecting this SSR 
principle, but there are others. Soldiers’ housing standards further demonstrates that 
the process has not been people-centred. One of the new AFL’s other problems has 
been overcrowding at EBK Barracks, where all the operational units of the army have 
been stationed. Six months elapsed after the riots of September 2008 before moves 
got under way to relocate some personnel to the new Chinese built camp at Gbarnga. 
Yet according to discussions with involved contractor staff, options were internally 
presented (at least in an informal fashion) to alleviate the problem much earlier. 
Adjacent to Camp Ware, now-disused former UNMIL troops housing remains 
empty.645 This adjacent housing area has frequently been considered an option to 
alleviate overcrowding. In 2007-08, however, the fact that the UN took control of the 
housing without coordination made it impossible for the buildings to be renovated for 
AFL use.646 As of mid 2009, however, with the UN having left, it is not fully clear 
why the refurbishment had not taken place in order to at least partially resolve the 
problem.  
 
The rioting and resultant dismissal of soldiers in September 2008 was caused for a 
varierty of reasons, all indicating the lack of a people centred approach. 
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Overcrowding played a role,647 but low pay, family separation, absence of social 
activities and MOD inability to provide free transport to Monrovia for soldiers also 
removed potential off-duty distractions for soldiers and increased resentment.648 The 
EBK unit leadership, insufficient in number, inexperienced, and without enough 
decision-making power was unable to address enough of the soldiers’ concerns to 
avoid resentments which finally sparked confrontation.  
 
These deficiencies show that the process in Liberia has not been people centred. If it 
had been, far more resources would have been allocated to soldiers’ and dependents’ 
welfare. Yet given SSR’s aim of building effective state institutions, it seems unlikely 
that any such programme can be anything but centered on state requirements.  
 
Assessing whether the programme was locally owned is not simple. There was 
extensive consultation with the United States on specifics and OSC staff have 
demonstrated a great will to provide what the Liberians want.649 Yet each phase has 
been dominated by foreign expertise and manpower, and funded by the United States. 
The initial assessment visit, mostly made up of officers who had not set foot in Africa 
before, proposed force designs taken from U.S. models that addressed conventional 
military concerns, rather than Liberia specific concerns.650 As a result, inappropriate 
technical rather than political considerations appear to have played a significant part 
in the initial assessment. Following that assessment, a force structure plan was 
designed by a former U.S. army officer supervised by the Liberian Minister of 
Defense. U.S. advisors have described how the engineer component of the force was 
hurriedly formulated by modification of standard U.S. Army tables of organisation. 651 
Thereafter the key demobilisation plans for the army were written by DynCorp 
contractor personnel. The demobilisation plan was carried out by U.S. contractors. 
The new army was then trained by U.S. contractors, mostly former U.S. military 
personnel, in a U.S. built camp to U.S. standards. This was not all-embracing;  
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DynCorp successfully carried Liberian wishes for female participation in the AFL to 
the U.S. Government and as a result females gained greater opportunities in the AFL 
than in comparable U.S. units.652 Yet the overall imprint was of the United States. 
 
The programme has thus effectively sought to create a U.S. Army in Liberia, with 
African personnel. The unique Liberian local ownership angle here is that Liberians 
have a great regard for the United States and many would probably prefer this 
creation of a non-locally owned army. There is a long-standing Liberian preference 
for adopting U.S. procedures and practices with as little change as possible.653 This 
was mirrored in the army reconstruction programme, with Samukai and other 
officials, when asked, always insisting on U.S. Army standards.654 Thus an analyst 
has to decide whether the Liberian preference for U.S. practices outweighs their 
foreign nature. The issue is whether the Liberians preference for developed-world 
standards make those standards ‘locally owned’ in a developing country. This 
author’s tendency is to say that whether Liberians may ostensibly prefer developed-
world standards or not, they remain ‘not locally owned’ for Liberia because they are 
intrinsically developed-world. On balance however, whether preferred or not, 
imported U.S. practices dominated. The programme sought to qualitatively change the 
character of the army, into a Western-style, effective bureaucracy. This aimed to 
replace the neo-patrimonial networks of governance that had made the AFL work in 
the past. Put another way, the programme sort to avoid an institution driven by 
personalities and riven with potential fracture points. This aspiration simply does not 
reflect the historical character of Liberian state institutions. Considering all these 
factors, the AFL programme cannot be considered locally owned. This is because it 
appears that these neo-patrimonial governance arrangement are effectively the 
existential fabric of the Liberian state and society.  
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 Democratic Norms, Human Rights 
Principles, and the Rule of Law 
The AFL programme from 2004 to December 2009 under contractor supervision was 
based on democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law. Each of 
these three components will be examined in turn. The Government of Liberia 
requested military assistance from the United States and then negotiated the details of 
that assistance. Such executive power is an accepted norm for all democratic 
governments. It was also in accordance with the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Accord. 
Protest from the legislature and civil society did not render such actions inconsistent 
with democratic norms.655 Indeed, scrutiny and debate within the legislature, and 
oversight from the judiciary, is another well established democratic norm. 
 
Yet Liberia in the early twenty-first century had very little real experience of 
democracy. From 1870 onwards, political power was increasingly concentrated in the 
True Whig Party. From 1878 to 1980, the True Whig Party alone ruled the country, 
developing the patronage networks described above. After Samuel Doe seized power 
in 1980, he replaced a well-organized patrimonial system with a less organized, more 
violent variant. The 1990s brought no fundamental change, merely increasing 
violence. Thus while the Comprehensive Peace Agreement preamble said that the 
reconstruction process was to be guided by ‘principles of democratic practice, good 
governance and respect for the rule of law,’ there was little pre-existing knowledge or 
respect for these principles already in place. As noted above in the section on 
political-economic factors, this lead to inappropriate use of the Defense Ministry’s 
bureaucratic influence.  
 
The extensive vetting is the best example of the programme’s commitment to human 
rights principles. Potential recruits that seemed likely to have committed human rights 
violations were rejected. The Liberian political leadership accepted every 
recommended disqualification of potential candidates ‘regardless of how ‘well 
connected’ that candidate might have been, politically or economically.’656 Further 
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evidence of the Ministry of Defense’s commitment however came by December 2008. 
That month it was confirmed that one of the reinstated former 1990s officers, who had 
been ranked as a Lieutenant Colonel, had failed vetting, and had been discharged 
from active duty.657    
 
Another example of the programme’s adherence to human rights principles was the 
insistence upon country-wide, multi-ethnic recruiting. This issue was particularly 
important for Liberia, as the army had become enmeshed in interethnic strife during 
the 1980s. Samuel Doe recruited a large number of Krahn into the force, and the 
ethnic preference given to the Krahn helped to destroy the functioning of the armed 
forces’ command structure.658 Charles Taylor, on the other hand, recruited large 
numbers of Gio from Nimba County into his National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL),659 and this process helped ethnicize the civil war.  Therefore there was a 
careful commitment, when recruiting for the new AFL, to make the army as 
representative of the country’s 15 counties and 19 ethnic groups as possible. It 
appears that every ethnic group is now represented in the new force.660 However, this 
is not because recruits came from across the country. Instead it is because large 
numbers of people from all the counties and ethnic groups gravitated towards 
Monrovia, fleeing the conflict, during the civil war. Most recruits ended up coming 
from Monrovia. Ethnic tensions have been reported within the force. ‘There have 
been several incidents where [Mandingo] recruits have been harassed and beaten up 
by recruits from other ethnic groups.’661 However there is little amplifying 
information available on these incidents. President Johnson-Sirleaf’s aim to have 20% 
women in the force also aided inclusivity, though as of January 2009 the proportion 
was only 3.5%.662  
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Adherence to the rule of law was demonstrated when Liberian officials accepted 
removal of candidates who failed vetting, both for the AFL and for the Ministry of 
Defense training programme. This broke with the previous Liberian practice of 
security forces routinely breaking the law with no significant consequences. Yet after 
close contractor control was removed, there are indications that the army’s discipline 
decreased. Both reinstated civil war era soldiers and new recruits have been reported 
to have committed serious crimes, resulting in deaths, in 2010.663 The two reported 
crimes alone do not represent enough evidence to draw strong conclusions. However, 
it appears that adherence to the rule of law is coming under threat. This is an 
indication that Liberia’s neo-patrimonalist environment is beginning to have an effect. 
Underpaid as the soldiers are, and with pay often disrupted and delayed, frustration 
and levels of crime are likely to increase.664 
 
In summary, the programme adhered to human rights and the rule of law. The policy 
decisions over the programme were taken in adherence with the norms of a 
democratic government. Adherence to these principles may have been partially 
induced by the heavy international involvement throughout the whole process. There 
are indications that the bureaucratic influence of the Ministry of Defense may be 
being used in ways inconsistent with democratic norms. This mirrors the way SSR 
has unfolded in other neo-patrimonial societies. However this does not affect the 
democratic norms evaluation for the U.S.-supervised army programme, and would 
have occurred in any case.  
 
 Addressing Diverse Security Challenges through integrated 
policy 
The third major SSR principle is that SSR should be a framework to address diverse 
security challenges through a broad needs assessment and integrated multi-sectoral 
policies. There is little definitive information on this principle for the Liberian army 
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reconstruction programme. What evidence there is available makes it appear unlikely 
that the programme was part of an integrated multi-sectoral security policy. At the 
time the programme was being designed, there appears to have been little focus on the 
development of an integrated SSR policy.665 As discussed in the method chapter, SSR 
now has to address a wide variety of non-military security challenges. These 
challenges include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
less immediate changes such as climatic change.   
 
The rebuilt army is not structured to address any of these non-military challenges. For 
example, national arrangements for counter-terrorism often rely on some level of 
capability within a nation’s armed forces. Yet in the Liberian case, no special anti-
terrorism unit now exists within the AFL. Instead the nearest such capability is within 
the Police, the Emergency Response Unit. The decision to place the capability within 
the Police, rather than the Armed Forces eventuated for two main reasons.666 Firstly, 
Liberians have a distaste for military special forces units, due to the atrocious history 
of Charles Taylor’s Anti-Terrorist Unit and others.667 Secondly, the other reason 
seems to have been due to the existence of similar ‘Special Weapons and Tactics’ 
(SWAT) units within comparable American police forces. Yet the placement of this 
capability within the Police rather than the AFL underscores the new AFL’s focus on 
military threats to national security.  
  
The Liberian programme was not part of a multi-sectoral programme based upon a 
broad needs assessment. The U.S. needs assessments in 2004 focused on the armed 
forces, rather than integrating defence issues into a wider security assessment. The 
creation of a new army and later the rebuilding of the Ministry of Defense was carried 
out in isolation from reform of the police, other security institutions, and wider 
government reform.668 The fact that army reform was carried out by the United States 
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while police reform was handled by the United Nations did not help matters. Two 
examples make this clear. First, the extensive reforms carried out at the Ministry of 
Defense while other ministries stagnated; and second, the isolation of the army 
reconstruction programme from the development of the National Security Strategy 
which established the development programme for the rest of the security sector.669 
 
In Liberia a number of separate SSR programmes were under way. Yet because of the 
focus on the reconstruction of the army, the AFL and Ministry of Defense became a 
priority for U.S. aid efforts. Their effectiveness improved while other agencies, such 
as the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, 
either stagnated or made little progress. The Ministry of National Defense (MOD) 
was one of the most competent government ministries, at least partially because of the 
advisors attached to it.670 The other reason the MOD was stronger than other 
ministries was because the same kind of demobilization and rebuilding programme 
created for the AFL was carried out.671 From April 2006 to April 2007, Ministry staff 
were demobilised, and then retrained. Ninety-one new graduates of the Ministry 
programme took up their duties in April 2007. This training effort also played a 
significant role. Under it the army reconstruction programme was being carried out by 
two competent companies under U.S. military supervision. Yet by mid 2009 there 
were some signs that the Ministry of Defense, as a competent body, was becoming 
involved in areas beyond defence, such as crime reduction.672 
 
The difference between the quality of the Defense Ministry and other ministries can 
be seen from the difficulties the defence sector had with the Finance Ministry. The 
Finance Ministry repeatedly delayed paying soldiers; interviews indicated that as of 
mid 2009, there had been significant delays in pay once every three to four months.673 
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In December 2009, a further delay in paying the AFL was reported in the Monrovia 
Inquirer, with Defense Minister Samukai complaining of finance ministry delays.674 
This declining efficiency can be seen as a second symptom of the neo-patrimonalist 
environment reasserting itself. Both British and American officials who have watched 
the programme evolve see a threat from the army – possibly a coup – if such a 
situation is not addressed.675 In addition, Amos Sawyer, head of a governance 
improvement agency, the Governance Commission, as well as civil society 
organisations, shared earlier fears in 2008.676 They were concerned about a possible 
coup d’ etat by the AFL once the U.S. phased out its support and funding. 
 
Both the relative priority given to the Defense Ministry, and the weakness of other 
ministries, demonstrate that Liberian army reconstruction was not carried out as part 
of an integrated multi-sectoral policy. 
 
The other series of events that shows the isolation of the Liberian army reconstruction 
programme was the lack of interaction with Liberian national security and defence 
planning. As indicated above, the army programme was effectively designed between 
July 2004, when the Liberia task order was signed between the State Department, 
DynCorp, and PA&E, and mid 2005, when funds were released to DynCorp to begin 
recruiting and facility construction. The development of the Liberian National 
Security Strategy, however, did not really begin until mid 2006, after the RAND 
Corporation had produced their report on ‘Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of 
the Security Sector.’ This was then submitted to the Governance Commission for 
review, starting the process that would eventually lead to the National Security 
Strategy being approved in January 2008.677 The consensus of executive and 
legislative branch officials, as well as international advisors, in Monrovia in April-
May 2009 was that the National Security Strategy had had little to no impact on the 
army reconstruction programme.678 U.S. officials said that there had been very little 
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discussion over interaction with AFL programme, which had mostly been ‘set in 
stone’ by that point.679 
 
Not only has the army reconstruction programme not been guided by a national 
security strategy, it has not been guided by an overall national defence strategy or 
defence review either. Liberian Ministers of Defense have worked with international 
advisors at least three times to produce a defence strategy, but none has eventuated. 
The first was with Daniel Chea and DynCorp advisors in May–June 2005. It appears 
that this first attempt in 2005 was delayed due to attention being given to the National 
Security Strategy.680 In early-mid 2009, President Johnson-Sirleaf deemed that a more 
recent draft strategy would not produce a force ready in time to assure the security of 
the country.681 A third draft was under development in June-July 2009. Discussions 
with a Swedish senior advisor suggest that by March 2010 a defence strategy was 
nearing finalisation and presidential approval.682 
 
There was also a reluctance to broaden the military’s approach to security challenges 
beyond the exterior defence mission. Liberia’s military history has been dominated by 
internal security concerns, and the most likely military mission is counter-insurgency. 
Yet since 2004 there appears to have been a strong focus on an unlikely mission, 
exterior defence. The Defense Advisory Committee in 2004 aimed to effectively 
recreate the former AFL, including artillery and an air wing.683 Despite counter-
insurgency operations having dominated Liberian military activity for the last fifteen 
years, significant planning was devoted to conventional exterior defence operations, 
especially against Sierra Leone.684 Asked to indicate the nature of the nascent army, 
the Nigerian lieutenant colonel serving as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (J-3) in 
May 2009 said the army was focused on conventional, rather than counter-insurgency 
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operations.685 What this shows is that the programme was focused on meeting 
traditional military, rather than more diverse, security challenges.  
 
Therefore the army reconstruction programme was separated from the police 
programme, which was carried out by the United Nations, took place before the 
development of the overarching national security strategy, and focused not on diverse 
challenges, but traditional military missions. It was also not steered by an articulated 
defence strategy until perhaps mid 2010. Therefore the programme cannot be 
considered to have adhered to the integrated policy principle. 
 
 Greater Civilian Oversight and Involvement 
The fourth SSR principle is the promotion of greater civilian oversight and 
involvement. The AFL reconstruction programme did not promote wide civilian 
oversight and involvement. The hierarchy at the Ministry of Defense and other 
government agencies were involved, but wider involvement by the legislature and 
civil society was limited. The AFL reconstruction programme was carried out by 
contractors working in close cooperation with the Liberian Ministry of Defense. The 
contractors’ performance was overseen by the Office of Security Cooperation within 
the U.S. Embassy. What might be described as a ‘normal’ level of civilian oversight 
and involvement was assured by that close cooperation with the Liberian defence 
authorities. Contractor personnel have described their actions on, for example, the 
design of the force structure. While preparing the draft, they received guidance and 
required alterations from Liberian ministry officials.686 
 
While normal or routine levels of civilian oversight took place during the Liberian 
army reconstruction process, this principle of SSR stipulates ‘greater’ civilian 
oversight and involvement. It is acknowledged today that legislatures and civil society 
have an important part to play in scrutinising government security reforms.687 Yet 
‘greater’ level of oversight, arguably, did not really take place. Unravelling the 
reasons for the limited wider involvement requires reconciling a number of 
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contradictory statements by U.S. and Liberian actors. However it appears that there 
were several factors involved. Among these was the contractor structure of the 
programme, which created some structural impediments to a free flow of information, 
as well as distrust; resistance to public debate on security issues by Liberian 
government agencies; and the role of the U.S. defence cooperation staff. 
 
Given the command chain in Liberia, PA&E and DynCorp were not very open to 
scrutiny, and were denied the ability to provide outsiders information in some cases. 
Due to U.S. legal restrictions, the contracts between DynCorp and PA&E and the U.S. 
State Department that governed the contractors’ activities in Liberia have never been 
open for inspection. While the programme was being designed, the then parliament, 
the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, was not consulted. Liberian 
legislators from 2006 could not compel the contractor representatives to appear before 
them. A number of requests were referred to the U.S. or Liberian authorities. U.S. 
officials however say that addressing requests for information to the contractors was 
incorrect, and such data should have been sought from the Liberian MOD and U.S. 
Embassy. There is also evidence that early efforts by DynCorp to engage civil society 
tailed off after civil society organisations raised concerns about DynCorp’s behaviour 
elsewhere (for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina).688 There were concerns that 
DynCorp, due to its previous history elsewhere, was an inappropriate choice to run 
the army training programme. This led to distance and discouraged open discussion 
between DynCorp and civil society.  
 
Stig suggests that one potential reason why more local ownership was not taken was 
that the international actors were not expected to be receptive to local input.689 Since 
the terms of the contract constrained what changes could be made, civil society 
groups may have felt that repeated attempts to influence DynCorp were not 
worthwhile. The civics component was possibly the only area where changes were 
made in the training programme – other areas do not appear to have been negotiable. 
                                                 
688
  Adedeji Ebo, “Local Ownership and Emerging Trends in SSR: A Case Study of Outsourcing 
in Liberia,” in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donnais (Zurich and 
Munster: Lit Verlag, 2008), 163. 
689
  Karianne Stig, “Promoting self-governance without local ownership - A case study of the 
Security Sector Reform in Liberia,” 57. 
  
 
DynCorp received much more attention than PA&E possibly because the recruitment 
phase was the target of most public attention.  
 
A second factor that discourages wide debate over the programme is resistance by 
Liberian government agencies to public discussion of security issues. Amos Sawyer, 
Chairman of the Governance Commission, told a South African researcher in August 
2007 that the MOD, the Ministry of Justice, and the Presidency particularly resisted 
public discussion of such issues.690 This author encountered some resistance himself 
when he was conducting research in Monrovia in mid 2009. It seems likely that 
official disapproval partially discouraged civil society organisations from tenaciously 
following inquiries to a satisfactory conclusion. This may accord with U.S. ODC 
officials’ perception that wider participation was limited primarily owing to 
legislature and civil society’s reluctance to participate.691  
 
The third factor, and one that still remains unclear, is the exact actions of the U.S. 
ODC staff. When Amos Sawyer made the comments above, he included the SSR 
programme team in them, as resisting public debate. Yet ODC officials involved have 
said they worked overtime to engage civic groups.  ‘Undoubtedly some civil and 
perhaps even government actors were excluded, but most excluded themselves and 
then complained from the side lines.’692 Visiting Monrovia in 2009, this author 
encountered both significant openness – despatching official documents – and, in 
some cases, obstruction. This obstruction may however have related more to events 
that the officials had not been directly involved in.  
 
It is clear that greater civilian involvement did not really take place, though the exact 
reasons remain unclear and are the subject of mutual counter-accusations. It appears 
that the contractor structure the United States used to carry out the programme could 
have been worked around. However, in the circumstances prevailing in Liberia from 
2004-09, the use of contractors heightened mistrust and hampered efforts to increase 
wider involvement. 
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 Transparency and Accountability 
The fifth SSR principle derived for this study is that SSR should be transparent and 
accountable. These two goals will be examined in turn. It appears that the army 
reconstruction programme was transparent to the State Department, and details were 
provided to the Liberian Congress. However, complaints from Congress on the 
programme were frequent. Accountability again was only to the State Department. 
The very limited applicability of both key principles did not extend to the host and 
beneficiary country. Therefore on balance it appears that neither facet satisfied what 
might be described as the true spirit of SSR. 
 
Little transparency and accountability was offered by the American architects of the 
programme. Yet evidence suggests that the Liberian government would not have been 
significantly interested in making the programme open to public scrutiny. As noted in 
the section above, there has been significant resistance from Liberian government 
agencies to public discussion of security issues. More importantly, the traditional neo-
patrimonialist system of governance thrived on opacity, rather than transparency. 
Presidents Tolbert and Doe closed media outlets that criticised the government.693 
Through the U.S. funded training programmes, earnest efforts were made to change 
the way the new soldiers and the MOD staff thought. Yet even if a small group of key 
personnel were trained, this seems unlikely to have had a significant effect on the 
attitudes of the majority of people involved in government circles. 
 
The contractors’ activities were initially not very transparent for Liberians. When the 
AFL programme began, Liberian interlocutors that the International Crisis Group 
spoke to ‘did not appear overly concerned about [the lack of transparency].’694 There 
may have been well-founded fears that opening up the contract to scrutiny would 
expose it to profit-seeking, given the transitional government’s reputation for 
corruption.695 Up to mid 2006, Liberian parliamentarians appear to have tried and 
failed to obtain key details of the programme. In 2006 Adedeji Ebo commented that 
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the only identifiable involvement of the parliamentary committee on national security 
was a visit to military sites, organised by the Ministry of Defense.696 In 2007-08 
however, U.S. officials testified before the Liberian Congress, and provided financial 
details of the AFL programme when asked.697 It appears that transparency was limited 
at first, but increased as time passed. U.S. ODC officials testified before Congress, 
and contractor representatives appeared at Congress consultative meetings. Yet 
criticism from Congress was constant. This may have been partially due to Liberian 
domestic political factors, as well as pervasive mistrust.  
 
It should be noted that the U.S. supervising officials had extensive visibility of the 
project. When the first basic induction course at VOA began in mid 2007, the ODC 
chief at the time drove to the training site 37 times in 60 days to oversee the 
contractors’ actions.  In mid 2009, with most of the programme’s functions having 
moved to EBK, contractor programme managers spoke of their continual and close 
contact with the military officers at the Embassy, citing daily exchanges of e-mails 
that, for example, began at 5am and continued until 11pm.698 They aimed to keep the 
Embassy as fully informed as possible. Yet this level of oversight did not reassure the 
Liberian government. Defence Minister Samukai continually complained of the 
remoteness of the contractors. For example, in August 2007 he complained to a Wall 
Street Journal reporter that he could not see copies of the contracts,699 and in April 
2008 said the contractors were not consulting with Liberian authorities.700 These are 
probably among the reasons why Samukai has said that he would have preferred to 
have the programme carried out by serving armed forces personnel.701 
  
It is clear that transparency and accountability for the contractors was primarily 
exercised by their U.S. government overseers, with some data being provided to the 
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Liberian Congress. But for the soldiers of the new army, the situation is mixed. 
Offenses against the Liberian authorities, such as the disturbances that took place in 
EBK Barracks in late 2008, have been quickly punished. Sixteen soldiers were 
discharged as a result.702 Offenses against the general public by AFL soldiers are less 
consistently punished. As described above, there have been at least two serious crimes 
committed by soldiers in 2010 where no military justice proceedings have been 
reported. Historical patterns of impunity for soldiers may be reasserting themselves. 
 
In summary, transparency for and accountability to Liberians during the army 
reconstruction process of 2004-2009 has been limited. In some cases, this may have 
been for good reasons, as is demonstrated by concerns over profit-seeking from 
members of the transitional government. However, this does not change the main 
conclusion – that this aspect of the process has not followed SSR principles. 
 Enhancing Institutional and Human Capacity 
The final SSR principle is the enhancement of institutional and human capacity. This 
was the main focus of security assistance during the Cold War, and even with the 
advent of SSR principles, probably remains the main thrust of army assistance today. 
In Liberia, clear success was achieved. Over 2,000 army personnel have been trained 
both at the individual and at a higher collective level. In addition, the Ministry of 
Defence staff were trained. 
 
There are two points to note in regard to enhancement of capacity in Liberia.  
Firstly, the decision to retrain all personnel from the start has led to a significant 
leadership gap. Secondly, due to inconsistent contractor quality and other associated 
mistakes, plus subsequent budget cuts from 2010, the force has not been trained in 
groups larger than platoons (of about 30 soldiers). 
 
The new AFL initially trained only lieutenants, the lowest ranking military officers. 
This approach created a lack of middle-ranking officers, and the experience level of 
junior officers and NCOs. Once battalions are activated, they need captains, majors, 
and a lieutenant colonel as a commanding officer. None of these officers were 
                                                 
702
  Rebecca Murray, ‘Liberia: New Army Faces Greatest Challenge,’ InterPress, 28 December 
2009. 
  
 
available. Instead, ECOWAS officers were requested, and a number arrived. The 
ECOWAS officers’ performance has been reported as patchy.703 To supplant and 
eventually replace the ECOWAS officers, 12 retired pre-2003 AFL officers were 
vetted for reinstatement into active service. In 2007, nine were readmitted in the ranks 
of major and lieutenant colonel. In May 2009 these officers were holding principal 
staff officer positions in Headquarters AFL (two), and serving as brigade executive 
officer (one), commander of the training command (one) and battalion commander 
(one). Two others were on training courses in the United States. The other battalion 
commander is a Ghanaian officer. One of the recalled lieutenant colonels was later 
promoted to colonel and appointed as deputy chief of staff.704 The seventh officer was 
discharged in 2008 as he failed vetting. Balancing these former officers who have 
served many years in a thoroughly unprofessional environment with the newly trained 
second lieutenants is creating stresses within the army. Additionally it is not clear 
whether the reinstatement of these officers brings needed experience back into the 
army or risks diluting the ethos instilled by the U.S. trainers.705 There is also irritation 
and opposition within the ranks to accepting officers who did not go through the same 
training programme as the majority of the new AFL.  
 
Experience levels for the new AFL second lieutenants and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) will have to develop slowly. The new AFL still has inexperienced new 
second lieutenants in staff positions designated for experienced captains. More 
importantly, the new NCOs have little experience. Ideally NCOs serve as the 
backbone of an army’s institutional knowledge: ‘They form the middle management, 
the backbone of the army. They maintain the traditions and standards. They maintain 
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the discipline and the administration.’706 One especially important NCO post is that of 
platoon sergeant. The platoon sergeant, ideally a long-serving soldier of great 
knowledge and experience, is intended to support and educate a newly arrived, 
freshly-graduated officer platoon commander. The difficulty with the new AFL is that 
all new officers and NCOs are similarly inexperienced. This has led to incidents of 
misbehaviour which would be unacceptable in a Western army.707 The U.S. mentors 
arriving in 2010 are designated to support the development of the new Liberian 
personnel. It is unclear yet what effect they are having. 
 
Thus due to the decision to use a ‘single state force’ model and recreate the army from 
nothing, a significant experience gap has been created. This has risked the imposition 
of excessive pressure upon new soldiers who may have been forced to perform 
beyond their experience. What is quite clear is that to alleviate the weaknesses the 
army will need extensive mentoring for a long time to come. ‘If we [the United 
States] keep working with them they’ll be fine.  If we abandon them, they will 
flounder back to old practices,’ as one involved U.S. expert commented.708 
 
The other significant point regarding capacity development is that the new army has 
not been trained to take advantage of its full capabilities. Furthermore, there is little 
money available in the foreseeable future for this to occur. The new AFL will have 
five levels of sub-unit and unit command – squad, platoon, company, battalion, and 
brigade. However, only the first two levels of command were fully trained by the 
contractors. As noted above, PA&E faced significant problems when trying to run a 
platoon-level exercise in December 2008. The deficiencies this revealed in platoon 
level skills delayed the process of training the soldiers in larger units. As of December 
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2009, company, battalion and brigade level training had not been completed.709 This 
is not surprising, given that the initial recruit training classes only graduated in 2006. 
but it emphasises the need for a continual development of officers’ skill in directing 
larger and larger units. The problem is that the money required to do so is scarce, 
following government funding cutbacks which began to take effect from early 2010. 
Training at the battalion and brigade level has been planned, but only started to take 
place from mid 2011. The domination of training by the American contractors and the 
supervisory Office of Security Cooperation means that the level above brigade – 
Headquarters Armed Forces of Liberia itself – gained little or no practice in running 
the army.710 It should be said however that the period in which HQ AFL could have 
gained such practice was limited, given that the first battalion did not form until 
September 2008. This means that such practice is being gained with little preparation, 
since January 2010 and the transfer from contractor control. 
 
Other lesser points regarding capacity enhancement in Liberia reflect previous army 
reconstruction experience elsewhere. Evidence from Liberia supports the contention 
that logistics, administration and maintenance need particular attention. Salaries have 
been a particular worry. Also troubling to Western advisors’ eyes was Liberian 
Ministry of National Defense unwillingness to budget properly. Instead of 
formulating a budget that covered each anticipated requirement, the annual budget has 
been made as ambiguous as possible to so that ‘they can fudge it as they go along.’711 
This may be because there is then greater flexibility later to address unexpected 
shortfalls. Yet if comprehensive planning had been undertaken, most or all 
contingencies might have been anticipated. Advisors’ perception is that Liberian 
defence officials either cannot or will not plan ahead in great detail.712  
 
In summary, the AFL reconstruction programme clearly enhanced institutional and 
human capacity, but to realise the force’s potential through the training of its 
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personnel, much remains to be done. The AFL rebuilding exercise validates the need 
for close attention to logistics and administration during army reconstruction 
programmes. 
 
Conclusions  
This chapter aimed to explore influence exerted by the historical priority of capability 
enhancement, political-economic factors, and the SSR principles on the Liberian army 
reconstruction programme. The Liberia fieldwork reinforces evidence from other 
cases that the SSR principles have had little influence. The most important 
influencing factor appears to have been the U.S. desire to enhancement capability, in 
common with numerous other army reconstruction programmes. The programme was 
designed to produce an effective army. Other priorities that might have risked this 
goal, such as a greater role for Liberians in the running of the programme and the 
desire for a large force, were de-emphasised. The prevailing political-economic 
environment slowly began to serve as a brake on the U.S. capacity enhancement 
agenda. 
 
Examining each SSR principle in turn, the programme was not people-centred, nor 
locally owned. It did follow democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule 
of law. It did not however take place as part of an integrated multi-sectoral strategy. 
Instead, reforms to the various parts of the security sector took place independently. 
Greater civilian oversight and involvement was not fostered. This was mostly because 
of the use of contractors paid with U.S. money who had little local civilian oversight. 
Again because of the involvement of the contractors, there was little local 
transparency and accountability.  
  
 
 
Figure 1: Adherence of Army Reconstruction in Liberia to the SSR Principles 
 
Thus the AFL reconstruction programme conformed to some SSR principles but not 
others. In making an overall assessment, one must judge whether the lack of local 
ownership, wider civilian oversight, an integrated multi-sectoral strategy, and 
transparency, invalidate the successes in incorporating human rights norms, the rule 
of law, and capacity improvement. As none of the army reconstruction programmes 
examined in this dissertation appears people centred, it is unreasonable to deem a 
programme as not reflective of SSR principles for that failure alone.  
 
Because the programme was in its essence about training new soldiers and equipping 
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because it was not locally owned and had significant accountability and transparency 
drawbacks, it seems most accurate to judge that it did not reflect SSR principles.  
 
If one discounts SSR principles as the most significant influence, capability 
enhancement and prevailing political-economic factors become most important. Put 
simply, the aim effectively seems to have been the creation of an American (quality) 
army in Liberia. Thus the historical U.S. priority of capability enhancement, the 
driving force behind the programme, was introduced into an arena dominated by neo-
patrimonial, personalized politics. From the date the CPA was agreed in August 2003, 
political-economic drivers reflecting Liberian realities began to impose themselves on 
the capability enhancement agenda. However, the neo-patrimonial influences and 
networks which dominated the Liberian environment did not immediately begin to 
penetrate the U.S. programme’s ‘bubble.’ Instead a number of issues began to have an 
indirect effect. These included a lack of resources leading to dissention within the 
force, infrequent efforts to expand the force size, and the re-emergence of historical 
patterns of impunity for AFL personnel. At the same time, constraints of U.S. origin 
had an effect: the decision to utilise contractors, and the decision to adopt a single 
state force model, among other factors. In the initial basic training period, when the 
recruits were sequestered from the outside world, a U.S. environment could be 
introduced and fostered. But once the initial training period was over the prevailing 
political-economic climate could have more and more effect.    
 
There were however components of the programme that embodied SSR principles 
fully. The intensive vetting stands out in this way, a procedure which should be 
adopted more widely. However, Liberia is creating one of the smallest armies that this 
study has examined. Opportunities to invest this much resources into this few soldiers 
will be uncommon. This will inevitably reduce the quality of future vetting 
programmes. 
 
In summary it appears that prevailing political-economic factors and capability 
enhancement dominated the AFL reconstruction programme more than the SSR 
principles. The limited effect exerted by the SSR principles mirrors the experience of 
the desk case studies discussed in Chapter 4. Evidence in this chapter supports the 
view that the SSR principles are overly generic and difficult to apply in field contexts. 
  
 
Since greater consideration of political-economic factors and capability enhancement 
factors sharpen the analysis, this result also underlines the precision problems implicit 
in current wording of the SSR principles.  
 
This chapter also provides additional evidence which supports the necessity and value 
of reducing the scope of SSR programmes, trends discussed in the literature review. If 
a multi-sector, comprehensive, approach to SSR is abandoned, several of the SSR 
principles may become easier to implement. The lesser degree of political 
compromise required to align less ambitious programmes will mean that each 
individual programme may have a greater chance to incorporate the SSR principles. 
Smaller, less ambitious programmes appear better placed to make SSR more 
internally consistent. At present, it appears over-ambitious. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This chapter concludes the dissertation by assessing the validity and usefulness of the 
current SSR principles. The SSR principles were first formulated by the OECD in 
2004, and embodied within the OECD Handbook on SSR of 2007. This concluding 
chapter is in two parts; a summary, followed by conclusions and recommendations. 
First, the dissertation research is summarized, covering the research question, the 
findings of the literature review, the method, the multiple case chapter, and the 
chapter which applies the three key concepts for army reconstruction to the Liberian 
case. It then revisits the principles to suggest areas where the principles remain valid, 
and where modifications to the principles might be considered.  
 
It appears from the findings of the literature review, incorporating late 2010 analysis, 
that the SSR principles may require significant changes to deliver realistic and 
effective programmes in the future. The results of the multiple case and field case 
studies have uncovered a number of pieces of evidence which resonate with these 
views. 
 Summary of Dissertation Research 
 
Development in many parts of the world is often hampered by security concerns. In 
the aftermath of internal conflict, the security situation circumscribes and reduces the 
potential for development. One of the frequent responses by nation-states to attempt 
to resolve internal conflicts is the deployment of an international intervention force. 
The despatch of such forces often takes place after a peace accord has been brokered 
between the parties to the conflict. 
 
Following the peace accord, the international intervention force is usually charged 
with maintaining the ceasefire and assuring adequate conditions for post-conflict 
reconstruction to commence. Among the reconstruction tasks is the development of a 
sustainable army to replace the intervention force upon withdrawal. As indicated in 
Chapter 4, this pattern has been repeated at least twelve times since 1990. There are 
  
 
also three closely associated cases, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Burundi, which 
display enough similar features to be considered alongside the other twelve cases.  
 
However, attempts to construct armies after internal conflict have been beset by 
repeated mishaps in the preparatory stage, the over-application of Western 
procedures, failed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, 
and inadequate coordination with other security redevelopment programmes. These 
difficulties reflect in many cases the weaknesses of the SSR principles as currently 
formulated. International interventions continue to be launched, some in extremely 
unpromising circumstances. Therefore studying previous army reconstruction 
programmes in order to develop potential changes to the SSR principles is 
worthwhile. Such changes would be useful both to better create conditions for 
development in post-conflict environments, and to inform the transformation of 
armies in other contexts. 
 
To address the research question “Are the OECD DAC SSR principles relevant and 
practical for post-conflict army reconstruction?”, Chapter 2 reviewed the literature to 
chart the available theoretical knowledge relevant to the topic.  The multi-disciplinary 
area of security sector reform was used as the key body of knowledge informing this 
debate to date. The chapter surveyed its origins, emanating from the confluence of 
varied developmental and intergovernmental efforts after the Cold war, to the late 
1990s definitions of SSR that are now in common use. In doing so it highlighted the 
continuing challenge of harmonising the concept and its practice, what has been 
described by Chanaa as the ‘conceptual-contextual divide.’713 
 
The literature review then examined six significant critiques of SSR and related 
literature. The first was the vast resources needed for comprehensive security 
transformation in most developing countries. The quality and quantity of human 
resources in post-conflict states are likely to be insufficient. Finances are almost 
invariably insufficient for the multitude of tasks involved, and frequently heavily 
dependent on outside donors. Also, pre-existing physical, constitutional, and 
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administrative resources are likely to be weak or lacking.714 When the transformation 
of the army is examined more closely, often foreign donors have had to provide the 
overwhelming majority of the funding for up to a decade (or longer). From the cases 
examined, it appears that donors are usually only willing to fund programmes 
sufficiently in countries that are deemed important to their national interest. Thus, for 
example, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq have had significant resources invested 
in army reconstruction.715 In these three states the financial resources invested in army 
reconstruction may be approaching a level adequate to fund the intended programmes. 
However, this leaves aside the lack of human and administrative resources. 
 
The analysis in the literature review also highlighted the great difficulties inherent in 
the task of transforming neo-patrimonial societies. The SSR concept is founded on 
democratic norms and the replication of the rational-legal features of states along 
Weberian lines. SSR focuses upon changing the security structures of states, but is 
heavily reliant upon a more fundamental transformation of the nature of the recipient 
state itself. In some cases, as Egnell and Halden note, there may be only ‘complex 
webs of informal networks,’ for which they cite Sierra Leone as an example.716 
Security change should ideally be based upon written or unwritten national norms and 
values. However, if those norms and values conflict with the basic principles of SSR, 
achieving transformation will be extremely difficult. Thus transformation has faced 
great resistance in Sierra Leone, as Egnell and Halden attest, the Congo, Zimbabwe, 
East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia. 
 
If SSR is to be sustainable, its programmes need to be assimilated within national 
modes of operating in the host state. SSR programmes need to be locally owned, and 
ideally not just owned by the elites of the recipient state, but by broader civil society 
or the majority of the citizenry of the country. Army reconstruction viewed through 
this prism often appears inappropriate, as in many instances it can be implemented 
with either foreign advisors or by carrying out a foreign plan (as in the Defence 
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Reform Commission approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina). But frequently former 
colonial patterns in the armed forces do not ease the inculcation of a fully local ethos.  
 
A further frequent weakness in SSR programmes is the lack of an integrated approach 
at the state level. The scope of comprehensive SSR is very wide, and covers 
everything from ministerial reform in the Interior Ministry, to prison conditions, to 
armed forces’ financial accountability, to training naval captains how to fight multiple 
ships in coordination. Given the multitude of local and foreign actors, there are often 
simultaneous, unconnected transformation programmes under way across the security 
sector, or even just within the armed forces, as international aid efforts to the former 
Zaire and to the Congo today show. SSR is intended to be an overall, holistic effort, 
but sometimes there is little coordinated planning at the state level. Creating and 
maintaining a coordinated national security policy to focus on identified priorities and 
to avoid duplication and waste is vital. Only recently, with the Kosovo Internal 
Security Sector Review in 2006, has the opportunity been taken to thoroughly review 
challenges and opportunities at the state level before the formulation of individual 
sectoral transformation programmes. 
 
At the level of the army and police, another widely present weakness is the tendency 
to prioritise equipping and training programmes over governance. This has historical 
roots with Cold War military assistance programmes. Often such assistance is aimed 
more to gain political favour with the recipient state leadership than to inculcate 
effective management and accountability practices. The ‘war on terror’ has increased 
pressure since 2001 to build numbers of security forces quickly, notably in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In those and other countries, there may be some democratic 
elements of the political system. Yet the controlling national elites often want reliable 
security forces that will do their bidding, and full democratic oversight and outside 
influence from parliament and civil society may be unwelcome. Yet the successful 
incorporation of governance components into army reconstruction is one of the 
crucial marks of whether a programme can be considered meaningful SSR. 
 
Finally, the application of management theories to SSR is an area where much 
potential advantage may be gained. There are a number of specific techniques, 
including Fitz-Gerald and Tracy’s ideas on alternate decision making models, Van 
  
 
Veen’s reverse stakeholder mapping, and an SSR application of the Balanced 
Scorecard, which have been developed in the past five years. These and other 
innovative new ideas may promise significant advantages in SSR research and 
programme execution. Yet they need to be much more widely disseminated, 
evaluated, and fine-tuned through testing to be made more effective.  
 
The second section of the literature review covered army reconstruction concepts and 
guidance available. These concepts and guidance fall into four main areas: overall 
guidance for SSR policy and processes, guidance supporting defence sector reform, 
guidance on DDR programming, and military doctrine. Concepts and guidance 
informed by the SSR literature is dominated by the OECD Handbook, which covers 
assessment, capability development, and programme design, as well as a number of 
less vital areas.  
 
Boucher, Burgess, LeRoux and Bonnemaison have written guidance for defence 
sector reform.717 Boucher, for example, asked whether armed forces were really 
necessary in all situations, and noted that forces can tend to be either too large or too 
small.718 This size challenge echoed a result discussed in more detail in the multiple 
case chapter. DDR plays a crucial bridging role, allowing ex-combatants to be either 
reintegrated into wider society, or be moved into the new security forces. The focus 
has unfortunately historically been placed on the initial disarmament and 
demobilisation phases, rather than the most important reintegration phase, which can 
stretch for years. Tailored reintegration programmes seem to be much more effective 
than simply disbursing money, tools, or training, but are expensive to implement on a 
large scale. 
 
Doctrine for reconstructing armies is the fourth area, and is relatively new. Only since 
2001 has the importance of reconstructing partner armies warranted the attention of 
doctrine developers. Previously it appears that U.S. and British practices were applied 
by default, especially in Zimbabwe and the Balkans. 
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Military doctrine which provides guidance for defence reform appears to be rare. Yet 
doctrine which covers the army aspect of defence reform (as opposed to overall armed 
forces, naval, and air doctrine) seems to be rarer still. There appear to be only two 
doctrinal documents which address the reconstruction of armies, as opposed to 
doctrine for armies that already exist.719 First released was the British Army’s 
doctrine note on Developing Indigenous Armies, completed in 2007. It said that every 
‘plan for engagement with indigenous forces should be steeped in cooperation with 
local and regional military-cultural normality.’ The U.S. field manual on Security 
Force Assistance, released in May 2009, has a much more technical and prescriptive 
approach. The text lacks consideration of the political factors inherent in the process. 
Neither manual elaborates on the linkages between army reconstruction and the 
higher-level discussion upon broader security issues on which such programmes 
should be based.   
 
The wider analytical conclusions of the literature review were three-fold. First, that 
army reconstruction has become a significant part of SSR, with roots stretching back 
to 1980. It often takes place in adverse environments. But the political-economic 
drivers of SSR are significantly different in conflict-affected states than they are in the 
developmental and post-authoritarian contexts for which the concept was originally 
evolved. The political space available for the implementation of SSR principles can 
be much reduced. With such limited scope to forward SSR governance aims, this 
situation has tended to reinforce the historical Western tendency to focus on 
equipping and training partner armies. Army reconstruction has been hastened 
appreciably in the face of short-term stabilization imperatives in Afghanistan, the 
Congo, and Iraq. The pressure of the ‘war on terror’ has also emphasised the rapid 
expansion of security forces. Second, between the various writings on defence reform, 
the OECD Handbook, and the doctrinal manuals, a significant amount of guidance on 
army reconstruction has now been formulated. However most of it dates only from 
2007 onwards and has been insufficiently used to allow for proper evaluation of its 
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worth. Third, the OECD’s SSR norms, widely accepted in the West, are often at odds 
with the nature of the recipient state. Thus most high-level guidance available for 
army reconstruction is not necessarily compatible with the environmental realities of 
the theatres in which defence reform takes place. Measures suggested by foreign 
advisors can be difficult or simply unwelcome in the first place. The literature review 
conclusions also indicated that, in order to provide greater guidance for post-conflict 
army reconstruction, a survey of a number of different case studies was required to 
provide more data to test the general conclusions of the literature.  
 
The first part of this survey of case studies was Chapter 4, a desk based review of 
some 15 different cases of army reconstruction. A desk review was selected primarily 
due to resource constraints, as finance and time did not allow an extensive programme 
of field visits. It was also the view of the author that the combination of a multiple 
case study analysis, combined with a single case study empirical analysis and 
fieldwork, would make the study more methodologically sound and empirically 
robust, and reflect both an effective and efficient use of resources available to a PhD 
student.   
 
The 15 cases examined include Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, 
the Congo, Burundi, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Liberia. As noted above, Zimbabwe, Burundi, and South Africa, in which no 
full international intervention forces were deployed, display sufficient similarities to 
warrant their examination alongside the other twelve cases.  
 
Based on the questions raised regarding the only available strategic level guidance 
informing army reform, the desk-based research evaluated the extent to which army 
reconstruction experiences of the past had actually adhered to SSR principles and, 
therefore, the utility of such principles in these processes.  The OECD-DAC 
principles provided a detailed set of norms which a effective and accountable security 
sector should follow. 
 
The analysis of the 15 cases identified common aspects across three distinct 
categories. The case of the ‘military merger’ brings all pre-existing armed groups into 
a single army. This appeared to be the predominant model, covering nine of the 15 
  
 
cases. The approach has been used in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, South 
Africa, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, the Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Nepal. 
All cases included the phenomenon of two to three previously warring factions 
amalgamated into one single force, though in the Congo six warring factions were 
involved. When a single force had been created, a professionalization effort was 
initiated.720 The resulting force was arguably less effective for a period of time, but by 
absorbing large numbers of ex-combatants, this model reduces the security problems 
perennial in such environments. It also effectively extends the length of the DDR 
process.  
 
The Kosovo and East Timor cases have been designated ‘institutionalization,’ a 
simpler process of only one former armed grouping being transformed into a state 
army. The whole process is much simpler, though to a degree inter-faction rivalries 
are replaced by intra-faction rivalries, such as the discord between ‘westerners’ and 
‘easterners’ that contributed to the splintering of the East Timorese Defence Force in 
2006. It seems likely that given the more unified nature of the new army, its 
bargaining power with foreign interests will be higher and thus the prospects for 
effective local ownership will be higher. Both East Timor and Kosovo forces have 
evinced a high degree of clandestine influence over the political development of the 
successor state. Correlation does not equal causation. Yet, given the case of the ANC-
MK in South Africa, it is entirely possible that this variant of army reconstruction 
may lead to a restriction in the political space available for meaningful democracy to 
develop. 
 
The other major alternative to the military merger model is the ‘single state force.’ In 
this case pre-existing armed groupings and personnel were either demobilized or 
prohibited from entering the new army. A new army is created from the bottom up, by 
giving initial training to men (and in the Liberian case, women) who may or may not 
have had previous military experience. Contractors may also be utilised to assist to 
supervise the creation of a ‘single state force,’ as with Vinnell Corporation in Iraq in 
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2003-04 and by DynCorp and PA&E in Liberia from 2005. Such a force can dictate 
high entry standards, and thus is well positioned to become competent relatively 
quickly. However, as learned in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sierra Leone, the Congo, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and South Sudan, excluded ex-combatants may constitute an ongoing 
security threat.  
 
The three categories vary widely in their adherence to SSR principles. None, 
however, places people at the centre of security sector transformation activities. 
Beyond that commonality, it appears that the ‘military merger’ model adheres most 
closely to SSR principles, with significant effort being bent to the task of ensuring 
democratic norms, addressing diverse security challenges, enhancing civilian 
oversight, and promoting transparency. Two perhaps unusual examples prevent an 
unequivocally positive response on the enhancement of capability. These are the 
integration of armed groupings in South Africa, where the integration of black ANC 
and PAC combatants as well as the homeland armies degraded capability. The decay 
of the army in Mozambique is a symptom of the greater malaise of the state there.   
 
Institutionalization fares almost as well, apart from a relative lack of transparency. 
Neither the Kosovo Liberation Army nor the Falintil gave birth to successor forces 
that were particularly open about their political linkages and influence in the reshaped 
polity. The creation of single state forces, as befitting their American origins, have 
been unequivocally focused upon military capacity, with less attention to the political 
consequences surrounding their actions. In all cases, civilian oversight appears to 
have been limited to the executive branch. All three armies in this category 
(Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia) have however increased their capabilities. All the 
contractors identified in army reconstruction efforts have been American, and their 
strengths and weaknesses broadly reflect the ‘single state force’ model. Only 
DynCorp’s extraordinarily attentive approach to personnel vetting in Liberia reflects a 
focus on anything but capacity enhancement. Only the very small size of the force 
involved, two thousand personnel, made such a degree of detailed vetting possible. 
All the other SSR principles have been of secondary or minor importance. 
 
The multiple case analysis suggested that many of the current SSR principles are 
flawed, because they represent Northern aspirations which may be completely 
  
 
unrealistic when attempted in developing states. Army reconstruction may only reflect 
SSR principles where Northern donors have significant influence. In other contexts, 
such as in the Sudan, army reconstruction is likely to retain a focus on improving 
capability and effectiveness. This orientation reflects dominant elite needs in this type 
of fragile states, and reflects the historical U.S. orientation in this type of military aid.  
 
The utility of the SSR principles to support army reconstruction then needed to be 
tested in a field case study.  Field research was carried out over a two-month period in 
Monrovia, Liberia, with two visits made beyond the city to the main military training 
bases. The research also included time spent in the key West African regional centre 
of Accra, Ghana, in order to consult with other key players in the Liberian security 
reconstruction process.  Multiple semi-structured interviews were conducted with a 
wide range of experts involving both civilian and military officials, and every effort 
was made to gain primary source documents. The data was then collated together to 
assess the extent to which SSR principles were adhered to.  
 
Chapter 6, the field case chapter, served as an in-depth single case study examining 
the extent to which the reconstruction of the Liberian army adhered to SSR principles. 
It first introduced the rebuilding of the Armed Forces of Liberia, effectively the 
Liberian army, from 2004 to December 2009.  
 
The analysis concluded that the reconstruction of the AFL adhered to two of the six 
SSR principles. In contrast, most of the other cases only achieved a ‘mixed’ level of 
adherence to a larger number of principles. The Liberian process was neither people-
centred, instead centred on the security of the state with no significant concern for 
soldiers’ or families’ welfare, nor locally owned. This finding supports the 
conclusions of the multiple case analysis. Instead a broadly U.S. model was imported. 
It should be noted however that throughout Liberian history large-scale adoption of 
U.S. models has been preferred to the formulation of indigenous Liberian doctrines. 
While a definite determination of local ownership is difficult to make, this author’s 
decision was to deem the programme not locally owned because the aim was a 
transformed, Western style institution qualitatively different from previous Liberian 
ministries. 
 
  
 
The process followed democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law.  
In the background, however, it seems likely that the Ministry of Defense is 
improperly using its latent bureaucratic influence. This appears to be very much in 
line with the historical reality of neo-patrimonial governance networks in Liberia. Yet 
this did not directly affect the contractor-run programme. The programme made a 
significant break with previous efforts with an intensive vetting campaign organised 
to investigate the background of potential recruits. Every single candidate 
recommended for de-selection by foreign advisors was disqualified, at least one which 
was very close to the Defense Minister. Given the level of detail uncovered by the 
field case research, it is unclear whether such an approach mirrors other country 
programmes, but from the reports received from Afghanistan and Iraq at least, it 
seems unlikely.  
 
The programme was not part of an integrated multi-sectoral effort to address broad 
security challenges. Instead, needs assessments solely focused upon the army were 
used to formulate a reconstruction programme isolated from other national security 
efforts. While the U.S. ran the army reconstruction programme, the United Nations 
was placed in charge of the police, and neither were integrated to any great degree 
with the reconstruction of other security agencies. Greater civilian oversight and 
involvement was not fostered. Instead scrutiny and control was restricted to the 
executive branch. In this regard the Liberian experience mirrors other single state 
force and contractor cases, in which much less emphasis has been placed upon wider 
civilian oversight and involvement than in the military merger category. Transparency 
and accountability for Liberians was limited, in common with nine of the other 15 
cases. None of the single state force or contractor-implemented army reconstruction 
programmes placed any significant emphasis on transparency. Despite this series of 
relative failures, the institutional and human capacity of the army was clearly 
enhanced. This was the primary objective of the programme from the beginning, with 
other considerations being of less importance. 
 
Despite some adherence to SSR norms and principles, significant divergences remain. 
There is not a single SSR principle that has been solidly adhered to across all of the 
four categories. Even the longest-standing, the aim of capacity enhancement, has 
fallen short in numerous cases. This supports one of the key contentions in the 
  
 
literature review. Immediate post-conflict reconstruction environments appear to have 
a much greater degree of difficulty than the more benign developing environments 
upon which the original conceptualisation of SSR was based. Therefore the SSR 
principles developed with that more benign context in mind seems much less 
compatible with the environments considered in this dissertation. Egnell and Halden, 
after consideration of several cases including Sierra Leone, concluded that a realistic 
level of ambition for any specific project should be carefully assessed based on local 
circumstances.721 Disaggregated, smaller, projects focusing on goals where aims can 
be aligned between donors and partner states appear to be a more appropriate aim for 
the future. 
 
Comparing Adherence to SSR Principles  
This section compares the adherence to SSR principles displayed in Liberia against 
the wider trends examined in Chapter 5. It seeks to add insights from the field case 
work to deepen our understanding of whether and in what circumstances army 
reconstruction programmes reflect SSR principles. The six SSR principles, grouping 
people-centred and locally owned, democratic norms, human rights principles, and the 
rule of law, integrated policy, civilian involvement, transparency and accountability, 
and capacity enhancement, will be addressed in turn. 
 
The army reconstruction programme in Liberia, as with all the other army 
programmes examined in this thesis, was not people-centred. The programmes centre 
on maintaining and enhancing the security of the state. The experience of other 
African army redevelopment programmes corroborates this; in Uganda, despite the 
implementation of the defence transformation programme, significant welfare 
improvements did not eventuate.722 Other examples include Liberia with inadequate 
provision for feeding soldiers, referred to in Chapter 5; and in Sierra Leone723 and the 
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722  Brigadier Robert Rusoke, Strengths and Challenges of Defence Transformation in Uganda: 
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Congo724 with lack of proper accommodation. Soldiers’, dependents, and local 
inhabitants’ welfare should be a consideration in any SSR programme, and 
performance will improve if participants are well looked after. Yet considering 
peoples’ welfare does not make welfare, or people-centredness, the central imperative 
of many SSR programmes. Intrinsically they focus on state security concerns. 
Therefore the fact that none of the programmes examined is people-centred says more 
about deficiencies in the way the OECD DAC has worded the SSR principles than it 
says about each programme. Put differently, some state-focused SSR programmes 
might incorporate sufficient focused elements to be regarded as adequately catering to 
peoples’ needs. Should the wording of this principle be adjusted slightly, these 
putative programmes might reach the performance level required to genuinely 
discharge their duty of care for all citizens affected by the programme. 
 
The difficulty is that SSR’s Northern origins mean that the state is almost invariably 
assumed to be the primary provider of security. ‘People-centred’ moves the focus 
from the institutions and politics of the state toward the well-being of individual 
people. Yet state institutions must in many circumstances prioritize the welfare of the 
majority of people over a small number of individuals. If state institutions do 
prioritize the majority, they are not quite acting in a way that is ‘people centred,’ 
because some individuals will not be cared for to the best extent possible. Therefore 
the wording of this particular principle needs to be adjusted slightly. A more carefully 
worded and still legitimate principle might have been phrased to ensure SSR fosters a 
people-centred security ethos. A people-centered security ethos allows institutions 
implementing SSR to place consideration of people at the heart of their activity 
without having to be diverted by making such each individual receives the best 
treatment possible. Such treatment might impair the execution of programmes aiming 
to cater to the majority. Thus a people-centred security ethos is an improvement on 
asking a process almost invariably focused on serving the many through state 
institutions to shift its aim to placing individuals at its centre. 
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Two of the three army reconstruction categories show some level of local ownership – 
military merger and institutionalization. Liberia falls within the single state force 
category, which does not show enough attention to such concerns to be deemed 
locally owned. The common thread among single state force cases is the dominant 
influence of the United States, mostly the U.S. Army, either directly or through 
retirees who join private military contracting companies. As Giustozzi has shown 
mostly clearly in the case of Afghanistan, the United States tries perhaps the hardest 
to replicate the characteristics of its own military in the army under reconstruction. 
Yet the United Kingdom has done much the same thing, if not to the same extent, in 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Sierra Leone. Britain also had significant influence in South 
Africa. It is really thus only the clear indigenous ownership of the process in South 
Africa, South Sudan, and Nepal that moves the ‘military merger’ category towards 
some degree of local ownership. Indigenous actors have been unified in the 
‘institutionalization’ category, and perhaps for that reason there has been a greater 
degree of local ownership evident there.  
 
On reflection it might appear obvious that a process which adopts existing guerrilla 
armies, rather than dispersing their personnel altogether, will display the highest 
degree of local ownership. Yet the international situation after the attacks of 
September 11 may have obscured the innate potential value of the single state force 
model. After the September 11 attacks, the United States’ government was quite 
content to follow its own model and build up armies from nothing or very little, rather 
than attempt to modify what was already in place. The imperatives of trying to avoid 
further terrorist attacks appear to have circumscribed the options that were considered 
by U.S. planners. Instead of careful consideration of a model that reflected local 
circumstances, the U.S. all-volunteer force model, constructed from the ground up, 
was the option preferred. Without the imperatives the ‘war on terror’ imposes, an 
indigenous adoption of the single state force model, without significant outside 
interference, might be crafted to include a significant degree of local ownership. 
 
In comparing adherence to democratic norms, human rights principles, and the rule of 
law, the Liberian programme comes off significantly better than many other cases. 
Democratic norms were respected during the implementation of the programme. Only 
a few other programmes have attempted to adhere to such standards – notably South 
  
 
Africa, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor. Even where such standards have been 
the aim, in the fragile security environment of many countries which have reached 
peace accords it has been difficult to attain such goals. Success in the Liberian case 
seems to have resulted from a clear mandate to incorporate such goals, a well 
managed programme (unlike some aspects of the KPC – KSF transition in Kosovo) 
and the firm presence of a major Western power. All the cases where such principles 
have been clearly been implemented share either a Western standard environment 
when the process began (South Africa), or strong international influence. It is quite 
possible that absent such international influence in Liberia, the result would have been 
the return to service of the former AFL, a warring faction which may have had war 
criminals within its ranks. Thus it is difficult to escape the conclusion that such 
principles will only be significantly adhered to where Western donors play a major 
role. This instantly recreates the inherent local ownership problem already present in 
army reconstruction. 
 
The third principle is that of addressing diverse security challenges through a broad 
needs assessment and integrated policy. Again, assessment of SSR programmes for a 
single component can fall victim to the way the principles are worded. Each 
component can only address issues within its competence – one cannot expect the 
police to also address air defence, for example. Integrating SSR efforts nationally and  
holistically would address diverse security challenges, but asking that of each 
component is inappropriate. A better wording might have included proper integration 
with closely related security sectors and programmes, rather than an expectation of 
performing tasks beyond an individual agency’s remit. The two categories which 
show some adherence to this principle indicate this mostly because of one case in 
each. In Sierra Leone (for military merger) and Kosovo (for institutionalization) 
international actors have moved firmly to construct an integrated SSR policy and 
resulting implementation network. This has more to do with holistic actions from the 
centre, involving several or many security agencies, than it does with those particular 
cases of army reconstruction. In the single state force category, U.S. efforts to rebuild 
armies have placed little importance on integration into wider security policy. 
 
The fourth principle is the promotion of greater civilian oversight and involvement. 
The field study of the Liberia case brings out no special insights here. The single state 
  
 
force category, where Liberia is placed, is perhaps the worst category of army 
reconstruction for the promotion of civilian involvement. This is because not only are 
reconstruction efforts responding to foreign concerns, as they often are, but because 
contractors have added a further layer in some cases. In the Liberian case, with 
contractors, the foreign power separated the locus of effort one remove further still 
from indigenous civilian control by adding commercial concerns to the mix. 
Indigenous actors not only had to deal with powerful foreign interests, but then had to 
induce those powerful foreign interests to make the contractors act the way they wish. 
In the other two single state force cases, Afghanistan and Iraq, neo-patrimonial 
governance imperatives have overridden any impulses to allow wider civilian 
involvement beyond the executive branch. There was also a significant involvement 
of contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, initially including army reconstruction through 
the Vinnell Corporation. Contractors have been present in the other two categories as 
well, but not anything to the same extent. In the other two categories it is easier to 
promote civilian involvement, with institutionalization possibly the category where 
such action is easiest, as there is only one armed grouping rather than many. Yet 
whether multiple armed factions or a single one makes civilian involvement easier 
will always be case-specific. Another complicating factor is that ‘civilians’ may have 
close linkages to the former warring factions, and thus have other hidden priorities 
additional to the promotion of disinterested civilian control. 
  
The fifth principle is transparency and accountability. Liberia and the rest of the 
single state force army reconstruction operations have shown little of either attribute. 
This is mostly because the most powerful actor, the U.S. government, was far more 
concerned with immediate enhancement of security provision than any other factor. 
Looking beyond the single state force category, trying to analyze transparency and 
accountability via the other two categories is of limited help. As discussed in the 
Chapter 4 conclusions, only South Africa, Bosnia, and Kosovo are clear examples of 
transparency and accountability, and both attributes were certainly aims in Sierra 
Leone. However the fact that three of these cases fall into the military merger 
category does not help analysis, because other military merger cases, most 
disturbingly, the Congo, have achieved very little transparency or accountability. The 
two cases of institutionalization appear to be especially vulnerable to breaches of 
transparency and accountability. The level of international involvement, often through 
  
 
organisations such as NATO, the OSCE, or the UN has more to do with the level of 
transparency and accountability achieved than any specific type of army 
reconstruction. 
 
The final principle is the enhancement of institutional and human capacity. This is the 
core focus of what army reconstruction has sought to do throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, and not an additional requirement, as some of the SSR principles have often 
been. Therefore much more success has been achieved in enhancing capacity than on 
any other principle. The most capability has been built with heavy foreign advisor and 
equipment support, as with single state forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, but this type of 
development is not necessarily sustainable. The oldest cases only date from 1980, so 
the evidence available is not necessarily conclusive as to which typology develops 
and sustains capacity best over the long term.  
 
It is vital to build up and sustain the training, personnel administration, pensions, 
maintenance and other programmes which together sustain the institution. The 
‘military merger’ and institutionalization categories appear to address this more 
sustainably than the other two categories, without the heavy importation of U.S. 
equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures, and institutional support that the single 
state force and contractor categories routinely rely upon.  
 
Comparing experience from Liberia to the desk survey results of other army 
reconstruction campaigns allows one to observe the degree to which each army 
reconstruction typology adheres most comprehensively to the existing SSR principles. 
Yet the categories are blunt divisions, and more research is really required, 
particularly on cases such as Namibia, Mozambique, and Sudan. Further research 
might make possible more well justified decisions as to which SSR principles were 
adhered to in each case. The single state force category can be ruled out first. It has 
not attempted, except in isolated cases, to follow SSR principles beyond capacity 
enhancement. This leaves the other two categories. Institutionalization, so far, has 
faced repeated transparency and accountability issues in the two cases where the 
approach has been tried. Marginally therefore, military merger appears to be the 
category in which SSR principles have been most respected. 
  
 
Conclusions: Reconsidering the SSR Principles  
 
Yet application of SSR principles to army reconstruction also reveals the challenges 
the principles face when being used as guidance. SSR principles are laudable 
normative guidance for the standards to which implementers should seek to adhere. 
Yet they do not really engage with the politics of partner countries nor the real 
motivations of Northern SSR donors. They also reflect a very high level view that 
simply does not address the complexities of events several layers down from national 
strategic considerations. Army reconstruction unfolds not at the national strategic 
level, not at the level of the Ministry of Defence or armed forces headquarters – the 
Defence Sector Reform level - but a level lower, at the army headquarters and 
throughout the army. SSR principles are a useful backdrop, and provide some starting 
points, but do not address the issues at this level. When Afghan brigade commanders 
are trying to decide their counter-insurgency priorities, merely reading that SSR 
should be 'people centred ' does not provide them the detailed guidance to tailor their 
community engagement operations. Planners making resource allocation decisions 
between different capability elements within an army need more guidance than simply 
the statement that SSR should address diverse security challenges. More detailed 
elaborations of national priorities are required. Frequently, for example, a decision 
needs to be made on prioritizing conventional manoeuvre forces vis-a-vis a more 
counter-insurgency orientation. The two capabilities are orientated towards separate 
tasks. 
 
Based on these findings, it appears that the debate and the reality on the ground has 
moved on since the SSR principles were originally formulated in 2004. However no 
detailed assessments have been found which test whether the principles have been 
adhered to in the field. Thus on the basis of the trends evidenced in the literature 
review, Chapter 5, and the fieldwork assessment, proposals will then be put forward 
for how the principles should be modified to better reflect today’s realities. 
 
As the evidence examined in Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrates, the SSR principles play 
a minor role in steering post-conflict army reconstruction. One of the most significant 
reasons for this minor role is that the principles, and more importantly, their 
  
 
underlying assumptions, more reflect Western normative aspirations for how 
development should take place than the realities of a post-conflict environment. The 
publication of Eric Scheye’s Realism and Pragmatism in Security Sector Development 
in October 2010 authoritatively supports a number of the trends evident from the 
literature review, and reinforced in Chapters 4 and 5. It also builds upon earlier work, 
notably Timothey Donais’ edited volume which addressed local ownership and SSR 
in 2008. Donais said that ‘most profoundly, perhaps, implementing local ownership in 
a meaningful way requires a shift in donor thinking.’725 It is important that SSR 
principles are reconsidered in the light of this mounting evidence. If this is done, 
expectations can be reduced and less ambitious programmes may be able to be 
delivered with greater chances of success.  
 
The first problem with the principles lies with their underlying assumptions. In fragile 
states, non-state security actors appear to be the primary security providers for 
ordinary individuals. Yet because of the Northern origins of SSR, and the formal 
frameworks that obscure the real informal power centres in much of the developing 
world, the vast majority of SSR efforts are directed toward the improvement of formal 
security actors. As a number of authors have demonstrated, formal arrangements have 
very little likelihood of becoming potent enough to deliver real security for the 
majority.726 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to try and formulate exactly how this 
reality ought to be incorporated into SSR principles, and thus programming. 
However, the essential question ought to be whether funding and other resources 
directed towards state security institutions actually induce security benefits for 
ordinary people. If donors decide they are really most interested in providing security 
for ordinary citizens, as opposed to supporting partner state elites, they may need to 
consider re-orientating much of the SSR effort toward non-state security providers. 
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Moving through the already defined SSR principles, the first is that SSR should be 
people-centred and locally owned. If attention is redirected toward non-state security 
actors as perhaps an equal priority to state agencies, ‘people-centred’ SSR makes 
some sense. Yet none of the fifteen cases of army reconstruction examined in 
Chapters 4 and 5 could be deemed 'people-centred.' The priority was placed on state 
security concerns. Furthermore, the priority is likely to remain on state agencies for 
some considerable time, at the very least. As discussed in Chapter 5, the use of the 
term ‘people-centred’ is not fully appropriate for a process still centred upon the state 
and its security. This issue requires some deconstruction of the terms ‘people-centred 
security’ and ‘people-centred security sector reform.’ People-centred security is a 
laudable and entirely appropriate aim. A people centred security sector might be 
considered appropriate. Yet the formulation ‘people centred security sector reform’ is 
imprecise. SSR efforts will probably focus on state institutions for some time to come. 
In view of this situation, ‘people-centred SSR’ is terminologically inexact because of 
this focus upon the transformation of the state and its institutions. Inherently such a 
process cannot have people at its centre – their security is its object, but it is through a 
governmental construct. A focus on individuals’ freedom from fear, whether actually 
as individuals or as small groupings, some with vested interests, would divert 
attention from the improvement of structures to serve all. Such a focus on individuals 
might be a special danger when considering SSR in neo-patrimonial societies, a 
frequent occurrence. ‘People-centred’ could be used to justify the diversion of 
resources into special programmes for the benefit of any politically well-connected 
group.  
 
In thinking about an alternative it is important to remain as closely as possible to the 
original aim of people-centred security. The amendment suggested is thus that SSR 
should ‘foster a people-centred security ethos.’ Thus any pressure placed upon state 
decision-makers to alter programmes to support any special interest groups might be 
alleviated. At the other end of the spectrum, when trying to address non-state actors, 
changing the terminology from ‘people-centred’ to ‘people-centred security ethos’ 
would not dilute efforts for such communities. This terminology change might allow 
state-focused SSR efforts to be more precisely targeted with less risk for diversion of 
effort and funds in a neo-patrimonial governance environment. 
 
  
 
A much more difficult challenge is posed by the issue of local ownership, described 
by even the eminent SSR expert Eric Scheye as ‘maddeningly complex.’727 The 
difficulties of local ownership have been a continuing theme through this thesis. This 
author believes that only two cases of army reconstruction can really be considered 
‘locally owned’ – South Africa, and Nepal, where the indigenous authorities 
maintained clear control. In East Timor also, there was a significant amount of local 
ownership. Meaningful local ownership does not appear to have occurred in any of 
the other cases. Scheye suggests trying to improve this situation by addressing 
informal governance networks, mentioned above in the literature review but almost 
invariably discounted in favour of the ineffective formal structures. Mapping the 
networks of favours, power, patronage, and clientalism is critical to understanding and 
therefore potentially being able to change governance arrangements in developing 
countries. The necessity for such understanding is emphasized in Chapter 5 by the 
incomplete nature of the information on the Liberian Defense Ministry’s bureaucratic 
power. Hidden networks and interactions may be having a significant effect on the 
Liberian politics shaping the environment for the army reconstruction programme, 
however, it is not possible to say this with any certainty.  
 
Scheye laments the absence of pragmatic SSR guidance for the question of local 
ownership. The key factor here however is remembering what the goal of any 
particular programme is. The role of local ownership will depend on where the 
impetus for the programme originates. A donor may wish to strengthen some aspect 
of a partner state’s security structures so that, for example, its population in the 
metropole is not overwhelmed by large refugee flows. In this case, less local 
ownership and programmatic arrangements utilizing formal government structures 
may be appropriate in order to achieve the donor’s aims. The ‘local owner’ remains 
the formal, indigenous partner government. At the other end of the spectrum, DfID’s 
wish to support justice development in the Eastern Congo may be of interest.728 In this 
type of programme, there might be little direct donor interest. Thus the priority might 
be able to be formulated according to the wishes of the local community. The design 
of the programme might be formulated via not much more than a couple of 
anthropologist-specialists making local communities aware that funding is available. 
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If it were possible for the local communities to make as many of the programmatic 
decisions as the bureaucratic constraints in London (or Washington or Paris or 
wherever else) could possibly see devolved to the lowest level, a great degree of local 
ownership might be achieved. These two hypothetical examples rest at each end of the 
donor interest spectrum.  
 
Army reconstruction, however, is in many cases funded from Western donors and 
influenced by Western strategic desires. Therefore army reconstruction falls closer to 
the first scenario than to the second. The critical factor is how much control a donor is 
willing to surrender over its own funds in order to support a programme which might 
address real needs. This surrender of control necessitates that real needs can be 
identified and, more importantly, agreed upon, by local actors. Since most of the 
funding, however, usually is supplied by outside donors, donors do have the option to 
withhold funding if, in their opinion, a programme does not meet those real identified 
needs. The question of supplying funding for programmes that may not actually meet 
the exact needs of ordinary people is a matter for donor ministry decision makers with 
a single-minded focus on their own country’s strategic priorities. Arguably a clear 
example is Afghanistan, in Chapter 5: army reconstruction for Western security 
reasons (anti-terrorism), rather that ordinary people’s security. As Scheye rightly says, 
donor taxpayers are the ultimate local owners of donor supported programmes.729 One 
really should ask in making funding decisions whether Northern taxpayers’ interests 
are served. 
 
The next group of SSR principles is that of democratic norms, human rights principles 
and the rule of law. Donais contrasted two separate views in his 2008 edited volume 
on local ownership. On the one hand, Scheye said in 2008 that ‘the values embedded 
in many [SSR] programmes do not coincide with the predominant cultural norms of 
many post-conflict and fragile states.’730 Chapter 5 describes perhaps one of the 
clearest dilemmas, the army reconstruction programme in the Congo. The Congo’s 
ruling oligarchy may not wish to strengthen respect for human rights or support the 
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rule of law.731 However, Donais also notes that Hansen ‘is equally clear that in post-
conflict contexts at least, normative transformation is part and parcel of the SSR 
agenda.’732 Resistance to such normative transformation is part of the reason why 
army reconstruction in the Congo has made so little progress. In other army 
reconstruction cases, either there has been little motivation to implement such policies 
(such as in Zimbabwe) or little success has been achieved. Therefore Scheye argues 
that donors must look for opportunities to support constituencies in the partner state 
that would (a) benefit from donor supported SSR, (b) accord with donor values, and 
(c) accord with donor political aims.733 These are recommendations for situations in 
which donor wishes form the impetus. However there are SSR opportunities which 
originate in partner states from civil society or other actors. Where such programmes 
are possible in the face of state hostility or disinterest, the originators need to choose 
very carefully where to deploy their resources in a fashion that meets their aims. This 
may mean doing nothing more than is possible with their own resources, or choosing 
potential confrontation with the state by drawing upon friendly foreign resources. 
However, whatever the course of action, such actors can choose carefully to undertake 
activities that meet their definition of what type of democratic norms or human rights 
are appropriate for their people in their specific context.  
 
The ‘disaggregation’ approach propounded by Scheye involves selection of specific, 
achievable programmes. The disaggregation approach also makes clear the great 
difficulty of meaningfully addressing diverse security challenges through integrated 
policies. Surveying all the cases of army reconstruction, it appears that only Sierra 
Leone can be considered a clear case of a programme integrated into wider efforts. As 
noted above in the literature review, Scheye is frank on the limitations of partner 
country national frameworks and strategies. Despite the value of national security 
strategy reviews, Scheye notes such reviews and other similar frameworks require 
three to five years to draft, have exhibited little effect on improving justice and 
security delivery, and are rarely implemented or capable of being implemented.734 
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Scheye notes that comprehensive programmes are far too expensive (as the literature 
review reflects), operationally impractical, and prone to fomenting political conflicts 
between different partner national agency stakeholders. Sierra Leone is the best 
example of such a comprehensive approach being attempted which incorporates army 
reconstruction. It suffers from these difficulties to a significant degree. A better 
alternative may be to look for opportunities to intervene with a decisive amount of 
resources in sectors where donor and partner interests coincide. This may lead to a 
decrease in army reconstruction activities. However, the programmes that were 
implemented would receive much more local support and have greater chances of 
addressing more closely defined problems. 
 
Greater civilian involvement and oversight is the next SSR principle. Of the fifteen 
army reconstruction cases, only four appear to have clearly enhanced democratic 
civilian control: Namibia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
These are only four of the nine cases in the ‘military merger’ category. Therefore the 
overall indicator is mixed. In order to improve this situation, again, the overall aim 
must the guiding factor. If greater civilian oversight serves donors’ interests, this 
civilian involvement could be made a priority, at the expense of other principles. 
However, to take a real example, if it were decided that drug smuggling through 
Guinea-Bissau to Europe could be best countered by leaving the existing military 
domination of governance in place, civilian involvement would have a lower priority. 
It is hard to imagine such a situation, but placing the dilemma in such stark terms 
helps make it clear that here as in every programmatic case, the original aim should 
dictate adherence to any particular principle. In most cases, even if civilian 
involvement and oversight were not possible to prioritize at the outset, the potential 
would remain to expand such activities slowly as the programme unfolded. 
Transparency and accountability might also be a greater priority for some 
programmes than in others, depending on donor and partner priorities. Army 
reconstruction has usually been neither particularly transparent nor accountable. Only 
South Africa, Bosnia, and Kosovo are relatively clear exceptions. Finally, the level of 
attention to capacity enhancement, as opposed to other priorities, also needs to be 
balanced according to the aims of each individual programme. Capability 
enhancement has been successfully achieved in most cases, as it has been the 
historical priority. Yet capacity enhancement might be less important than making 
  
 
sure a programme is appropriately locally owned – in whatever sense that might be – 
or meets democratic norms or human rights principles. Small increases in capability, 
carefully coordinated, assuring respect of other SSR principles, appear among the best 
placed initiatives to be sustainable in the long run. 
 
Perhaps the clearest common threads in this proposed list of changes – and thus the 
best way of encapsulating some sort of new path – is by emphasizing realism and 
honesty. SSR as the OECD envisions it is enormously overambitious, and represents a 
Northern donor-based agenda. It is not practical to aim at the comprehensive 
refashioning of Southern states’ security arrangements in order that they mirror 
something akin to those of their Northern counterparts. Therefore prioritization is 
required. Specific projects will see better results than widespread, ineffective 
dispersion of funds. It is also important to remember that Northern funding aims, 
fundamentally, to forward the national interests of Northern states. Therefore it is only 
reasonable to expect some sort of return on the investment Northern countries make. 
Smaller – disaggregated – programmes that harness Northern funding in areas where 
there are common donor and partner actor interests appear more likely to be 
successful and sustainable.  
 
The difficulty with emphasizing realism and honesty is that any formal redrafting of 
the SSR principles may be exceedingly difficult. It appears very likely that the SSR 
principles assumed their current form in 2004 as a result of political compromise. As 
Chapters 5 and 6 have highlighted, the imprecise nature of the principles makes their 
application in the field difficult. It would be extremely helpful if a set of principles 
that embodied the new approach could be drafted and disseminated. Yet international 
organizations may find this very difficult, due again to the need to achieve consensus.  
 
Moving from the SSR principles to army reconstruction, one is forced to consider the 
possibility that post-conflict army reconstruction may not always be the best course of 
action. In many cases, the reconstruction of an army is not the most effective way of 
inducing security for development. Often it seems that armies are reconstructed for 
foreigners’ aims, and those of partner state elites, more than those of locals. Accepting 
the key assumption of this thesis that the aim is providing security for development, 
support for non-state security forces ought to be given much higher priority. Yet 
  
 
armies will continue to exist, and play a major role, because they are not often 
dissolved completely, and they are a symbol of statehood.  
 
Therefore the proper balance of support for state and non-state security forces appears 
to be a key part of the future research agenda. As the history of SSR efforts teaches 
us, there will be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ rule. However, if major donors are really 
interested in assuring security for people, as opposed to security for partner state 
elites, the present predominance of support to state agencies ought to change. Further 
research also ought to be initiated so as to explore some general parameters for how 
much donors should support non-state forces. This agenda would confront directly the 
support for the state, the custom of the last 65 years of development (and the last 15 
years of SSR). However it appears to be the only method by which security for 
development can be assured in anything but the very long term. 
 
A larger issue is whether principles are useful in themselves. One might question 
whether formulating principles to guide SSR is actually a useful exercise, based on 
the results of this research so far. It could be argued that trying to formulate universal 
guiding frameworks distracts effort from smaller-scale efforts to achieve concrete, 
measurable tasks. Yet it is this author's considered view that principles, in this case, 
can be effectively considered analogous to theory. Both research and practical 
endeavour requires a theoretical framework, even if only a very simple one. The 
human mind uses a set of preconceptions – theory - in order to better understand and 
interact with the world. The more sophisticated a deliberately created theoretical 
framework, the better it approximates reality, and thus the better it may predict events. 
Therefore it is useful to formulate theoretical precepts in order to guide academic and 
more practical efforts. Initial theoretical formulations may not be very accurate. 
Criticism hones and refines such formulations, hopefully building toward more 
precise models.  
 
To move from generalization to this specific case, one would argue that the SSR 
principles as defined by the OECD in 2004 represent a useful initial formulation. Yet 
this and other research demonstrates that they have weaknesses, and thus they need to 
be revised and updated. With such revision, they will be made more useful and more 
representative. Such revisions in turn may be superseded by still further re-
  
 
formulization. Yet the creation of principles in themselves is a useful, and indeed 
necessary endeavour should one wish to better understand the world. 
 
 Recommendations 
In many cases, recommendations would begin with verifying the results of the 
doctoral thesis research. Yet the material surveyed in the literature review, backed 
with the desk and field case research, indicates that the problems uncovered with the 
SSR principles are well-founded. In effect, this thesis has only been an exercise in 
confirming what is already well known, by study of a new field case. Therefore, 
recommendations commence with policy reformulation efforts.  
In the short to medium term, major Western donor nations should reassess whether 
their SSR efforts are actually better described as part of foreign aid efforts intended to 
support developing state governments – which are a worthy goal. This is because 
many such programmes do not actually display some of the major principles of SSR. 
Such programmes may be very worthy of continuance, but should not be designated 
SSR as they divert resources from programmes that are actually SSR, and cloud 
perceptions of the practice. Others will be vulnerable to a range of the problems 
mentioned above, and should be reviewed with a view to termination. This applies 
especially to 'holistic' all-embracing programmes that are simply impractical due to 
ever-present interagency tensions, and others that do not exhibit enough local 
ownership to be successful.  
Some programme will actually fall into the category of ventures can that truly be 
considered SSR. Given the problems in the practice surveyed above and in the 
literature review, most should be rigourously reviewed to ensure that they are actually 
advancing the security situation in the host countries. Most should be refashioned to 
make sure they are operating in discrete enough sectors to make success achievable, 
instead of aiming at holism.  
Finally as always in the social sciences, there is a 'opt-out' from such a searching 
reexamination. It may forward governments' agendas to propose and even implement 
programmes that are designated SSR without actually displaying its characteristics. 
This appears especially true of many post-conflict army reconstruction programmes. 
In considering these challenges, one must always first and foremost be cognizant of 
  
 
the original aim. In some cases such action is justified, but should be carefully 
weighed against the potential damage to the overall, very useful, concept. 
In the medium to long term, once national governments and other significant actors 
have reconsidered their positions, the international consensus on what SSR is and 
does could be reassessed. Changes made at the national level could be placed upon 
the OECD's agenda, especially those focusing on disaggregated programmes rather 
than holistic all-embracing efforts. Reformulating high-level guidance and, hopefully, 
the SSR principles themselves will present difficulties, but the OECD is probably the 
best organization to steer the process. This would build upon its previous efforts in the 
area.   
 
  
 
 
 
 Annex A: Model Army Reconstruction Framework 
 
The challenge that initially stimulated this dissertation was the inadequacy of existing 
macro-strategic guidance for army reconstruction programmes in the face of 
immediate post-conflict environments. This inadequacy suggested the need for 
amended guidance, which was the main aim of the research during the second and 
third years. Following the viva, the direction of the thesis was altered. This author 
feels however that since a post-conflict army reconstruction framework has been 
constructed, it should be included as part of the final version so that it might be 
available for future scholarly use. 
 
At the grand strategic level, the SSR principles lay out an effective set of criteria by 
which the army reconstruction process should be evaluated. However, they do not 
constitute an army reconstruction framework in of themselves.  Post-conflict army 
reconstruction is a unique area, both in terms of the short-term stabilization 
imperatives present and of the potential scale of programmes. It can have very 
significant impact on other areas of national security and development programming. 
Thus such a framework could also include broader implications for specific 
institutional engagement.   
 
A well considered framework which could inform a wider set of post-conflict SSR 
programmes, linked to generic guidance for post conflict armies, would advance 
intellectual thinking in this area. This section lays out such a framework on the basis 
of the research throughout this dissertation, and especially from the practical lessons 
of the desk and field case studies. Each country or region in which army 
reconstruction or wider defence sector reform is carried out is unique, and needs to 
have a reconstruction plan specifically formulated for its own conditions. Therefore 
the ideas below cannot be rigid rules. They are, as the British Army says of doctrine, 
‘the basis for study, training, and informed discussion.’735  
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Previously there was no specific literature giving guidance for the army 
reconstruction aspect of defence sector reform. The OECD Handbook on SSR 
guidance on defence reform is very general and does not provide specific 
prescriptions for post-conflict army reconstruction. The British and U.S. manuals, on 
the other hand, arguably do not integrate their tactical prescriptions adequately into an 
operational or strategic level framework. In addition, the thoroughly political nature 
of the army reconstruction process is not adequately emphasized, nor the continuing 
political engagement necessary at a national level reflected. Other writers, such as 
Boucher, and Burgess, do not provide an overall framework within which post-
conflict army reconstruction might take place. To alleviate these literature gaps, the 
research contained in this dissertation forms the basis for specific guidance on armies, 
in the highly complex task of their own post-conflict reconstruction. The model below 
bridges the higher-level considerations, which always need to be informed by the 
unique characteristics of the country or region, with conclusions informed by the 
country case studies.  
 
Three key concepts - political-economic factors, capacity enhancement, and the SSR 
principles – were formulated in the literature review conclusions. These three key 
concepts aim to represent the most important influences upon post-conflict army 
reconstruction. This author believes that these three key concepts are extremely 
important in formulating a revised normative framework for the practice. 
 
The first key concept is political-economic factors. Armies are political instruments of 
state policy, and are affected by political factors in both the domestic and international 
arenas. All armies, and national defence forces, are influenced by what economic 
resources can be provided. Together the term ‘political-economic factors’ 
incorporates these influences. Chapters 4 and 5 presented a number of important 
examples which show how these influences work in practice. The end of the Cold 
War radically changed the world’s political landscape, and effectively made possible 
reconstruction of armies on a much greater scale than before. The first three army 
reconstruction programmes in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique can be used to 
sketch how the interplay of the three key concepts worked in practice. These initial 
  
 
first three army reconstruction efforts in were affected much more by political-
economic factors within the countries and the wider region than any other factors.  
 
The Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique cases demonstrate the key political 
requirement to create state armies, and wider armed forces, responsive to a new 
government. Such new state armies were seen as important in making sure the 
countries were stable, and thus enabling wider regional stability. These developing 
countries were, however, poorly situated economically, and the state’s resources were 
frequently diverted through neo-patrimonal clientist networks. Diversion of state 
resources reduced monies available for public spending, including for security 
agencies, and corroded expectations about integrity in public life. 
 
Capability enhancement is the second of the three key concepts. International and 
local actors alike, it appears, were keen to create army capability in order to ensure 
domestic and regional stability. The deputy commander of the BMATT in Zimbabwe 
in 1980 said he received information on which ZANLA guerrillas should be made 
senior officers from the Chinese ambassador, because ‘it was in their [the Chinese] 
policy interests to keep a stable southern Africa.’736 In Zimbabwe the British trainers 
sought to create an accountable army. Yet it appears that creating capable armies that 
would respond to their political leaders’ directions was seen as most important. In 
order for that to happen other considerations appear to have been given a lower 
priority. Emphasis seems to have been placed on a functioning, loyal, army, rather 
than governance concerns.   
 
The major change from the Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique cases and the 
other cases which followed them from 1994 onwards was the steadily increasing 
salience of governance concerns. In the post Cold War environment, major powers 
were much more able to emphasize considerations of human rights, democratic 
norms, the rule of law, greater civilian involvement, and accountability. Instead of 
hampering their ability to bolster friendly regimes, such governance considerations, 
and others, could be emphasized, so that ordinary citizens might be better treated.  
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From 1998, after Claire Short’s speech which began to popularize the term security 
sector reform, such considerations gradually coalesced into the OECD SSR principles.  
 
These three key concepts are general formulizations of the influences affecting army 
reconstruction. Yet together they also have a direct relationship with the three major 
stages which appear to encapsulate the army reconstruction process. Host country 
political-economic factors directly inform assessment of a country’s defence 
challenges and the design of an army reconstruction programme. Political-economic 
factors dictate what resources are available to be utilized. In Zimbabwe and 
elsewhere, the economic necessity to provide gainful employment for former 
combatants affected the size of the army. In Namibia, as well as in South Africa, the 
political imperative of reconciliation dictated that personnel for the new force be 
found from both preceding armed forces.  A country’s politics influences the choice 
of potential international partners and the overall configuration of the rebuilt armed 
forces. For example, existing Commonwealth ties influenced the selection of the 
British Army as the chosen interlocutor in Zimbabwe and South Africa. A country’s 
economic resources affect what can be spent on the armed forces. In Zimbabwe, due 
to the need to constructively occupy former combatants, an army the country could 
not afford was created.737 
 
The historical priority of capability enhancement directly affects the mechanics of the 
army reconstruction programme. Influential agencies or personalities have often been 
focused on the need to create capable forces, and less upon how they will be held 
accountable.738 Examples abound, but perhaps the clearest cases have been in 
Zimbabwe, the Congo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In each the overriding concern was 
creating security forces to enforce a nascent government's writ, and abuses of power 
and of governance have been the result. Elsewhere, though the security situation has 
induced less pressure to create capability quickly at the expense of other concerns, 
capability enhancement has remained of vital concern.  
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However, the most important component of the model is the preparatory 
considerations affecting the entire effort. These preparatory considerations are 
affected by the SSR principles. This is because the key tenets of the peace accord 
almost invariably incorporate many of the same normative aspirations included within 
the SSR principles. For example, Liberia's 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
preamble said that the reconstruction process was to be guided by ‘principles of 
democratic practice, good governance and respect for the rule of law.’739 Both 
democratic norms and the rule of law are written into the SSR principles. Both SSR 
principles and the normative aspirations relating to democratic development 
embodied in many peace accords stem from the same background of Western liberal 
aspirations formalized in the international arena through such documents as the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Chapter 4 cites two factors which affect 
preparatory considerations: political agreement, invariably along democratic lines, 
and the value of reconciliation policies. Before the formulation of the term ‘security 
sector reform,’ these two factors were best grouped with political-economic factors, 
and they are grouped thus in Chapter 4. Yet they can also form part of sound 
preparations for an army reconstruction programme to take place. 
 
Other normative aspirations, such as holistic integration of development and security 
programming, also feed into preparatory considerations for army reconstruction. For 
example, the Liberian Poverty Reduction Strategy has four pillars – peace and 
security, economic revitalization, governance and the rule of law, and infrastructure 
and social services.740 In additions, the democratic right of citizens to discuss 
important national issues supports the requirement for as wide a debate as possible on 
security and defence issues. 
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Figure 1 Time Progression Diagram for Army Reconstruction 
 
Figure 1 above depicts this interrelationship in graphical form. In order to gain the 
proper perspective, attention should first be directed at the ‘Year = 1980s-1990s’ end 
of the three circular ‘tubes’. These three ‘tubes’ represent the key concepts 
influencing army reconstruction: political-economic factors, the historical imperative 
of capability enhancement, and the SSR principles. As the progression of time 
advances ‘forward’ towards the viewer, years ‘pass.’ Each of the three continuing 
influences affects a separate component of the overall army reconstruction model. 
When the progression of time reaches 2011, it is clear that each key concept has a 
significant effect on a particular counterpart portion of the model. 
 
The model shown in Figure 2 begins with the above-mentioned preparatory 
considerations at the nation-state level. The OECD Handbook provides good guidance 
on higher level policy concerns and prerequisites to begin an army reconstruction 
programme. After such higher level considerations are addressed, assessment of the 
situation must be partnered by the design of an appropriate reconstruction programme. 
  
 
The OECD Handbook also provides good guidance in this area. Thereafter the stage is 
set for the commencement of the reconstruction programme itself, for which the 
recently released British and U.S. manuals provide guidance. These three areas form 
the foundations on which the model is based. 
 
The model is in the form of an equilateral triangle, with preparatory considerations, 
including the vital national security and defence debate, at the apex. From the 
preparatory considerations, two streams of activity proceed: immediate actions on 
constructing interim security forces, represented by the line directly to the army 
reconstruction process, and formulation of a more considered longer-term plan, 
represented by the line to the assessment and design process. Each part of the process 
involves a number of issues which will be commented upon in turn. 
 
There is one key factor that does not form part of the army reconstruction process but 
is nevertheless embedded in the model. This is the pervasive presence of non-state 
security actors, represented across the whole of the conflict-afflicted state's political 
space. This presence is represented in the model by the large grey circle upon which 
the stages of the army reconstruction process are superimposed. The non-state 
security actors are the primary providers of security to ordinary citizens so that those 
citizens are able to carry out development activities. Their status as primary providers 
of security tends to be constant during periods of relative calm, armed conflict, during 
periods of negotiation, during the arrival of an international intervention force, during 
the period of that force’s stay, and after it leaves. Non-state security providers, as 
shown in the literature review, also penetrate state security agencies, informalizing 
them in a number of ways. Without a radical transformation of developing states, non-
state security providers also appear set to retain their primary position for the 
foreseeable future. This is why, as explained below, part of the future research agenda 
should be the proper balance of support between state agencies, who tend to receive 
most SSR support, and the non-state actors that actually provide most of the security. 
 
The model is actually more dynamic than a first glance might indicate. Depending on 
the nature of the transitional state, entry points to begin army reconstruction may 
present themselves in any one of the three corners of the triangle. This is often the 
case when ‘trial and error’ and ‘project-based’ approaches are taken, particularly in 
  
 
such unstable environments.  Yet the beauty of the model is that it integrates such 
disparate starting points into a broader narrative which clearly shows the intended 
strategic direction. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Army Reconstruction Framework  
 
 Preparatory Considerations 
With these essential precepts clarified, the active aspects of the post-conflict army 
reconstruction model can be explained. At the stage of preparatory considerations, 
there are four issues upon which consideration is vital before the process gets 
underway. These are the peace accord, which forms the starting point for the entire 
state reconstruction process, the necessity to create a viable future for existing armed 
factions, a national security and defence debate, and integration of SSR programmes 
into wider reconstruction. 
 
  
 
The first issue is the necessity for an agreed peace settlement. If at all possible, the 
settlement needs to be widely respected by all the major political factions. The peace 
settlement forms the starting point for the entire post-conflict reconstruction process, 
including defence and security issues.  
 
 
Figure 3: Preparatory Considerations 
The second issue is the necessity to create a viable future for existing armed factions. 
There is never a blank slate for institutional reconstruction in a post-conflict 
environment. There are always pre-existing forces that need to have their future 
determined in some fashion. In the Congo there were at least nine separate major 
groups. There are several options available to provide such a viable future for former 
warring factions. These options include eliminating then through the DDR process, 
bringing groupings within the political process, or possibly suppressing them by 
force. Once some sort of overall framework for their future is established, individual 
fighters or groupings may be able to be included within either a ‘military merger’ or 
new single state force creation. 
 
The third issue is the need for some type of public debate on the future size, shape, 
and missions of the defence force.  Since the pioneering South African debate over 
defence in the mid 1990s, opening a space for debate has been a feature of reviews in 
Uganda in 2002-2004, and in Kosovo in 2006.741 This type of approach was then 
endorsed by the OECD-DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform in 2007. The 
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South African example shows how such a debate can promote extremely helpful 
stakeholder consensus.742 It should take place even if dominated by political power-
brokers and other vested interests. It is important that a wide consultation process is 
undertaken, even if its bounds are artificially constrained by the country’s political 
terrain, the population’s higher priorities (bread on the table as opposed to abstract 
debate on security) and literacy limitations.743  
 
The debate may conclude that armed forces are not necessary,744 and police or border 
guards can fulfill all required missions. If armed forces are required, the balance 
between regular and reserve forces, or even the use of a reserve force only,745 should 
be carefully considered. Armies in post-conflict environments tend to suffer from lack 
of a clear role.746 In many parts of Africa, for example, there is little need to defend 
against aggrandizement aimed at annexing portions of a state’s territory.747 This is 
because OAU conventions agreed to respect colonial era boundaries. If armed forces 
are the appropriate response, the debate needs to produce a clear, widely agreed, and 
correct mission and sets of tasks for them.    
 
Considerable discussion has taken place on the merits of a reconstruction or 
development role for armies in developing countries and conflict-afflicted situations.  
As noted in the literature review, several African countries have considered 
development focused armies. Western thinking does not support armies tasked to 
undertake development instead of a primarily combat role. The particular political set 
of circumstances that gave birth to the Kosovo Security Force may allow a trial of an 
army not fully focused on military duties. This situation should be monitored so as to 
elicit lessons that can be identified for other contexts. There may also be another 
middle way. Pioneers, in the British Commonwealth military tradition, are infantry 
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troops skilled in engineer tasks. They are not heavily equipped and their initially 
manoeuvre warfare role was to provide engineer support on the battlefield when 
specialist engineers were not available.. Such troops might be an option to 
accommodate developing nations’ wish for a development-focused force with a 
Western emphasis on combat capability. 
 
The fourth issue is the integration of army reconstruction not just into a broader SSR 
programme, but within civil institutional redevelopment of a wider nature still. If 
post-conflict reconstruction is properly managed and resourced, each governmental 
agency, by properly serving citizens within their ambit, will assist other agencies to 
more smoothly carry out their mission. Competition between agencies should be 
avoided if possible.  
 
From the preparatory considerations, two streams of work may unfold. Their 
existence and priority depends upon the security situation in the area of operations. If 
the international intervention force needs local supplementation to guarantee 
dominance of the security space (as in Iraq), interim auxiliary security forces may 
have to be created relatively quickly. This is the direction represented by the right-
side arrow in the model, directly to the army reconstruction process itself. If the 
intervention force is sufficiently capable to assure security while an army is 
reconstructed more slowly (as in Liberia), a more considered assessment and design 
phase may be possible. This is the direction shown in the left-side arrow, leading to 
assessment and design first, before the reconstruction of an army designed for 
permanence. Each alternative will be considered in turn. 
 
The first possible alternative is a need for additional security forces to support the 
intervention force. If the central government is still being rebuilt, then the army (or 
other warring factions) may be unusable and little further input from the centre may 
be available. Therefore, to provide interim security for development, supplementary 
security forces may have to be created at the regional or local levels. In past 
operations, these have taken the form of the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps, and tribal 
  
 
forces along the lines of ‘One Tribe at a Time.’748 As Bruce Baker describes in the 
context of Sierra Leone, these forces, which might include contractors, must enforce 
state law, not just local codes of behaviour.749 Activities to strength such forces may 
involve a significant amount of ‘train-and-equip’ type support. Emphasis on training 
and equipping at the expense of governance in these situations is almost inevitable. 
This is regrettable but is likely to be forced by the imperatives of short-term 
stabilization. 
 
Steps must be taken to make sure these local forces will be able to be disbanded when 
they are of no further use, or incorporated into the state administrative apparatus. In 
the case of Afghanistan, David Kilcullen describes the process of raising local police 
as part of a road-building project in Kunar Province in The Accidental Guerrilla. 
After a year of service, the local police could join the Afghan National Police.750 
However, disbandment of forces must be carefully handled in order to ensure 
demobilized youths are found some type of constructive occupation. Otherwise they 
may drift back into destabilizing activities. 
 
 Assessment and Design Phase 
Once interim security arrangements are firmly in place, possibly including the support 
of local auxiliaries to the international force, assessment and design for a permanent 
army can begin. There are three important characteristics for the assessment and 
programme design phase. The external advisors and designers involved in the army 
reconstruction design need to have a clear understanding of the local environment. 
They need to be aware of the political limitations that each of the local actors operate 
under (and their own). If it is possible to reach the level of anthropological ‘thick 
description,’ in accordance with Geertz’s guidelines, this is even better still.751 
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Figure 4: Assessment and Design Phase 
 
Second, on the basis of the nationwide debate on defence and security, there needs to 
be a free and open discussion between the local army process designers and the 
external designers involved. The discussions between the two successive Liberian 
Defence Ministers and the DynCorp contractors who formulated the force design for 
Liberia in 2004-5 represent such a process in its basic form. A discussion which was 
less constrained – possibly with greater vision and imagination from the hosts - would 
have produced a more sustainable consensus. Options and constraints need to be fully 
discussed, so that a shared understanding of potential paths ahead is created.  
 
Third, on the basis of the national debate and collaboration between local and external 
designers, a comprehensive army reconstruction programme needs to be formulated in 
as much detail as is possible at the outset. The programme must be created within the 
framework of a comprehensive defence policy and reconstruction programme. This 
programme should be realistic and agreed to by all involved donors/outside designers 
and stakeholders. Army reconstruction activities that will absorb significant 
government resources need to be sequenced carefully with other government and 
international actions.  
 
  
 
 Army Reconstruction Process 
There are a number of recurring trends applicable to the army reconstruction process 
itself. The key requirement is an integrated approach to each formation and unit level 
of the army being rebuilt. The task can be split into individual and corporate capacity 
building, and what advisory activities need to supplement capacity building.752 There 
will be different training and advisory needs at each level of the hierarchy. However, 
if the present heavy use of advisors is to reach its full potential, Western army advisor 
service will need equal worth with combat service when officers are considered for 
promotion. For decades a critical step for officers has been battalion command. It is in 
combat command of one’s own country’s troops that reputations have been forged. 
Yet if command of a brigade advisory team in Iraq or Afghanistan does not afford the 
same chance of promotion, officers with substantial knowledge and experience in 
mentoring foreign security forces may not be promoted.  
 
The critical requirement is to adjust the British and United States’ armies corporate 
outlook so as to position those armies to effectively advise the development of 
indigenous security forces. This adjustment in corporate outlook appears to require 
officers in senior positions with previous advisory experience, so as to influence the 
evolution of internal military culture. Yet if officers who have had combat command 
continue to enjoy precedence for promotion over those who have had advisory 
service, the required military cultural change may not eventuate. 
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Figure 5: Army Reconstruction Phase 
 
At the apex of the institutional structure, there will be a need for training and advice 
for the national security integrating apparatus. Below, the same will apply at Ministry 
of Defence level, Army headquarters, army formations, and units and subunits. The 
concentration of effort, experience seems to indicate, should be at the upper levels.753 
Training competencies will need to be nurtured at all levels of the hierarchy. A group 
of reform-minded senior officers is extremely valuable in implementing change and 
then ensuring it is not rolled back.  
 
The Ministry of Defence will have to consider and integrate the requirements of the 
separate armed services, including the gendarmerie in some cases. The Army 
headquarters will have to assure the logistical support for the force, and assure that the 
army is properly trained to carry out logistics support. This is a critical area of 
operational capability, more important, in some cases, that combat support forces such 
as artillery or engineers. This applies doubly when a force is being transformed from a 
guerrilla into an institutionalized army.  
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Also important to inculcate are routine management skills which may not have been 
emphasized beforehand: meeting management, running of schedules, and other such 
duties. Army headquarters will also have to manage development of locally 
appropriate doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. In adopting foreign doctrine, 
care should be taken if at all possible to avoid the use of conflicting foreign models. 
Zimbabwe shows the difficulty of applying differing systems (British and North 
Korean) in the same army. These models should be not be overcomplicated; British 
Army experience in Iraq demonstrates that it is unreasonable to expect wholesale 
adoption of doctrine.754 
 
At the formation and training units’ level, Southern African experience shows the 
need to set realistic, rather than unobtainable, transition goals. The army itself when 
being reconstructed should be designed to be all-inclusive, to avoid factional 
dissatisfaction. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated the 
need for a carefully thought balance between quality and quantity of new soldiers. In 
general, as recommended in British Army doctrine, quality should be sought at the 
expense of quantity.755 This is because retraining and other remedial actions will be 
necessary after the end of the planned preparation programme, if units are not of 
sufficient standard. Yet in certain circumstances the need may be to thicken security 
force coverage in any particular area, for which lesser trained personnel may be 
adequate. In Iraq in 2007-08, the U.S. commander responsible for training was aiming 
for a ‘sufficient quantity of sufficiently capable’ troops.756  
 
Conclusions 
The suggested course of action embodied in the model and the above points for 
consideration are based upon lessons identified from the case studies. Together they 
represent an ideal process which has internalized the lessons drawn from the case 
study research. However, due to national political priorities and inertia, such changes 
are unlikely to happen in full. Local ownership is perhaps the most significant 
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problem not just for army reconstruction but for the whole of defence sector reform. 
Yet increasing local ownership faces significant obstacles to effective 
implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Annex B: Key Interviewees 
 
Higher Defence Processes 
Former Head of State (Gyude Bryant, Transitional Chairman) 
National Security Advisor, Liberia 
UNMIL SSR Advisors (former and serving) 
Heads of Civil Society organisations 
Staff at Governance Commission who drafted the National Security Strategy 
Senators and Congressmen 
U.S. State Department staff 
U.S. Agency for International Development staff 
Political Counsellor, Embassy of the United States 
British Political Counsellor attached to Embassy of the United States 
University of Liberia academic staff 
Pillar Technical Advisory staff, Ministry of Planning 
ECOWAS and African Union office political affairs officers 
Acting Minister, Ministry for National Security 
Reconstruction of the Army 
Deputy Ministers, Ministry of National Defence, Liberia (former and serving) 
Command Officer in Charge, Armed Forces of Liberia 
Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces of Liberia 
Senior Military Advisor, Ministry of National Defence  
Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy (former and serving) 
Chiefs, PAE and DynCorp Armed Forces of Liberia task order (former and serving) 
British and Swedish advisors to the Ministry of National Defense 
Former chief, U.S. Military Mission, Liberia 
Other DynCorp and PAE personnel 
Defense Attache, Embassy of the United States 
Assistant Defense Attache, Embassy of the United States 
U.S. Department of Defence and Department of State personnel 
United Nations staff (UNMIL and UNDP Liberia) 
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